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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the long incumbency of Clyde Carr, Labour MP for Timaru between 1928 
and 1962. Before entering politics, Carr was a minister in the Methodist and Congregationalist 
Churches, a journalist, an editor, a poet and a radio announcer. He served on the Christchurch City 
Council from 1922 to 1928. Carr's career is unique in New Zealand parliamentary history as the 
longest term by a backbench MP in a provincial town seat. 
Two approaches are taken to explain Carr's incumbency. Firstly, the historical and social nature 
of the Timaru electorate is described and compared with nine other provincial town electorates. 
Timaru was characterised by slow population growth and high levels of union is at ion in the period, 
and both these factors were statistically associated with a high Labour vote in provincial town 
electorates. The high level of residential segregation in Timaru may also have acted to consolidate 
Labour support there. 
Secondly, Carr's behaviour at his eleven successful election campaigns in the seat is described. 
Carr's idiosyncratic political style and personal charisma were instrumental in his success in 
holding the seat, especially at elections where the country as a whole swung away from Labour. 
Six themes characterise Carr's political thought and behaviour: diligent constituency work, a 
natural ability to communicate in a wide range of contexts, innovative and active campaigning at 
elections, a "common touch", frequent involvement in controversy of one kind or another, and 
good fortune. 
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1. Introduction 
In those days, the ferry's arrival times in Lyttelton varied a bit with wind and tides during 
the voyage. The train to Christchurch - a lot of very elderly carriages - departed when all 
passengers came off the ship at times that therefore varied a bit. But there was always 
plenty of time in Christchurch for breakfast in the refreshment room on the platform before 
the express left for the south. Timaru, Oamaru, Dunedin and Invercargill all had Labour 
MPs for varying periods of Clyde's time in Timaru. 
After 1949, some who had been ministers knew the manager of the refreshment rooms, 
and struck a special deal with him for a full breakfast on Saturday morning at a giveaway 
price. All MPs were brought to share in this largesse - except Clyde Carr. He had always 
boasted of a deal he had with the train guards in their off duty room that had a good fire 
during the cold winter mornings that prevailed when MPs were going to Wellington. Clyde 
would continue his Bellamy'S pattern of helping himself to extra bread or scones on the 
ferry - and toast these on a fork over the coal-coke brazier. 
His 'pals and colleagues' never told him of the cheap/free deal in the refreshment rooms, 
letting him scuttle off down to the end of the platform with the guards every Saturday. I 
think that tells something of a relationship that would not produce votes in a cabinet 
selection. 
- Robert Tizard, former Labour cabinet minister' 
By no means a household name on New Zealand's political landscape, Clyde Carr was Labour MP 
for Timaru from 192~ to 1962. He moved to Timaru just before the 1928 election, campaigned 
hard and, against all expectations, defeated the incumbent MP, Francis Rolleston. Carr went on to 
win a total of eleven elections in Timaru, retiring in 1962. The short anecdote quoted above is 
indicative of a number of key aspects of Carr's career and personality. Most obviously, it portrays 
Carr as an outsider within the parliamentary Labour Party. It also portrays Carr as an eccentric and 
a penny pincher, and gives some idea of the considerable demands placed on MPs in the age 
'RobeliTizard to Colin Brown, 16 February 1996. 
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before air travel became commonplace. Most significantly, however, it describes a parliamentarian 
and a man who was as comfortable toasting scones over a coal fire with train guards as 
breakfasting with his fellow MPs. Carr's greatest political talent was his ability to relate personally 
with electors from all walks of life. A large part of his personal' appeal came from his natural 
ability to meet people at their own level, and discuss matters relevant to them in their own terms. 
His highest priority as a politician was always to represent the views and interests of his 
constituents, even when doing so put him at odds with his own party. He was rewarded for his 
work with a remarkable political loyalty on the part of the voters of Timaru, who consistently 
returned him across a thirty-four year period. 
Prior to entering parliament, Carr had a varied career, working as a bank clerk, a minister of 
religion, an editor, a radio presenter and a Christchurch City Councillor. His parliamentary and 
campaign speeches betrayed a man with a deep love for language and literature. He won the 
Macmillan Brown Prize for literature in 1926, published a volume of poetry in 1944, and was a 
voracious reader. Like his one-time friend and associate John A. Lee, Carr was an iconoclast. His 
interests and activities ranged from religion to radical politics to arcane economic theory to 
humanitarian internationalism to classical literature to the emerging world of broadcast media. 
Purpose and structure of thesis 
This thesis aims to explain Carr's long incumbency in Timaru. The investigation began as a 
biographical investigation into the eventful and sometimes controversial life of this fascinating 
man. However, a simple biographical narrative, while essential, is not sufficient to explain Carr's 
success. An individual's character, opinions and beliefs, career prospects and choices, professional 
failures and successes, are all influenced by the society in which they live. In a fundamental way, 
the possibilities of an individual's life are limited by their social context. Therefore, historical 
biography should describe the political and social context inhabited by its subject. With this in 
mind, the thesis moved away from being a biography of a man per se, to being a historical account 
of the long and faithful relationship between an MP and his electorate. 
The philosophical issue of the relative importance of individual agency versus social structure in 
historical explanation is highly complex but central to all historical inquiry. Keith Sinclair has 
argued that "the 'life and times' is bastard form of literature" because "history aspires to be social 
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science; biography aspires to be literature.,,2 According to this rationale, this thesis aspires to be a 
"bastard fonn", as it attempts to integrate truly diverse modes of inquiry and source material. It 
utilises both mass quantification and intimate character study, but places itself emphatically on the 
social science side of Sinclair's social science-literahlre dichotomy .. 
This "bastard" approach allows a multi-faceted explanation of Carr's incumbency. Statistical 
material is used to explain the forces that shaped his political career, whether or not he was 
conscious of them at the time. Sinclair's objection to including social context in biography is that it 
can weigh down a biographical narrative with unnecessary infonnation. However, to try to 
completely separate the life of an individual from its context is as misguided as to pad out a 
biographical account with tonnes of irrelevant detail. This thesis attempts to blend the personal and 
the structural by providing a focused analysis of those social factors likely to affect the Labour 
vote in the Timaru electorate. 
A secondary reason for adopting this dual approach to researching Carr's life was a pragmatic 
one. There is an absence of key source material on Carr's personal and political life. None of his 
correspondence, personal papers, journals or other personal writing survives, if indeed it was ever 
produced. Equally disappointingly, the minute books of the Timaru Labour Party branches and 
Labour Representation Committee are not available.3 By contrast, there is a great amount of 
statistical data available for the period. Much of this material is collated in the census and 
aggregated by urban area or borough, mak;ing it relatively simple to collect data not only on 
Timaru, but for all the ten provincial town electorates referred to in the thesis. 
The electors of Timaru proved to be remarkably faithful to Carr, and the record shows that he 
was diligent in his work on their behalf. Many commentators retrospectively explained Carr's hold 
on the seat with glibly circular logic, claiming that Carr was able to hold the seat for so long 
because it was a safe Labour seat. This thesis aims to ascertain to what extent Timaru was 
inherently a "Labour seat", and what role Carr's distinctive personal and political style had to play 
in his electoral success. 
After providing an outline of the structure of the thesis, the rest of the introductory chapter will 
seek to establish the uniqueness of Carr's parliamentary career in the history of twentieth century 
2 Keith Sinclair, "Political Biography in New Zealand," in Biography in New Zealand, ed. Jock Phillips 
(Wellington: Stout Research Centre, 1985), pp. 32-33. 
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New Zealand politics by comparing Carr's career with those of other long-serving MPs. The 
second chapter of the thesis builds a biographical picture of Carr's life prior to entering politics, 
focusing on his childhood, education and work prior to entering parliament in 1928. It describes 
his constant brushes with authority and his increasing interest and involvement in labour politics. 
Chapter three aims to describe the historical, social and demographic context of Carr's 
incumbency. It begins by giving a background on the twentieth century history of the Timaru 
electorate, focusing on its industrial and economic development, and the growth of the labour 
movement there. Next, the chapter describes the electoral geography of Timaru across Carr's 
period. Lastly, a range of demographic variables are compared with the Labour vote in ten 
provincial town electorates across the period of Carr's career. The aim of this comparative analysis 
is to evaluate the extent to which the demographic profile of Timaru indicated that it would vote 
Labour. The gap between Timaru's inherent propensity for Labour-voting and the level of support 
that Carr actually received was the measure of his personal and political appeal to his electors. 
Chapters four and five describe in some detail Carr's political career. These chapters are divided 
into sections corresponding to each of Carr's election campaigns and various other political and 
biographical themes. The concluding chapter outlines the political science literature on the issue of 
incumbency, and assesses the relevance of this literature to Carr's career. Finally, six themes in 
Carr's life and work are identified. These themes are meant to bring coherence to the diverse 
strains of Carr's career, and contribute to an explanation of his incumbency. 
How was Carr's career unique? 
Carr's importance to national affairs was marginal at best. His career is interesting because of the 
peculiarity of his incumbency: Carr was a backbench MP who held a seat that was neither safely 
Labour nor safely National. In the context of twentieth century New Zealand parliamentary 
careers, this was unique. Table 1.1 lists all MPs who served careers of thirty years or more in the 
New Zealand parliament, not including MPs who first entered the house before 1900, nor MPs 
who were still sitting in 1984. 
3 Unfortunately, the minute books of the Titnaru branch of the Labour Patiy are missing. However, Michael 
Bassett has kindly allowed use of his own notes taken from the Timaru Branch minutes in the 1960s. 
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Table 1.1: Long-serving MPs in New Zealand Parliament4 
Name Party(ies) Electorate(s) Term(s) Total Highest 
length of political 
term(s) office 
Atmore, Harry Liberal, Nelson 1911-1914, 30 Cabinet 
Independent 1919-1946 Minister 
Carr, Clyde Labour Timaru 1928-1962 34 
Coates, Joseph Reform, Kaipara 1911-1943 32 Prime 
National Minister 
Field, William Reform Otaki 1900-1911, 32 
1914-1935 
Forbes, George Liberal, Hurunui 1908-1943 32 Prime 
United Minister 
Fraser, Peter Labour Wellington 1918-1950 32 Prime 
Central, Minister 
Brooklyn 
Freer, Warren Labour Mt Albert 1947-1981 34 Cabinet 
Minister 
Holyoake, Reform, Motueka, 1932-1938, 40 Prime 
Keith National Pahiatua 1943-1977 Minister 
Macfarlane, Labour Christchurch 1939-1946, 30 Speaker 
Robert South, 1946-1969 of the 
Christchurch House 
Central 
Mason, Henry Labour Eden, Auckland 1928-1966 40 Cabinet 
Suburbs, Minister 
Waitakere, New 
Lynn 
Nash, Walter Labour Hutt 1929-1968 40 Prime 
Minister 
Ngata, Apirana Liberal, Eastern Maori 1905-1943 38 Cabinet 
United, Minister 
National 
Nordmeyer, Labour Oamaru, 1935-1949, 32 Cabinet 
Arnold Brooklyn, 1951-1969 Minister 
Island Bay 
Parry, William Labour Auckland 1919-1951 32 Cabinet 
Central, Arch Minister 
Hill 
Five out of fourteen politici~ns on this list were Prime Ministers, six were cabinet ministers and 
one was Speaker of the House. So, the ftrst characteristic that makes Carr's name stand out on this 
list is his low rank in terms of the party and parliamentary hierarchies. He is one of only three MPs 
on the list who did not serve in cabinet. The local electoral beneftts of holding a cabinet position 
are fairly obvious: ftrstly, cabinet ministers receive a high level of visibility as a result of their 
public proftle. Secondly, ministers have the advantage of increased status and influence within 
their party and parliament, which makes them appealing candidates for their electors. The second 
4 Data taken from J.O. Wilson, New Zealand Parliamentary Record, 1840-1984, 4th ed. (Wellington: 
Government Printer, 1985), pp. 179-247. 
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point that makes Carr stand out on this list is the nature of the electorate he served. Only three of 
the MPs here represented electorates that cannot be considered by their nature "safe" for one of the 
two major parties. Coates, Field, Forbes and Holyoake all represented rural electorates, seats 
which consistently returned conservative candidates. On the other hand, Fraser, Freer, Macfarlane, 
Mason, Nash, Nordmeyer and Parry represented city seats with large working-class populations, 
the Labour Party's traditional constituency. Apirana Ngata represented a Maori electorate, and was 
held in enormously high personal regard by Maori electors. 
The two remaining MPs, Harry Atmore and Carr, represented provincial town seats. The 
provincial town seats ranged across the full spectrum of voting behaviour and therefore do not 
constitute a "safe" category of electorate. Clearly, Atmore's career provides an important and 
interesting point of comparison with Carr's. There are a number of points that differentiate Carr 
and Atmore's careers, however. Firstly, Carr held Timaru in eleven consecutive elections for the 
same party. On the other hand, Atmore was temporarily ousted for a term in 1914, and during the 
course of his career, largely avoided aligning himself with any political party. For most of his 
career he sat in parliament as an independent, and his status as an independent helped to create the 
perception that his interests lay with his electorate rather than with a politicai party. 
By contrast, one of the most remarkable aspects of Carr's win in 1928 was his status as an 
outsider to the electorate. He had never lived in Timaru before moving there to fight the 1928 
campaign, nor did he have any family con,nections to the town. A strong family or personal 
commitment to the community, or a history of involvement in local politics, certainly help explain 
cases of long incumbency. Harry Atmore was born, educated and went into business in Nelson. 
Furthermore, he represented the town on the rugby field, was well known in the town for his glass 
and gold work on various buildings, and later for his extensive personal library. Before he became 
an MP, Atmore was involved in local politics as a member of the Education Board, the City 
Council and the Licensing Committee. During his career, Atmore developed a reputation as a 
generous local MP who "worked for all Nelsomans without party bias, with such a commitment 
that his constituents regarded him as a personal friend."s Atmore's career can therefore be largely 
explained by his strong local reputation, high status within parliament (he served as Minister of 
Education under Ward and Forbes) and his pragmatic approach to party politics. 
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Carr is therefore a member of two minority groups among long-serving New Zealand MPs: those 
who never served as a cabinet minister and those representing electorates that did not fall into a 
traditionally safe category. It is this fact that makes Carr's career unique. There is no immediately 
obvious explanation for Carr's long incumbency, as there are for the other long-term MPs on the 
table. 
It is the object of this thesis to explain the phenomena of Carr's incumbency with reference to both 
his actions as a politician and the demographic characteristics of the Timaru electorate. In so 
doing, the thesis will distinguish between two types of factors: the intentional and the structural. 
Intentional factors are those that relate to an individual's conscious behaviour. Elements of Carr's 
behaviour which are relevant to the explanati~n of his electoral success include the vigour of his 
campaigning, his efficacy in securing central government funding for schools and amenities in 
Timaru, and his willingness to involve himself in the life of the community. Structural factors 
operate over longer periods of time and are out of the control of the individual. Such factors 
include nationwide swings in support for the major political parties, and demographic and 
economic change within the electorate. Structural factors are less likely to be recorded by 
contemporary observers, and it is chiefly through the use of large-scale quantitative data from 
official statistical records that the effect of these factors can be identified and assessed. The 
examination cif structural factors lends itself to comparative analysis of compatible cases. Timaru 
electorate falls into the natural group often comparable provincial town seats: Gisbome, Hamilton, 
Hastings, Invercargill, Napier, Nelson, New Plymouth, Palmerston North, Timaru and Wanganui. 
In the concluding chapter of this thesis, the two modes of explanation are integrated to describe the 
close and stable "fit" between the nature of the electorate and the personality and behaviour of the 
man. 
Finally, a note on the secondary literature on Carr. Carr's name appears in works of New Zealand 
history for a number of different reasons. These reasons range from his nomination for the party 
leadership in 1940, to references to his poetry, or to one parliamentary speech or other. It is 
important to note, however, that Carr rates only a brief mention in these texts. The only two 
substantial pieces of writing on Carr are Colin Brown's entry in the Dictionary of New Zealand 
5 Shirley Tunnicliff, "Atmore, Harry 1870-1946," in Dictionary o/New Zealand Biography Voillme FOllr 
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Biography and Carr's autobiographical piece in Politicalities. Because there is no tradition of 
debate about Carr's life and work, there is no need at this point for a lengthy discussion on the 
historiography surrounding him. Instead, where Carr is mentioned in a secondary text, this will be 
integrated into the general biographical narrative. 
(1921-1940) (Wellington: Department ofIntemal Affairs, 1998), pp. 22-23. 
-~-
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2. "All things by turn and nothing long": Carr's life before 
politics, 1886 to 1928. 
"All things by turn and nothing long" - that has been the record of the subject of this 
sketch. But one does see life. Sticking to one's last needs only a bit of cobbler's wax 
anyway and is a monotonous occupation for a man who loves change and variety. 
- Clyde Carr's description of his own career' 
Childhood 
Clyde Carr's father, Thomas Carr, was born in 1846 in Eastwood, Nottinghamshire. As a 
Wesleyan minister, he travelled to New Zealand in 1873 and began work, marrying Matilda 
Thorne in 1876. Matilda's father, William, had been on the personal staff of British Resident 
James Busby after his arrival in New Zealand in 1842.2 Clyde remained proud of his family's 
heritage in New Zealand, and frequently referred to William Thorne's close association with 
James Busby, claiming that it was his maternal grandfather who had sharpened the axe with which 
Hone Heke cut down the flagpole at Kororareka. 3 Clyde was born to Thomas and Matilda ten 
years after their marriage, on 14 January 1886 in Ponsonby, Auckland. 
As the young family of a Wesleyan missionary, the Carrs were required to move around the 
country constantly.4 While this lifestyle must have been disruptive for the young Clyde, it allowed 
him to see and experience life the length and breadth of the country, and he developed into an 
outgoing, personable child. His parents' professional commitment to the church and willingness to 
uproot the family on a regular basis left a lasting impression on him. Later, in Politicalities, Carr 
described his own childhood (referring to himself in the third person) " ... our friend has known the 
doubtful joys of the gypsy life, and wanderlust is in his bones.,,5 Another result of the family's 
, Clyde Carr, Politicalities (Wellington: National Magazines, 1936), p. 71. 
2Timaru Post, 28 November 1935. 
3Timarll Herald, 19 September 1962. 
4 Who's Who gives a detailed description of Thomas and the family's movements. They were stationed at 
Wangaroa North from 1873 until 1875, Gisbome from 1875 to 1876; Balclutha 1876-9; Blenheim 1879-82; 
Cambridge 1882-3; Three King's Theological College 1883-1886; Grafton Rd 1886-8; Hamilton 1888-90; 
Franklin 1890-3; Hutt 1893-9; Rangiora 1899-1903; Richmond 1903-6; Hastings 1906-9; Birkenhead 1909-
13; and Waihi 1913-5. Who's Who in New Zealand, 2nd ed. (1925), p. 39. 
5 CalT, Politicalities, p. 71. 
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constant movement was that Carr attended schools all over the country. He went to primary 
schools in Pukekohe, Hutt, Rangiora, and Richmond, and attended secondary school in Nelson. In 
later life at least, Carr wrote about himself as a disruptive "bad boy" at school, but he seems to 
have had a great deal of respect and admiration for some of his teachers there.6 
The influence of this early period in Carr's life manifested itself in his later careers both as a 
clergyman and as a politician with a special interest in education and issues affecting young 
people. Carr's willingness in 1928 to travel to an unfamiliar electorate to stand for parliament was 
informed by his experience, both as a the child of a minister and as a minister himself, of travelling 
in order to promote his beliefs. 
After four years of secondary school, Carr worked as a clerk for the Bank of New South Wales 
for four years. He later described the work as "penal servitude ... the work was hard, the routine 
uncongenial, and the hours were long. Indeed, the local institution was known as 'lighthouse.'" 
After leaving the bank, Carr spent a year "'baching' with a dozen boon companions" after his 
parents had moved away from Nelson to Hawkes Bay. He then spent another year working as a 
cashier, ledger-ke~per and confidential clerk in a softgoods store, a job which involved "long 
hours and dreary routine.,,7 Now in his early twenties, Carr's lack of obvious direction or career 
must have been disappointing for his parents. 
The Church 
Some combination of his own disillusionment with office work and parental disapproval at his 
lack of career and bachelor lifestyle lead Carr to take up a position as a home missionary in the 
Methodist Church. In 1908, Carr was posted to the Home Mission Station at Ashurst near 
Palmerston North. At this time his father was also ministering in the Rangitikei district. For 
eighteen months, Carr was the "white haired boy of the dear old ladies of the congregation" at 
Pohangina, Ashurst and Stoney Creek.s He seems to have been well-liked by his congregations, as 
the report in the Outlook on the occasion of his departure demonstrates: 
At both the Ashurst evening service ... and a farewell social held on Thursday evening, the 
church was filled to overflowing, and the occasion will long be remembered by those 
6 ibid., p. 72. 
7 ibid. 
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present. At the latter Mr Percy Green, secretary of the Bible Class, presented Mr Carr, as 
leader, with a beautiful illuminated address, on behalf of the congregation and choir, with 
another purse of sovereigns .... Visitors were present from all around the district.9 
After his successful work as a home missionary, Carr decided to train as a minister, and spent three 
years at the Methodist Theological College in Auckland. While at the College, Carr attended 
university also. 10 In Politicalities, Carr was typically diffident about his work ethic while studying 
(once again, referring to himself in the third person): " ... even though he spent a further two years 
at other of our University colleges, he was usually more congenially and perhaps more profitably 
employed sketching his class-mates, making odes to the sunset or sonnets to his mistress' eyebrow 
than listening to the drip, drip of dreary lectures.,,11 Carr's dislike for authority was beginning to 
show itself. His blase attitude towards study did not payoff for him, however, and he never 
completed a degree. 
Carr entered the Methodist ministry in 1912 at the age of twenty-six. While performing the 
customary probationary period for a new Minister, he was stationed at Kilbimie in Wellington 
until 1913, then in 1914 he transferred back to Ashurst for a year. 12 Following an interest in 
overseas missionary work, in 1915 Carr travelled to New South Wales for training. All his life, 
Carr claimed to have been ordained as a Methodist Minister in 1915. 13 However, it is unclear if he 
was ever actually ordained as a full minister, as Methodist records make no mention of his full 
formal ordination. They do, however, describe him being received into the N.S.W. Conference as 
"Minister or Preacher on trial" and appointed to Nasouri district, part of the Indian Mission at 
Suva, Fiji. 
While working in Fiji, Carr married Laurel (Laurie) Gascoigne on 12 August 1915 at Suva. 
Laurie was born 19 february 1887 in Halcombe in Manawatu, the daughter of Sarah Child and 
8 ibid. 
90lltlook, 1 May 1909. 
\0 F.R.V. Milne (Student Records Manager, University of Auckland) to Colin Brown, 5 March 1996; and 
Ruth Carruthers (Special Projects Officer, New Zealand Vice Chancellors' Committee) to Colin Brown, 2 I 
Februaty 1996. Carr studied at Auckland University College for the years 1910 and 1911 studying English, 
Latin and Science. He then transferred to Victoria College in 1912. The only year he sat examinations was 
1913, in Latin, English and (Natural) Science. There is no record that he completed a degree. 
II Carr, Politicalities, p. 72. 
12 Details of Carr's career in the Methodist Church are taken from Methodist Chllrch of Allstralasia in New 
Zealand: Minutes of the Annual Conference, 1908, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912,1913,1914 and 1915. 
13 For example, Timaru Post, 28 November 1935. 
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George Gascoigne. 14 The couple remained married for forty-six years until Laurie's death in 1961. 
In January 1916, a few months after their marriage, Carr resigned from the Church. 15 In 
Politicalities, Carr offers frustratingly few clues as to the reasons for his resignation, simply saying 
that he became "ineligible for a promised two-year period of further training in India, [and] 
returned to New Zealand and joined the Congregationalists.,,16 One possible explanation for his 
resignation was that he married while still on probation and without the permission of the church. 
This would have been serious enough a transgression for the church to censure him, and possibly 
demand his resignation. 17 
Returning to New Zealand from Fiji, Carr joined the Congregationalist Church. He began his 
ministry in June 1916 at the Congregational Church in Auckland. 18 He must have been very 
conscientious, because within a year he was appointed chair of the Auckland district of the 
church. 19 This was Carr's first taste of involvement in administration. By 1919, he had resigned 
the charge at Newton was ministering in Maungaturoto in Northland. In 1920, Carr moved to 
Christchurch to take charge of the Congregationalist Church in Linwood and became chair of the 
Canterbury district.20 For the next four years, according to the yearbook reports, Carr did an 
admirable job of leading the church: "by the blessing of God 'and the remarkable energy and 
undoubted ability of our minister, [there have been] encouraging symptoms of progress. The Rev 
Clyde Carr has now been with us over 12 months. He has been loyally supported by the 
members.,,21 Carr attended university again at this time, but did not complete a degree. 22 Clyde and 
14 Certificate of Marriage, Registrar General's Office, Suva, Fiji. Reference 149554. 
15 Marcia Baker (Methodist Church of New Zealand) to Colin Brown, 26 JanualY 1996. Methodist Church 
circuit appointment records on CaIT simply state that he resigned in 1916. 
16 Carr, Politicalities, p~·72. 
17 Lillyan MacDonald (Librarian/Archivist, Uniting Church in Australia New South Wales Synod Church 
Records and Historical Society) to Colin Brown, 5 March 1996. According to MacDonald, "I think it likely 
that [Can-'s] marriage in Fiji (August 1915) during his first and only appointment there - and while still 
within the customary period of probation - probably had some bearing on his premature resignation. Even 
thirty years later such action demanded censure. Although I have no proof, I could well believe that Can-'s 
married status made him ineligible for fmiher missionary training in India." 
18 Details of Can-'s career in Congregationalist Church are taken from Congregational Union o/New Zealand 
AnnualReport, 1917, 1918, 1919, 1920, 1921, 1922, 1923 and 1924. 
19 Who's Who in New Zealand, 4th ed. (1941), p. 101. 
20 ibid. 
21Congregational Union Annual Report, 1921, p. 25. 
22 M. Sykes (Administrative Assistant for Academic Registrar, University ofCanterbUlY) to Colin Brown, 24 
January 1996. Can- was admitted to the Canterbury University College in April 1921, and took Philosophy 
and Latin. 
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Laurie had a son, Rae, in 1918 and a daughter, Dianne (baptised Betty), in 1920. A third child, a 
daughter, was still bom.23 
Then, on 3 February 1924, Carr resigned from the Linwood Church. The reasons for Carr's 
resignation from the Congregationalists are not exactly clear, although the Linwood Church report 
of that year suggests that there had been a fairly major dispute within the church: "this Church has 
been passing through a most remarkable experience during the past year, the resignation of the 
majority of the office bearers and their non-attendance at the Church service caused grave anxiety 
to those who take a deep and keen interest in the Church's future life.,,24 There is further reference 
to the circumstances surrounding Carr's sudden and unexplained resignation in lB. Chambers' 
history of Congregationalism in New Zealand, A Peculiar People, which refers to Carr (though not 
by name) saying, "after [the resignation of Carr's predecessor at Linwood, Rev 1. Sarginson] ... 
there were further ministers, one being very unfortunate, resulting in the resignation of the office 
bearers who also refused to attend church services.,,25 Carr himself makes the most explicit 
reference to the causes of this resignation en masse: "he joined the Labour movement and began in 
his preaching to apply Christian principles to problems of life and labour, so much to the chagrin 
of his church committee that they resigned in a body. ,,26 That an uncompromising radicalism was 
creeping into Carr's preaching is also suggested by a quotation from one of Carr's Linwood 
sermons from May 1923: "Matters economic and social are approaching a crisis. Will it really 
mean a class war? That depends on the mal1I!-er and spirit in which the world responds to Labour's 
just demands.,,27 Carr's political radicalism seems to be the best explanation for his resignation, 
although there is little direct documentary evidence for it. 
Despite the somewhat ignominious end to his career in the clergy, Carr held on to the honorific 
"Reverend" throughout his life. He always insisted on being addressed as Reverend in parliament. 
Timaru resident R.A. White believed that Carr held onto the title to "sustain his image as a man of 
high ethics and principle.,,28 For a period, once every session, Carr would make a ceremonial 
23 Rae Can' to Colin Brown, 26 February, 1996. Later, Clyde and Laurie adopted their grandson, Robin, who 
was born to Dianne out of wedlock in 1947. 
24 Congregational Union Annual Report, 1924, pp. 38-39. 
25 lB. Chambers, ''A Peculiar People" " Congregationalism in New Zealand 1840-1984 (Wellington: 
Congregational Union of New Zealand, 1984), p. 84. 
26 Carr, Politicalilies, p. 73. 
27 Quoted in Bruce Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour,' A History of the New Zealand Labour Party 
from 1916 to 1940 (Wellington: Price Milburn, 1962), p. 60. 
28 R.A. White to Stephen Kerr, 8 March 2001. 
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appearance in parliament dressed in a long black evening coat and a clerical collar.29 The clerical 
title and garb provided a means of bestowing upon himself a respectability and status that he may 
have not otherwise have demanded. Furthermore, Carr's ability to relate to a wide range of people 
and integrate himself into the life of the community, and his abilities as an entertaining and 
effective public speaker, were largely developed during in his time in the church. Carr's 
experience as a minister remained a defining influence on his career in politics. 
Entry Into Politics 
In the period after his resignation from Linwood Church, CalT pursued a career in writing and 
editing, and became increasingly involved with the labour movement in Christchurch. He worked 
for some time as an assistant editor at Whitcombe and Tombs Limited, writing and revising many 
educational and other publications and collecting material for the Treasury a/New Zealand Verse. 
In 1925 and 1926 he was managing editor at Andrews, Baty and Co Limited. 30 This period saw 
the beginning of Carr's own literary career, when he won the Macmillan Brown Prize for literature 
for his theological essay "The Everest of the Spirit," a verbose theological tract based around the 
metaphor of mountaineering as the noble but difficult struggle to be virtuous. 31 Carr continued to 
write throughout his career in parliament, publishing a great number of poems in the Australian 
magazine, Aussie in 1928 and 1929. While never destined for fame as a poet, Carr did have his 
patriotic ode "Aotearoa" set to music and broadcast on 2YA in Wellington. 32 In 1944, the 
Progressive Publishing Society published a book of Carr's poetry, entitled simply enough, 
Poems.33 
Meanwhile, the same passion for politics and activism that had caused Carr trouble at Linwood 
Church saw him becoming increasingly involved in local labour politics. Carr had first become 
involved with the Labour Party while still at Linwood, working as the chairman of committees for 
Daniel Sullivan's successful second election campaign in 1922.34 In 1923, Carr was elected to the 
Christchurch City Council, where he served as part of a strong Labour minority on council which 
included future mayor of Christchurch and Labour Party president Rev lK. Archer, Labour MPs 
29 Auckland Star, 30 April 1962. 
30 Carr, Politicalities, p. 73. 
31 Clyde Carr, The Everest of the Spirit (Christchurch: Christchurch Press Printers, 1926). 
32 Timanl Post, 28 November 1935. 
33 Clyde Carr, Poems (Wellington: Progressive Publishing Society, 1944). 
34 Press, 15 November 1928. 
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H.T. Annstrong and E.J. Howard, and future Labour MP Mrs E.R. McCombs. 35 The Christchurch 
City Council was the most Labour-oriented of local bodies in New Zealand at this time, and Carr's 
experience on it provided him with not only an introduction to politics, but the formative 
experience of being part of a politically ascendant Labour team. Carr set his heart on joining some 
of his fellow Labour councillors into parliament, unsuccessfully seeking the Labour candidature 
for the Kaiapoi, Riccarton and Ellesmere electorates in 1925.36 Carr was reelected to the 
Christchurch City Council in 1925 and 1927, eventually standing down when he won the Timaru 
seat in 1928. 
In 1927, Labour won a majority on the Christchurch City Council, with eleven Labour members 
out of sixteen, Archer was elected mayor. Archer was succeeded by Sullivan as mayor in 1931, 
and the latter served until 1936 when he decided that holding a cabinet position as well as a 
mayoralty was inappropriate.37 Both Archer and Sullivan were important early influences on 
Carr's political career. Like Carr, Archer had become involved in Labour politics through the 
church. A passionate socialist, Archer remained strongly socially committed and active within the 
Baptist Church throughout his life, standing unsuccessfully for parliament on four occasions. 38 
Sullivan, on the other hand, became involved in labour politics through the union movement. He 
won Avon for Labour in 1919, and represented the seat until his death in 1947. He ranked highly 
in cabinet under both Savage and Fraser.39 Upon Archer's death in 1949, Carr spoke in parliament 
at some length, describing his experience oflocal body politics and acknowledging the role of both 
Archer and Sullivan in sparking his interest in politics.40 
Aside from his editing work and the beginnings of his political career, the most noteworthy of 
Carr's jobs in this period was his role as an announcer on 3 Y A. Carr drew upon his experience of 
public speaking when he applied for the position of announcer on the new radio station in 
Christchurch in May_ 1927. Carr's abilities must have been impressive, as he beat seventy-two 
35 Christchurch City Couneil Yearbook, 1923 and 1924. 
36 Timaru Herald, 10 November 1928. 
37 Jacinta Clark, "Labour Party Politics in Local Govennuent : A Case Study of the Christchurch City 
Council" (Master of Alis, University of CanterbUlY, 1981), pp. 19-20. 
38 Bany Gustafson, "Archer, John Kendrick 1865-1949," in Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Volume 
Three (1901-1920) (Wellington: Department ofInternal Affairs, 1996), pp. 16-17. 
39 James Watson, "Sullivan, Daniel Giles 1882-1947," in Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Volume 
Four (1921-1940) (Wellington: Department ofInternal Affairs, 1998), pp. 503-505 . 
. 40 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 286, 3 August 1949. 
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other applicants to win the job.41 Carr became one of only four radio announcers in the country, 
one in each of the main centres. While the other announcers from this time stayed with the Radio 
Broadcasting Corporation and pursued careers in broadcasting, Carr was very unhappy with his 
employment conditions at the station and left under a cloud of controversy after just sixteen 
months in the job. As a parting shot, Carr anonymously contributed a long article to the New 
Zealand Truth of October 1928, in which he accused the R.B.C. of exploiting its employees, of 
being cultural philistines and of ignoring the wishes of its listenership. In the article, Carr referred 
in some detail to specific disputes that he had had with his employers over reimbursement of 
expenses and other working conditions. 42 
The dispute returned to haunt Carr less than a month later during his first election campaign. The 
general manager of the R.B.C. wrote to Francis Rolleston, the Reform candidate in Timaru. The 
letter was intended to provide Rolleston with campaign ammunition, describing the poor working 
relationship between Carr and the R.B.C., and claiming that Carr was suspended from 3YA after 
refusing to appear at work on a Saturday afternoon: "to our mind, it was the climax to a hostile 
attitude that the man had taken up and the very umeliable service he had given since his joining 
the Company, and which appears to characterise the man himself.,,43 A small article in the 
Auckland Star on the occasion of Carr's retirement shed more light on the reasons behind Carr's 
departure from the R.B.C. According to the article, when Carr read the news on the radio there was 
never a dull moment, because "instead of giving a factual or objective account of the news, it was 
his habit to comment on it. This brought him into conflict with the A.R. Harris Company, which 
ran the station, and it wasn't surprising when he parted company with radio.,,44 
Carr's role as announcer with the R.B.C. was the last job he held before deciding to seek 
nomination for the Timaru seat. Carr was one of two nominees for the 1928 candidacy for Timaru, 
the other being Fred_Cooke, and on 11 August 1928, Carr was selected.45 Carr's decision to stand 
in Timaru completed his progression from an interest preaching the "social gospel" to his 
congregations, to an involvement in local body politics, to an involvement in politics at the 
41 John Herbert Hall, The History o/Broadcasting in New Zealand 1920-1954 (Wellington: Broadcasting 
Corporation of New Zealand, 1980), p. 27. 
42 New Zealand Truth, 25 October 1928. 
43 General Manager of Radio Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand to F.J. Rolleston, 2 November 1928. 
Item 79, Folder 10, F.J. Rolleston Papers, Canterbmy Museum, Christchurch. 
44 Allckland Star, 30 April 1962. 
45 Minutes of National Executive of New Zealand Labour Party, 23 August 1928. In New Zealand Labour 
Party Head Office, Wellington. 
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national level. During his time in Christchurch, Carr had shifted his attention from the spiritual 
realm to the political. This process reflected both the influence of Archer, and the increasing 
inequalities of wealth that Carr witnessed as the country slipped into depression. By 1928, Carr 
saw Christianity and labour politics as inseparable, and decided to devote himself to politics. 
However, the same radicalism that had fueled Carr's growing commitment to labour politics had 
also brought his career as a clergyman (and possibly also as a radio announcer) to an end. After his 
dismissal from the Methodist and Congregational Churches and the R.B.C., Carr's career options 
were limited. As he left Christchurch for Timaru to oppose Rolleston, a senior cabinet minister 
with an enormous majority, Carr must have wondered what he would do next should his campaign 
be unsuccessful. 
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3. "All the amenities of a city": the nature of the Timaru 
electorate 
Timaru is essentially a sound and progressive town. It possesses all the amenities of a 
city ... ' 
This chapter aims to describe the historical and social context of Carr's political career in Timaru. 
It begins by giving a brief overview of the history of Timaru, focusing on the agricultural 
foundations of the South Canterbury economy and the emergence of political labour in Timaru. 
Next, the electoral geography of Timaru is described. Electoral results in Timaru polling booths 
across Carr's term have been collated and classified in order to uncover the geographical bases of 
support for Labour in the electorate. In the second half of the chapter, a detailed comparative 
analysis is performed between Timaru and nine other provincial town electorates which are 
fundamentally similar in size and structure. The comparative analysis focuses on a number of 
social variables which may be expected to affect the strength of the Labour vote in these towns. 
The social variables are: rate of population growth, level of unionisation, religious affiliation and 
rate of home ownership. The combination of a general history and a detailed comparative analysis 
is intended to build an accurate picture of those aspects of Timaru's social structure which affected 
the electorate's propensity to vote Labour. 
Population Growth and Economic Development 
The area known today as South Canterbury was first inhabited by Ngatimamoe from around 1500. 
Ngai Tahu invaded and settled the area around 1600, and the Maori who were established in the 
area when the first Europeans arrived were of that iwi. As the southernmost point at which lcumara 
could be grown, the area was not an enormously attractive one for Maori. It was perhaps for this 
, Quote taken from a publicity brochure issued by Timaru Borough Council for the New Zealand Centennial: 
Hector Matheson, Timartl : South Canterbury: New Zealand (Timmu: 1940). 
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reason, that the area was comparatively sparsely populated when the first Pakeha arrived. The 
Maori census of 1861 counted only ninety-nine Maori in South Canterbury.2 
The early 1840s saw the first whalers arrive at what is now called Caroline Bay, but Pakeha 
settlement of South Canterbury did not begin in earnest until the 1850s with the arrival of the 
Rhodes brothers, who established the first large scale sheep station in the district. Within five years 
of the Rhodes' arrival, the large flatlands of South Canterbury had been entirely divided up among 
a few Pakeha settlers, and within ten, the inland MacKenzie country was also settled. The large 
run-holders made every effort to recreate for themselves the rural lifestyle of the English gentry, 
and enjoyed a prosperous existence based on wool exports to Britain. Wool prices were unstable, 
however, and beginning in the late 1860s, the structure of the agrarian economy in the area began 
to change. As wool prices fell, and the Liberal government introduced policies intended to 
encourage closer settlement of the land, the large estates began to be replaced by smaller scale 
farming. The progress of closer settlement was facilitated through improvements to the transport 
infrastructure of the area, diversification of agriculture products and technological advancements 
(especially the introduction of refrigerated shipping which allowed the export of lamb meat from 
the area). By the turn of the .century, small-scale mixed farming was predominant on the downs 
and plains of South Canterbury.3 
Large scale Pakeha settlement began in 1859, when 120 settlers arrived at Timaru aboard the 
Strathallan. In the following decades, population growth occurred in fits and starts in response to 
changes in economic circumstance and opportunity in the district. The greatest influx of 
population into the area occurred not as the result of government sponsored settlement schemes, 
but as the result of the Otago gold-rush of the 1860s. Between 1861 and 1864, the South 
Canterbury population doubled with immigrants, mostly from England, Ireland, Scotland and 
Germany.4 Population growth in Timaru stagnated at the end of the nineteenth century, and in the 
fifteen years of recession after 1881, Timaru's population actually fell from 3917 to 3613. After 
1896, however, the town grew quickly, the population rising to 11280 by 1911. After this brief 
period of rapid expansion, growth slowed, and for most of the twentieth century, Timaru lagged 
2 Department ofIndustries and Commerce, An Economic SunJey o/the South Canterbury Region (Wellington, 
1964), p. 10. 
3 TJ. Hearn, "South Canterbury: Some Aspects of the Historical Geography of Agriculture 1851-1901" 
(Master of Arts, University of Otago, 1971), p. 277. 
4 Economic SunJey o/South Canterbury, p. 17. 
21 
behind the national growth rate. In fact, as Table 3.1 shows, Timaru grew more than ten 
percentage points slower across the period than the combined population of the ten provincial 
town electorates. This slow growth was the result of both a low birth rate and outward migration to 
Christchurch and the North Island. s 
Table 3.1: Population growth in Timaru 1926-1961 6 
1926 popUlation 1961 population 0/0 increase 
Timanl 15168 24821 38.9% 
South Island provincial towns 44747 84397 47.0% 
North Island provincial towns 107595 215641 50.1% 
Total ten provincial towns 152342 300038 49.2% 
Total New Zealand 1408139 2414984 41.7% 
Throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, agriculture remained the foundation of the 
Timaru economy. All of the large businesses in the town were based around the processing and 
transport of agricultural products: the freezing works, woollen mills, flour mills, the port and 
railways. The presence of these large unionised workplaces produced a strong Labour-voting 
population in the town. At the same time, the town's economic dependence on farming ensured 
that there was also a measure of rural conservative political influence within the electorate. In New 
Zealand Politics in Action, Robert Chapman notes that this dichotomy is characteristic of all 
provincial town electorates, and argues that the "group of large town electorates perfoml nearest to 
the New Zealand norm for they contain both the major divisions of New Zealand life.,,7 
Historically, sheep-farming had been the dominant activity on South Canterbury farms since the 
beginning of Pakeha settlement, and, while there was some diversification of agriculture and 
horticulture over the period, sheep remained at the centre of the regional economy throughout the 
twentieth century. The introduction of refrigerated shipping in the 1880s allowed the export of 
sheep meat, and necessitated the establishment of the freezing industry in the area. The two largest 
workplaces in Timafu were the two freezing works at Smithfield (established in 1883) and Pareora 
(established in 1904). These two facilities, and the advent of refrigerated shipping at the end of the 
nineteenth century, underpinned the growth of the South Canterbury region by allowing the full 
exploitation of its fertile lands and efficient fanning techniques through the export of high value 
5 ibid., pp. 25-27. 
6 Data taken from New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings, NelV Zealand Census of Population and 
Dwellings (Wellington: New Zealand Department of Statistics). 
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products to overseas markets. Labour Party records show that there were already 367 Timaru 
freezing workers affiliated to the party in 1929.8 The freezing works remained the major employer 
in the town throughout the period of Carr's term, and the Freezing Workers' Union remained 
affiliated to the Labour Party across the entire period. 
Several woollen mills in South Canterbury were also involved in the processing of sheep 
products. While the woollen mills were less significant employers of labour than the freezing 
works, membership of the Woollen Workers' Union grew steadily throughout the post-war period, 
from 38 members in 1940 to 138 in 1960. The textile industry was also comparatively well 
represented in Timaru in the post-war period, although there are no records of union membership 
in the Labour Party conference returns. In 1961, ten out of a national total of 185 textile factories 
were located in Timaru, and a much greater percentage of Timaru's factory workers were 
employed in the textile industry than the national average.9 Woollen mills and freezing works were 
some of the biggest workplaces in the New Zealand economy in the middle of the twentieth 
century, at a time when most factories were very small. 10 
While sheep were the most important livestock in South Canterbury, beginning in the nineteenth 
century there had been a degree of diversification of the agricultural sector. Grain production 
increased from the 1880s, and South Canterbury became an important wheat growing area. In the 
town of Timaru, secondary industry developed around the wheat industry. Three flour mills, a 
biscuit factory and New Zealand's first pasta factory were all established in the town, and were 
important early employers oflabour. As early as 1911, the Bakers' Union was established, and by 
1928, the Bakers', Biscuit Employees', and Millers' Unions had all reached a fair size. The Flour 
Mill Workers' Union was one of the few unions to affiliate to the Labour Party in 1928 (before the 
introduction of compulsory unionism in 1936), and remained affiliated throughout the period of 
Can-'s career. 
Transport necessarily played a key role in the Timaru economy, providing access for South 
Canterbury's agricultural products to both domestic and offshore markets. The two major 
employers in the transpOli sector in Timaru were the railways and the port. Once it affiliated to the 
7 Robert Chapman, Keith Jackson, and Austin Mitchell, New Zealand Politics in Action,' The 1960 General 
Election (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 242. 
8 All data on union membership in Timaru taken from New Zealand Labour Party Anllual Conference 
Reports, New Zealand Labour Party Head Office, Wellington. 
9 Economic Survey of SOllth Canterbury, p. 161. 
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Labour Party after the introduction of compulsory unionism, the Amalgamated Society of Railway 
Servants (A.S.R.S.) remained one of the largest unions in Timaru, with a consistent membership of 
around 250. The Watersiders' Union was far smaller than the A.S.R.S. but was significant as one 
of the first large unions in Timaru. As early as 1914, it had 161 members. By the late 1940s, 
membership had fallen substantially, but by 1960 it had risen again to 169. II The size of the 
Watersiders' Union at the beginning of the century indicate its central importance in the early 
development of the political labour movement. It was also significant as one of the most politically 
active unions in the period. 
Through a quirk of sea currents, the southern breakwater of Timaru Harbour grinds the shingle 
which is trapped against it into a fine sand. This sand is then carried by currents around the 
breakwater and is deposited on the sea floor in the harbour, and constant dredging is necessary to 
maintain access to the harbour. While the high maintenance costs and modest cargo tonnage meant 
it remained economically marginal, the port became an important part ofTimaru's identity. One of 
the key points of convergence amongst all politicians in the area was the importance of protecting 
and expanding the port. Ironically, the same build up of sediment that created problems in the 
maintenance of the port also formed the artificial beach under the cliffs at Caroline Bay, which 
became one of the country's premium holiday destinations. The annual New Years carnival 
attracted thousands of visitors and brought considerable revenue to the area. 
Despite a concerted effort to establish and attract new industry to the area on the part of 
politicians and business throughout the twentieth century, such efforts were largely unsuccessful. 
In the 1960s, most industry in the region had been established in the nineteenth century. An 
economic survey of South Canterbury conducted by the Department of Industries and Commerce 
in 1964 found that frozen food, macaroni and linen flax were the only new industries established in 
Timaru during the twentieth century, and noted that many other industries had closed in that time, 
including biscuit manufacturing, furniture manufacturing, strawboard manufacturing, and fish liver 
oil extraction. 12 Counteracting efforts to develop and attract industry to Timaru, was the powerful 
trend towards the centralisation of manufacturing and shipping in New Zealand to the four main 
centres. Those industries that Timaru and other provincial towns were able to retain and attract 
10 J.L. Hewland, "The Nature and Distribution of Manufacturing in New Zealand" (Master of Arts, University 
of Canterbury, 1948), p. 12. 
II N.z.L.P. Annual Conference Reports. 
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were chiefly those involved with the processing of pastoral products. This was because the raw 
materials in these processes (carcasses, grains, raw milk, wool and so on) were bulky and 
perishable, and factories needed to be located near the source of the raw materials. 13 Food 
processing and transport remained the major employers in Timaru in the post-war period. 
Figure 3.1: Timaru, c. 195y14 
12 Economic SUl11ey o/South Canterbury, p. 172. 
13 Hewland, "Nature and Distribution of Manufacturing". 
14 South Canterbury Museum Photographic Collection H.T.S. 26/3782. 
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Political History 
As Table 3.2 shows, Timam has been dominated by Liberal and Labour MPs since the beginning 
of the party era in New Zealand politics. The presence of large numbers of unskilled and semi-
skilled workers such as those in Timam's port and freezing works strongly influenced the politics 
of the electorate in a Labour direction. 
Table 3.2: Members of Parliament representing Timaru electorate 1890-2003 
Name Party Term 
William Hall-Jones Liberal 1890-1908 
J ames Craigie Liberal 1908-1922 
Francis Rolleston Reform 1922-1928 
Clyde Carr Labour 1928-1962 
Basil Arthur Labour 1962-1987 
Maurice McTigue National 1987-1993 
Jim Sutton Labour 1993-
One of the electorate's most distinguished representatives was William Hall-Jones, who entered 
Parliament as an independent, and was subsequently invited to join Ballance's Liberal Party. Hall-
Jones served as a cabinet minister under Seddon, gaining the opportunity to advance his 
progressive personal policy concerns: the enfranchisement of women, the introduction of non-
contributory government-funded old age pensions and the subdivision of large farming estates into 
smaller settlements. IS Upon his retirement from parliament to take up the appointment of high 
commissioner in London, Hall-Jones was succeeded by another Liberal representative, James 
Craigie. 
It was no coincidence that Hall-Jones was concerned with the "bursting up" of the large estates. 
Land reform was a central concern of many within the Liberal Party and had a particular relevance 
to South Canterbury. Dating from the earliest Pakeha settlement, there remained a well-defined 
social and psycholQgical differentiation between large landholders on one hand and small farmers 
and urban workers on the other. Much of the land in South Canterbury was held by a small number 
of wealthy nm holders known as "squatters", who became the target of both public resentment and 
central government legislation aimed at breaking up the large estates. Erik Olssen describes such 
landowners attempting to emulate the "lifestyle of the English squire .... At the tum of the century 
15 John Hall-Jones, "Hall-Jones, William 1851-1936," in Dictionary of New Zealand Biography Volllme Two 
(1870-1900) (Wellington: Department ofInternal Affairs, 1993), pp. 188-189. 
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they could still be found migrating between country house and town club, sending their sons to 
schools such as Christ's College or even to England for their education, amusing themselves with 
hunts and balls, and acting as local benefactors and patrons.'''6 Throughout his parliamentary 
career, Can was assured a certain amount of public sympathy by criticising the wealthy elites of 
the area. In the town of Timan! itself, large business interests like the stock and station agencies, 
shipping and meat processing firms and banking and insurance companies, were referred to as the 
"commercial aristocracy".17 Perhaps as much as the presence of large industries like the port, 
freezing works and railways, this heightened and particular class consciousness contributed to the 
early establishment of the labour movement in Timaru. It may be instructive to conduct further 
historical investigation into the numbers of large estate owners relative to landless labourers in 
South Canterbury in comparison to other areas, and the relationship between these patterns and the 
development of political labour. 
Political labour emerged in Timaru relatively early in comparison to the other provincial town 
seats. In 1908, Timaru was one of just six South Island electorates where a Political Labour 
League candidate stood. In 1911, Timaru was one of a handful of towns outside the four main 
centres where the Labour Party stood candidates in the local body and general elections. In 1912 
the first New Zealand Labour Party had just nine financial branches, one of which was in Timaru. 
18 In 1919, when the second Labour Party fought its first national election, the result in Timaru was 
encouraging, with Labour candidate Percy Vinnell attracting 40.4 percent of the total vote. While 
the result gave Liberal incumbent Craigie a healthy 1519 vote majority, Vinnell's share of the vote 
compared favourably with Labour candidates in other provincial town electorates. Only in 
Palmers ton North and Invercargill did Labour candidates achieve a higher share of the vote at the 
1919 election. 
Vinnell's share of the Timaru vote leapt up to 48.4 percent in 1922, putting him 288 votes from 
winning the seat. While he failed to take the seat, losing to future cabinet minister Francis 
Rolleston, Vinnell's share of the vote was higher than any other Labour candidate in a provincial 
town seat at the election, including Lewis McIlvride, who won Napier with 38.1 percent of the 
16 Erik Olssen, "Towards a New Society," in The Oxford HistOlY o/New Zealand, ed. B.R. Williams 
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 261. 
17 David Johnson, Timaru and South CanterblllY.' A Pictorial History (Christchurch: Canterbuty University 
Press, 1996), p. 64. 
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vote in a three-way contest. If the 1922 result gave the local Labour Party organisation cause for 
optimism, their hopes were brought down to earth with a crash in 1925. In another straight out 
contest with Rolleston, Vinnell suffered from the dramatic nationwide swing against Labour. The 
electorate swung to Reform by 25.4 percent, and Rolleston held. the seat with a huge majority of 
2486, an increase of2198 votes over his 1922 majority. 
After three successive elections fought by Vinnell, a new candidate was sought for the 1928 
election. That new candidate was Carr, and he won the seat in 1928 with a swing back to Labour 
of equal magnitude to Rolleston's in 1925. Carr went on to win eleven consecutive elections 
before retiring in 1962. The by-election held after his retirement was won by the Labour candidate, 
Basil Arthur, who went on to enjoy a lengthy term of twenty-five years before losing to Maurice 
McTigue in 1987. McTigue held the seat in 1990, but lost it to Labour's Jim Sutton in 1993. 
Underpilming the electoral success of Labour in Timaru was the high level of membership of 
unions affiliated to it within the Timaru Labour Representation Committee (L.R.C.). Members of 
affiliated unions were required to pay levies to their unions, a proportion of which was fed back in 
to their local L.R.C. to cover campaign and general operational costs. The support of a large 
number trade unions was crucial to the growth, financial strength and electoral success of the 
Labour Party. In Timaru, the key unions up to the mid 1930s were the Waterside Workers' and 
Freezing Workers' Unions. Other unions in this period were the Engineers' and Drivers' Unions; 
construction-related unions such as the Bricklayers', Carpenters, Painters', Plasterers' and 
Plumbers' Unions; and wheat-related unions such as the Millers', Biscuit Employees' and Bakers' 
Unions. Union membership fell in the mid 1930s as a result of the depression, until Labour's 
introduction of compulsory unionism (in the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1936) 
had an enomlOUS impact, both on the membership of the large unions and on the number of new 
unions which were formed and affiliated to the Labour Party. In 1935, there were 914 members of 
eight different affiliated unions in Timaru, and by 1937 there were 2935 members in twenty-two 
different unions. Fees paid to the party by the Timaru unions over the period increased from 
£2711711 to £144111/0. 19 
18 Barry Gustafson, Labour's Path to Political Independence,' The Origins and Establishment of the New 
Zealand LaboltI' Party, 1900-19 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1980), pp. 19,36-37,50. 
19 N.Z.LP. Annual Conference Reports. 
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The numerically dominant unions within the Timaru L.R.C. after the introduction of compulsory 
unionism were the Freezing Workers', Labourers', Hotel and Restaurant Employees', Workers', 
Engineers', Drivers' and Watersiders' Unions, and the AS.R.S. Of these, the Freezing Workers' 
Union was consistently the largest across the entire period. Capitation from Freezing Workers' 
Union members was an invaluable source of income for the party, providing between 15 and 25 
percent of the total capitation from unions and branches within the Timaru L.R.C. Union levies 
were not always paid gladly, however, especially during the depression when economic pressure 
was felt keenly by unskilled and semi-skilled employees of the big works. Letters from Freezing 
Workers' Union members in 1934 convey the sense of frustration and desperation felt by such 
men, some of whom had been out of work and in unemployment camps for months before being 
asked to contribute their union levies: 
" ... As I have been an inmate in an unemployment camp for 7 months my chances of paying 
this will be obvious to you ... ,,20 
" .. .in Answer to your Final Warning Well Sir I am stiff and if you give me say 3 Weeks 
more I will guarante [sic] to pay you ... ,,21 
"I am sorry I could not meet this before but work is scarce and so is money. I have been a 
financial member of your union for 13 years and as far as Pareora is concerned I am given 
to understand there is no job for me here so I am surprised at your union for pressing me for 
a few shillings when times are so bad. ,,22 
In addition to being the largest unions in the electorate, the Freezing Workers' Unions were also 
important on account of their political activity. In 1935, union officials from Christchurch travelled 
to Smithfield and Pareora Freezing Works to organise Alliance of Labour branches. 23 
20 Walter Sow to H.C. Revell, 21 Januaty 1934. CanterbUlY Freezing Workers and Related Trades Union 
Archives, Macmillan Brown Library, Christchurch. 
21 J. O'Leary to H.C. Revell [undated]. CanterbUlY Freezing Workers and Related Trades Union Archives, 
Macmillan Brown Library, Christchurch 
22 S.M. Creasey to H.C. Revell, I Februaty 1934. CanterbUlY Freezing Workers and Related Trades Union 
Archives, Macmillan Brown Library, Christchurch 
23 New Zealand Worker, 24 November 1935. 
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Growth in party membership in the late 1930s was even more spectacular than the growth in 
affiliated union membership. In 1937, there were sixty-four members of the central Timaru branch. 
By 1940, three more branches had been established, and the total membership had leapt to 78l. 
This enormous increase can not be put down to legislative change in the same way as the increase 
in union membership, but rather reflects the massive popularity of the first Labour Government. 
The fact that the new party branches were established in relatively isolated communities close to 
freezing works is suggestive of the important role of the large unions in fostering support for the 
party. 
The Timaru Federation of Labour minutes show that Carr and the F.O.L. had a fairly close 
relationship, frequently corresponding over business ranging from minor administrative matters to 
the issue of regional development and employment. Other than a minor dispute over his 
involvement with John A. Lee, Carr and the F.O.L. had a good working relationship, the latter 
frequently expressing its satisfaction and gratitude with the work Carr had done for the 
electorate.24 The umbrella organisation through which the party and the unions communicated was 
the L.R.C. The Timaru L.R.C. was almost always headed by a representative from a union, 
suggesting industrial labour had a strong influence over the affairs of the local party.25 
Graph 3.1: Membership of Labour Party branches and affiliated unions in 
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24 Timaru Federation of Labour Minutes, MS-Papers-41 00-1911311-5, New Zealand Federation of Labour 
Collection, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington. 
25 New Zealand Labour Party Journal Go/den Jub/iee Edition, April 1966, p. 137. 
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As graph 3.1 shows, both affiliated union and branch membership in Timaru dropped after 1940 as 
a result of both the controversy over Jolm A. Lee's expulsion from the Labour Party and the effect 
of World War Two. Bentley estimates that union membership dropped by fifty thousand nationally 
between 1938 and 1943, leaving Labour to fight the 1943 election with half the campaign fund it 
had enjoyed in 1938.27 After World War Two, however, union and branch membership in Timaru 
and nationwide began to increase. This increase was reversed in the late 1940s and early 1950s as 
Labour faced first an internal dispute over conscription then heavy defeat by National at the polls. 
Nationally, union membership dropped by approximately fifty-one thousand between 1949 and 
1952.28 From the late 1940s, branch membership in Timaru went into decline. A temporary 
recovery in the wake of Labour's 1957 victory did not survive the bacldash against the party in 
response to the 1958 "black" budget. Affiliated union membership, on the other hand, recovered 
through the 1950s, and remained fairly stable as a proportion of the voting population. The effects 
of Lee's expulsion and the 1958 budget on branch and union membership in Timaru are discussed 
in chapter five. 
Other organizations were also instrumental in spreading the influence of left-wing and labour-
oriented ideas at a grass-roots level. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s there was a strong Workers' 
Educational Association in Timaru. Mostly attended by manual workers, the organisation was 
patronised by over eight hundred men and women in 1936, with activities ranging from public 
lectures to one-act plays. Most of the subject matter was focused on art and literature appreciation, 
or economics and international relations. The W.E.A. was affiliated to the Carpenters', General 
Labourers', Driver and Flour Mill Workers' Unions. By the early 1950s, however, the Timaru 
W.E.A. had all but petered out.29 
Electoral Geography 
By breaking down election results in Timaru to a polling booth level, much can be learned about 
the geographical bases of support for each party within the electorate, and how these bases of 
support changed over time. In order to achieve this, voting results at thirty-one polling booths 
26 N.Z.L.P. Anllual Conference Reports, 1929-1963. 
27 T.W. Bentley, "Trade Union Financial Assistance to the New Zealand Labour Party 1930-1960" (Master of 
Arts, University of Auckland, 1973), pp. 21-24. 
28 ibid., p. 30. 
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across the period were collated and categorised according to their location and partisanship.3D 
Maps 3.1 and 3.2 show that the thirty-one booths fall into two geographical categories. Eleven 
booths lay outside the borough boundaries in rural areas, and the other twenty were in urban or 
suburban areas. Appendix one shows voting pattems for each booth during Carr's term. 
Map 3.1: Locations of rural polling booths within Timaru electorate 1928-1960 
Kerrytown~ 
Seadown .. 
Levels .. 
Rosewille 
Washdyke .. 
Fairview4ll 
Pareora West~ 
Otipua4ll 
Kingsdown .. 
29 Timaru Workers' Educational Association Annual Reports, Macmillan Brown Library, Christchurch. 
30 Locating the booth sites was a diftlcult task, as the locations used for polling booths changed over the three 
decades of Can"s term, as did the names used to describe booths in the same location. A complex process of 
cross referencing the (often frustratingly brief) booth names from newspapers, the Appendices to the Journal 
of the HOllse of Representatives and the New Zealand Gazette was necessaty to precisely locate and confinn 
the location of booths. Returns from a handful of booths in the central business dish'ict were aggregated into a 
single category because these booths tended to change location frequently from year to year. 
Map 3.2: Locations of suburban polling booths within Timaru electorate 1928-1960 
Labour voting booths: 
1. Marchwiel 
2. Belfield Hill 
3. West Public School 
4. Cullman town 
5. Wilson Street 
6. Main Public School 
7. Central Business District Booths 
8. Woodlands Street 
9. Browne Street-
10. Courthouse 
II. High Street 
12. Kennedy's Garage 
13. South Public School 
14. Kensington 
National voting booths: 
15. Gleniti 
16. Highfield 
17. Waiiti Road 
18. Waimataitai 
19. Bay Hall 
20. Elizabeth Street 
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The rural booths (Fairview, Kerrytown, Kingsdown, Levels, Otipua, Pareora, Pareora West, 
Rosewill, Salisbury, Seadown, and Washdyke) shared two common characteristics. They were all 
situated away from the central business district and suburbs, and were generally much smaller than 
the suburban booths. Pareora West, for example, averaged just 28 votes per election across the 
period. The two exceptions to this among the rural booths were Pareora and Washdyke, both of 
which averaged over two-hundred votes per election. 
The rural booths overwhelmingly favoured National candidates. The conservative influence of 
the fanner was all powerful in these areas. At Rosewill, Pareora West, Fairview, Seadown, Otipua 
and Kingsdown, Carr never won a majority of the votes. He won the Levels booth just once (in 
1935), and Salisbury twice (in 1935 and 1943). However, at the remaining three rural booths, 
Pareora, Washdyke and Kerry town, Carr was dominant. Pareora, for example, was consistently 
one of the most strongly Labour-voting booths in the entire electorate. Pareora was the site of one 
of the region's two major freezing works, and both the strong Labour-voting tendency and the 
consistently large turnout suggests that it was freezing workers living near the works that 
dominated voting there. Washdyke, a largely industrial settlement immediately to the north of 
Timaru was the other consistently Labour-voting rural booth. Once again, it is likely that. the 
population of factory and mill workers there was responsible both for the large turnout and strong 
Labour orientation. Kerrytown was a much smaller and more remote booth than Pareora or 
Washdyke, but was also consistently Labour-voting. The presence of a community of labourers, or 
employees of a dairy factory or similar may have been responsible for voting behaviour there. 
The most important point with regard to the rural booths is their relative insignificance to the 
overall result in Timaru. The combined turnout in these eleven booths was on average slightly less 
than ten percent of the total electorate vote. Furthermore, between 1946 and 1954, up to nine of 
these booths at a time were absorbed into the surrounding Waimate electorate as part of the 
electoral redistribution. Voting returns in the Waimate electorate show that these redistributions 
worked in Carr's favour. The aggregate result from the booths which had formerly been in the 
Timaru electorate favoured National by 103 votes in 1946, 142 votes in 1949, 148 votes in 1951 
and 89 votes in 1954. While the effect of results was not decisive, Carr was fortunate that they 
worked in his favour, especially as this was the period of his career in which his majority was at its 
smallest. 
34 
The majority of the votes in Timam were cast in suburban booths, and the patterns of voting 
within these booths were also remarkably stable. Map 3.2 shows that all twenty of these booths 
were located within the boundaries of the Timam borough in built up, predominantly residential 
areas. Only six suburban booths (Highfield, Waiiti Road, Bay Hall, Waimataitai, Gleniti, and 
Elizabeth Street) favoured National across the period. Highfield and Waimataitai favoured 
National by an average margin of over 25 percent over the period. On only two occasions did any 
of the National-voting suburban booths return a majority for Carr: at Gleniti in 1935 and at 
Waimataitai in 1938, by fourteen and eleven votes respectively. All six National-voting suburban 
booths are located along a ridge of raised land mnning in an east-west direction between the 
Waimataitai Stream to the north and Otipua Creek to the south, creating a "blue streak" 
horizontally bisecting the town. The homes along this ridge enjoyed the advantages of altitude -
good views and exposure to sun - and were known for their high real estate value. 
The other fourteen suburban polling booths voted consistently for Labour. Of these, no less than 
six (High Street, Brown Street, Kensington, Marchwiel, Belfield Hill and South Public School) 
returned an average majority for Carr over his career of 25 percent of the total vote cast at that 
booth. On only two occasions during his term did any of these booths fail to return a majority for 
Carr: in 1946 at the Courthouse and in 1960 at West Public School, by one vote and five votes 
respectively. The Labour-voting booths were located predominantly in the southern-central and 
southern areas of the borough, and in the north. The northern Labour-voting booths were 
Marchwiel, a post-war state housing suburb that was home to many returned soldiers, and Belfield 
Hill, located in the immediate vicinity of the Smithfield Freezing Works. 31 The other Labour-
voting suburban booths lay to the south of the "blue streak", from West Public School in the west 
to the central business district in the east, and south to Kensington. It was the southernnl0st booths 
(Browne Street, High Street, South Public School and Kensington) that demonstrated the greatest 
support for Carr over the period. 
Since voting returns at the twenty suburban booths accounted for over ninety percent of the total 
Timaru vote across the period, they are worthy of more detailed investigation. As the graphs in 
appendix one show, the Labour- and National-voting suburban booths alike were remarkably 
31 Michael Wilkinson, "The Post-War Growth ofTimaru: A Study of the Post-War Growth of Population, 
Occupational Structure, Surface Area and the Port from 1945 to 1957" (Master of Arts, University of 
Canterbuty, 1958), p. 18. 
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consistent in their voting preferences. There were no significant shifts in allegiance at any of the 
booths. This suggests a high degree of residential stability, which may have been a product of the 
low population growth that Timaru experienced in the period. The fact that each of these booths 
showed a marked and consistent pattern of voting either for or against Carr across his entire career 
suggests a fairly high degree of residential segregation in Timaru during this period. 32 
The pronounced geographical separation between National- and Labour-voting areas probably 
worked in Carr's favour. The political influence of Labour was enhanced by the fact that the 
majority of the electorate was Labour territory. At any given election, most of the Labour vote was 
cast in "Labour friendly" booths, that is, booths which were won by Carr by a significant margin 
election after election. Because such a small area of the town could be considered "National 
friendly", the majority of. the National vote was also cast in Labour friendly booths. Thus, the 
effect of residential segregation in a Labour-voting electorate may have been to create a kind of 
solidarity within Labour-voting areas and to prevent a similar sense of community forming 
between the relatively isolated pockets of National voters. In a study of voting among the working 
class in Britain, Parldn found that "manual workers are more likely to vote Labour if they live in 
predominantly working-class areas than if they live in socially heterogeneous ones.,,33 Parkin 
conceives of worldng-class communities and organisations like trade unions as "normative sub-
systems which deviate from the overall [conservative] value system in politically significant 
ways". Membership of such communities or sub-systems acts like a "protective ring" around the 
individual voter, shielding her or him from conservative influence and increasing the probability 
that they will vote for Labour. Strongly Labour-voting areas may also develop a certain immunity 
against swings away from the party. In their study of voter behaviour in Britain, Butler and Stokes 
found that there was a tendency for local areas to become homogenous in their political opinions. 
So, where the Labour party was strong, the effect of a national swing against it was relatively 
weak. Where Labour was weak, the swing against Labour was amplified. 34 
Interestingly, there is fairly convincing evidence of a parallelism of opinion between the different 
polling booths, regardless of their overall preferences. In both National- and Labour-voting booths, 
32 The patterns of suppOli for Labour candidates in Timaru prior to 1928 shows that the core regions of 
suppOli were in place a decade before his arrival. 
33 Frank Parkin, "Working-Class Conservatives: A Theory of Political Deviance," British Journal of 
Sociology 18, no. 3 (1967), pp. 285-286. 
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Carr's share of the vote rose through the 1930s to a peak in 1938. Carr's heavy reduction in votes 
in 1943 when he faced the Democratic Soldiers Labour Party candidate Cresswell, and his 
relatively weak recovery in 1946, also occurred across all booths. From there, support for Carr 
dropped to a low point in 1943, recovered slightly, but continued to decline through the late 1940s 
and early 1950s to its lowest point in 1954. At the 1954 election, Social Credit took more votes 
from National than Labour across all booths. Carr's share of the vote rose again in 1957, with the 
drop in Social Credit vote, then fell away slightly in 1960. There was no consistent pattern in the 
levels of third party vote in 1931, 1943 or 1954. 
The electoral geography of Timaru proved to be remarkably stable over Carr's career. The results 
of the polling booth analysis show that there were distinct areas of strongly Labour- and strongly 
National-voting booths, and that geographical patterns of voting did not shift significantly over 
time during Carr's career. 
Comparative Analysis Methodology 
In order to understand the social factors effecting the vote in Timaru, it is necessary to place the 
structural characteristics of the town in a broader context. In Carr's period, Timaru b~longed to a 
group of ten provincial town seats: Gisborne, Hamilton, Hastings, Invercargill, Napier, Nelson, 
New Plymouth, Palmerston North, Timaru and Wanganui. The comparability of these ten towns 
has been established in the literature, most notably by Robert Chapman.35 Chapman referred to 
these electorates as a "natural group" because of their similar size and because they constitute the 
second tier of urbanisation in New Zealand. All of the towns were large enough to have their own 
electorate to themselves, but not so large as to require more than one electorate over their urban 
area. Chapman described a common social-psychological condition in these towns, which had 
much in common urban areas, but which were also affected by rural attitudes as the natural result 
of their economic dependence on the rural sector. He argued that the towns were microcosms of 
the entire New Zealand electorate, "rurally oriented and urban minded in balance.,,36 Voting 
behaviour in the provincial town electorates was therefore not qualitatively different to the rest of 
34 David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice, 2nd ed. 
(London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. \30-\33. 
35 Chapman, Jackson, and Mitchell, Politics in Action, pp. 235-240. 
36 ibid., p. 242. 
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the country, but in fact served to highlight national trends in voting because of the electorates' 
economic and demographic representativeness. 
In the following sections, four aspects of the demographic composition of the towns are 
examined in order to determine which of these factors had the strongest int1uence on the Labour 
vote. The social factors under investigation are: rate of population growth, level of unionisation, 
religious affiliation and rate of home ownership. The bivariate cOlTelation analyses were done in 
Prentice Hall SPSS Version 11.0, using Spearman's cOlTelation coefficient. A bivariate cOlTelation 
measures how two sets of variables are related. The cOlTelation coefficient is the measure of the 
strength of the relationship, ranging between -1 (a perfect negative relationship) and + 1 (a perfect 
positive relationship). A value of a indicates no linear relationship between the two variables. 
Election results were taken from the Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives. 
Only the election years after 1931 were included, because the combination of two- and three- way 
fights at the 1928 election made it impossible to make meaningful comparisons between the 
different towns. During the period before the formation of the National Party in 1936, there was 
often more than one candidate representing the Coalition in each electorate. Typically one of the 
anti-Labour candidates would represent old United Party interests, the other Reform Party 
interests. For this reason, a number of results from 1931 and 1935 which could not be interpreted 
as Labour versus conservative were also omitted from the analysis. Those elections where an 
independent candidate received over twenty-five percent of the vote, or where one of the two 
highest polling candidates was not representing Labour or the Coalition, were omitted. 37 
The figure used to represent the strength of support for Labour in the analyses is Labour's share 
of the vote cast for the two major party candidates (the "major party vote"), not Labour's share of 
the total vote. It is a moot point as to which of these measures conveys the "true" level of support 
for the party. In practical terms, however, the number of wins by a Labour candidate is the most 
significant result, and may therefore be adopted as a benchmark for the level of political support 
for Labour. Table 3.3 shows the rank orders of the towns using different measures to represent the 
strength of the Labour vote. As the table shows, the match in rankings between the number of wins 
by a Labour candidate and Labour's share of major party vote is much closer than between the 
37 Invercargill in 1931, and Gisborne, Palmerston Notih, Wanganui and Invercargill in 1935 were omitted 
from the analysis. Also, Nelson was omitted up for all elections until 1946, because of the uniquely 
independent nature of Atmore's term there. 
38 
number of wins by a Labour candidate and Labour's share of the total vote. This is because when a 
simple measure of Labour's share of the total vote is used, high-polling third party candidates drag 
down the share of the vote of the major party candidates in their electorate relative to other 
electorates. Thus, support for Labour appears lower than its true·level in electorates where a third 
party candidate polled highly. When Labour's share of the major party vote is used, the third party 
vote is disregarded. 
Table 3.3: Different measures of the strength of the Labour Party in ten provincial town 
electorates 1931-1960 
Wins by a Labour Labour's share of major Labour's share of total vote 
candidate party vote 
Timam (10/10) Napier (56.7%) Napier (54.4%) 
Napier (9110) Wanganui (55.0%) Gisbol1le (52.6%) 
Wanganui (9110) Timam (54.4%) Timan! (51.7%) 
Gisbol1le (8110) Gisbol1le (54.3%) Palmers ton North (49.7%) 
Palmerston North (6110) Palmerston North (51.1 %) Hastings (49.5%) 
Hastings (6/10) Hastings (50.9%) Wanganui (49.3%) 
Invercargill (3/10) Invercargill (48.2%) Invercargill (46.3%) 
Nelson (2/10) Nelson (48.2%) Nelson (45.9%) 
Hamilton (2/1 0) Hamilton (46.3%) New Plymouth (44.1 %) 
New Plymouth (1/8) New Plymouth (45.9%) Hamilton (43.7%) 
As table 3.3 shows, the rank order of all three lists is roughly the same. The top three towns in 
te11l1S of their Labour vote were Napier, Wanganui and Timan!. At the other extreme, New 
Plymouth and Hamilton were the strongest National-voting electorates, and the remaining 
electorates, Gisbol1le, Palmerston North, Hastings, Invercargill and Nelson sit in the middle. The 
high third party vote in Wanganui means that it sits too low in the "total vote" column and, 
conversely, Gisbol1le is too high. The match in the town rankings between the wins by a Labour 
candidate column and the major party vote column is very close. In fact, Timan! stands out as the 
only aberration between the two columns, with Carr's eleven consecutive wins not matched by a 
consistently high share of the major party vote for Labour in the electorate. Table 3.4 shows that 
Labour's share of the major party vote in Timan! was relatively high but not the highest among the 
ten towns over the period of Carr's career. 
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Table 3.4: Labour's share of the major party vote in ten provincial towns 1931-1960 
Electorate 1931 1935 1938 1943 1946 1949 1951 1954 1957 1960 
Gisbome 51.8% 58.6% 64.4% 58.4% 57.0% 51.7% 48.9% 51.9% 54.0% 49.0% 
Hamilton 30.5% 57.2% 56.8% 48.5% 48.8% 44.1% 41.6% 45.5% 46.1% 40.7% 
Hastings 38.7% 54.4% 60.6% 56.8% 51.7% 46.7% 46.3% 50.9% 53.5% 49.0% 
Invercargill 57.7% 53.6% 49.2% 46.0% 42.6% 45.8% 47.7% 43.3% 
Napier 57.1% 69.3% 66.1% 56.5% 56.7% 52.6% 49.9% 52.4% 57.6% 54.3% 
Nelson 47.9% 45.6% 41.2% 47.3% 51.7% 55.8% 
New Plymouth 34.0% 46.0% 53.3% 49.8% 48.6% 44.9% 42.1% 45.9% 48.0% 44.8% 
Palmers ton North 44.7% 57.5% 50.7% 53.4% 48.2% 49.3% 51.2% 54.6% 49.5% 
Timanl 54.1% 54.4% 58.9% 57.7% 51.9% 53.0% 52.0% 56.4% 55.7% 51.2% 
Wanganui 46.9% 64.7% 61.1% 57.0% 53.7% 50.8% 51.5% 56.1% 50.7% 
Data for the social variables used in the conelation analysis were taken from two sources. Firstly, 
the material on Labour Party branch and affiliated union membership was taken from Labour Party 
annual conference records held at the Labour Party head office in Wellington. Union membership 
records from 1946 were incomplete, and therefore could not be included in the analysis. Also, 
there were no union or branch membership records remaining for Hamilton in 1943 or Hastings in 
1949, so those cases were omitted from the analysis. Data relating to the other variables - religious 
affiliation, population growth, and home ownership - were taken from the census. Despite the 
various limitations with historical data, there were always at least forty-six cases to use in the 
conelation analyses. 
Population Growth 
There was a fairly large degree of variation between the ten towns during the period in terms of 
population and popUlation growth. As shown in appendix two, Hamilton and Palmerston NOlih 
displayed the most spectacular growth, climbing steeply from being two of the smallest towns at 
the end of the nineteenth century to being the two largest in the post-war period. On the other 
hand, Timaru, Invercargill, Napier and patiicularly Nelson showed the slowest growth over the 
entire the period. Nelson, for example, was the largest of the towns in 1874, but experienced very 
flat growth right up until the late 1930s. By the end of the period, Nelson was one of the smallest 
of the ten towns, with only slightly over half the population of the largest town, Hamilton. 
Census population data was used to conelate the rate of growth in with Labour's share of the 
major party vote in each town over the period. The percentage growth since the last census year 
was used to indicate the rate of growth of a town. This figure was reached by dividing the 
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difference in population between one census and the previous one by the current population. For 
example, in 1951, the population of Invercargill was 28074. At the pervious census in 1946, 
Invercargill's population was 24104. So the figure for the intercensual growth of the town in 1951 
is given as 14.1 percent. Table 3.5 gives the figures for rate of population growth for each town 
across the period. 
Table 3.5: Intercensual population growth in ten provincial town electorates 1926-1961 38 
Town 0/0 0/0 % 0/0 0/0 % Total 
growth growth growth growth growth growth growth 
1921- 1926- 1936- 1945- 1951- 1956- 1921-
1926 1936 1945 1951 1956 1961 1961 
Hamilton 18.4% 13.2% 26.5% 26.3% 17.0% 18.3% 72.9% 
Palmerston North 13.7% 18.3% 12.2% 17.2% 14.3% 14.6% 61.8% 
Nelson 8.7% 9.3% 13.9% 22.6% 5.0% 27.0% 61.3% 
New Plymouth 18.7% 15.8% 10.3% 14.7% 9.7% 19.4% 61.2% 
Hastings 10.2% 20.4% 12.8% 15.2% 10.1% 21.3% 61.0% 
Invercargill 12.5% 13.5% 6.7% 14.1% 8.0% 15.2% 52.2% 
Gisborne 16.7% 3.4% 8.0% 14.7% 12.0% 19.1% 49.8% 
Timaru 7.4% 12.8% 5.0% 13.7% 9.0% 6.5% 43.4% 
Napier 5.2% 1.1% 11.3% 12.5% 7.3% 15.9% 41.6% 
Wanganui 30.7% -2.7% 2.8% 12.5% 8.1% 14.2% 35.7% 
Timaru, Napier and especially Wanganui were the slowest growing ~owns across the period. 
Gisborne and Invercargill were also fairly slow growing, whereas Palmerston North, Nelson, New 
Plymouth and Hastings grew fairly quicldy. Hamilton showed by far the strongest growth between 
1921 and 1961. As the rank order of the towns in terms of population growth corresponds roughly 
with their rank order in terms of Labour's share of the major party vote, further investigation was 
warranted. A Spearman's two-tailed bivariate correlation analysis of the relationship shows that 
there is indeed a significant negative correlation between support for Labour and the rate of 
population growth in the towns over the period. The correlation coefficient is -0.514. Correlation 
tables output from SPSS for all correlations in this chapter are found in appendix three. 
There is nothing in the literature about the relationship between Labour vote and rate of 
population growth in New Zealand towns. While it is outside the scope of this study to investigate 
this phenomenon further, it is an extremely interesting result which is worthy of further research. 
Three potential hypotheses may be mentioned at this stage. Firstly, it could be that population 
growth in the towns was occurring predominantly within a certain social cohort that was inclined 
38 Data taken from N.Z, Censlts. 
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towards National voting, for example white collar workers. Secondly, it could be that in faster 
growing towns there was more opportunity for upward social mobility, which helped to create a 
social-psychological tendency to vote for the political party which espoused the philosophy of the 
individual. The inverse effect could be that where there was a degree of demographic and 
economic stagnation, the result of a low birthrate and a high rate of out-migration from an area, 
there was increased solidarity among those who remained in the town. Such voters may have been 
more likely to have remained steadfastly loyal to the party which prioritised social security, 
equality of opportunity and govemment intervention over individual advancement. Finally, the 
con'elation may be spurious, the result of an invisible third factor influencing the two variables 
here. 
Unionisation 
Trade unions have always provided the foundation of support for the Labour Party. The pivotal 
importance of union support to the Labour Party both in terms of membership and financial 
resourcing is well established in the historiography of the party. Throughout the period of Carr's 
term, the major contributors to the party's finances and campaign funds were unions. In his thesis 
on trade union financial assistance to the Labour Party, Bentley noted that it was only at the 1938 
election, after the introduction of compulsory unionism in 1936, that Labour had the financial 
resources to stand a candidate in every electorate. Compulsory unionism also allowed Labour to 
properly fund its head office, and run more effective election campaigns, employing advertising 
agencies for the first time.39 Each L.R.C. was funded by the Labour Party head office according to 
the capitation received from unions and branches within its boundaries. Thus, one might expect 
that in electorates with high levels of union membership, the local Labour organisations would be 
better able to capitalise on preexisting support for the party through better operational and 
campaign funding. -
Retums to Labour Party Annual Conference provided data on the membership of unions affiliated 
to the party for each electorate across the period of Carr's career. A number of aspects of union 
membership were examined in the analysis. Firstly, the total membership of both affiliated unions 
and Labour Party branches was correlated with Labour's share of the major party vote. Once the 
39 Bentley, "Trade Union Financial Assistance", pp. 5, 38. 
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crucial importance of the level of union membership in affecting the Labour vote had been 
established, the nature of unionisation in each town was investigated. The key factors with regard 
to the nature of unionisation were, firstly, the types of unions which predominated during the 
period and, secondly, levels of union membership in the period before the introduction of 
compulsory unionism. Unions associated with large workplaces and a tradition of political activity 
were expected to influence the electorate in a Labour direction, while the level of pre-compulsory 
unionisation was likely to be an important indicator of the level of organisation of industrial labour 
in a town. Table 3.6 shows the number of members of unions affiliated to the Labour Party as a 
percentage of the total vote in the electorate for that year. 
Table 3.6: Affiliated union membership as a proportion of the total vote in ten provincial 
town electorates 1931-196040 
Electorate 1931 1935 1938 1943 1949 1951 1954 1957 1960 
Gisborne 5.6% 4.3% 18.4% 19.8% 24.0% 24.2% 17.3% 18.9% 14.7% 
Hamilton 0.3% 0.8% 15.4% 0.0% 24.9% 19.0% 11.3% 18.7% 8.8% 
Hastings 2.4% 1.0% 17.0% 16.2% 0.0% 15.5% 13.4% 14.3% 13.7% 
Invercargill 5.0% 3.4% 16.4% 15.2% 20.7% 23.0% 20.4% 14.9% 12.1% 
Napier 6.2% 4.5% 18.1% 16.5% 26.7% 19.3% 14.5% 13.0% 12.1% 
Nelson 0.9% 2.0% 19.6% 16.1% 11.8% 10.9% 9.7% 13.l% 10.4% 
New Plymouth 6.8% 3.6% 13.3% 16.7% 17.7% 15.8% 11.7% 14.0% 10.2% 
Palmerston North 3.7% 2.2% 15.4% 15.6% 23.l% 22.8% 19.9% 20.l% 17.3% 
Timaru 7.7% 3.l% 14.9% 21.5% 24.1% 23.7% 24.2% 24.0% 21.1% 
Wanganui 3.6% 3.6% 19.1% 20.7% 25.2% 25.5% 17.3% 16.8% 14.2% 
In the majority of towns there was a decrease in union membership between 1931 and 1935 as a 
result of the depression. In 1938, there was a leap in membership as a result of the introduction of 
compulsory unionism in 1936. Membership continued to rise throughout the 1940s to a peak in 
1949 as unions strengthened under Labour rule. After that point, membership of affiliated unions 
went into decline under National, with only a temporary respite at the 1957 election. In this sense, 
the fortunes of affiliated unions broadly reflected those of the parliamentary party. Union 
membership across all towns moved in parallel, with the exception of Timanl in the 1950s. The 
stability of union membership in Timaru in this period differentiated it from other strong Labour-
voting towns like Napier and Wanganui, where membership dropped dramatically. Nelson ran1es 
consistently lowly on the table, Timaru and Wanganui consistently highly, otherwise there were 
few steady patterns in the relative ran1e order of the towns. 
40 Data taken from New Zealand LaboltI' Party Annual Conference Reports. 
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Membership of Labour Party branches rose in all towns though the 1930s, then dropped after 
1940 as a result of both the controversy over the expulsion of Lee and the loss of many members 
to war duties of one Idnd or another. 41 Membership recovered through the 1940s and increased 
beyond its level in the late 1930s. However, under the National. govemment of the 1950s, like 
union membership, branch membership went into steady decline, interrupted only by a brief 
recovery in 1957. The movement of individual towns across the period was much less regular with 
regard to branch membership than union membership. Hamilton ranks consistently lowly across 
the period, but other than that there are few or no other discemable pattems in the rankings of the 
towns. 
Correlations between Labour's share of the major party vote and rates of union membership, 
branch membership and combined union and branch membership in the ten towns show that it is 
the level of affiliated union membership which had the strongest relationship to Labour vote. The 
correlation is positive but fairly weak, with a coefficient of just 0.216. There was no correlation 
between level of party membership and Labour vote. 
It is possible that the qualitative nature of union membership in each town was more significant 
than the overall level of union membership in temlS of its influence on the Labour vote. In 
particular, the types of unions which predominated in each town may be significant, as they reflect 
the industrial profile of the electorate. In his discussion on factors determining the different levels 
of support for Labour between the ten towns, Chapman claimed that the crucial difference between 
National- and Labour-voting provincial towns was the nature of industrial development in each 
town. The National-voting provincial towns were service towns to their rural hinterland, Chapman 
claimed, whereas Labour-voting towns were the home of "independent industrial development." 
As examples of such independent industrial development, Chapman cited a "long established and 
busy port, railway workshops, freezing works, light industrial factories .... ,,42 
The levels of union membership each town in the era before the introduction of compulsory 
unionism was also significant, as it demonstrated both the length of establislmlent of unions during 
Carr's term and the will and ability of workers to organise in the absence of govemment 
compulsion. As there are no Labour Party records of union membership before 1929, figures from 
41 Data on Labour patiy branch membership in the ten towns is given in appendix three. 
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the A.J.HR. were used instead. Because of the complexities of the three party system and the 
fragmentary data, it was impossible to perfOlID an quantitative comparative analysis of the 
relationship between union membership and the Labour vote in the period between 1911 and 1935. 
Nevertheless, a qualitative examination of patterns of union membership in the pre-compulsory era 
revealed some interesting patterns. 
Most union members across all ten towns in the pre-compulsory era were involved in agricultural 
processing, construction and transport. The most widely established of these were the freezing 
workers' unions in Gisborne, Hastings, and New Plymouth. Other unions of significant size in 
agricultural processing industries were the Shearers' Union in Gisborne; the Slaughtermens' and 
Milk and Cheese Factory Workers' Unions in Invercargill; the Wool Workers' Union in Napier; 
the Flax Workers' Union in Palmerston North; and the Bakers', Millers' and Biscuit Factory 
Employees' Unions in Timaru. The most important transport-related unions in the period were the 
watersiders' unions, which were some of the largest unions in the port towns: Gisborne, Napier, 
Nelson, New Plymouth, Timanl and Wanganui. The other significant transport-related union 
across all the towns was the Drivers' Union, although the Coach and Motor Union, Tramways 
Union and Taxi Drivers' Union also emerged in this period. The third category of industry which 
was highly unionised was construction. In every town the Carpenters' Union was strong and long-
established, and the Painters' and Builders' Union was also relatively strong in this period. Finally, 
the General Labourers' and Engineers' Unions were established in many of the towns in this 
period. In terms of absolute numbers of workers belonging to unions, Invercargill and Gisborne 
ranked far more highly than the other towns, and Timaru, Hastings and Hamilton ranked very 
lowly. 
Patterns of union membership in the pre-compulsory era directly reflected the kinds of industry in 
each electorate, rather than any inherent social characteristic of the towns themselves. The same 
key unions tended to establish themselves in each town, and none of the towns showed a 
particularly strong tendency towards high levels of union is at ion. 
Many of the unions established in the pre-compulsory period continued to be dominant during the 
following decades. The largest and most widespread unions in the compulsory period were the 
waterside workers' unions, the AS.R.S., the freezing workers' unions, the Hotel and Restaurant 
42 Chapman, Jackson, and Mitchell, Politics in Action, p. 241. 
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Employees' Union, the New Zealand Workers' Union and the Engineers' Union. Of the six port 
towns, Napier, New Plymouth and Timaru had the most consistently strong watersiders' unions. 
The Nelson union never had more than one hundred members, whereas the Gisborne and 
Wanganui unions were relatively strong in the 1930s with a membership of around 160, but had 
dwindled away to nothing by the mid 1950s. While the Timaru Watersiders' Union was not 
particularly large, its membership grew steadily across the period from 120 members in 1928 to 
169 in 1960. The Napier and New Plymouth Watersiders' Unions were much larger, growing from 
two to three hundred across the period.43 
Freezing works were some of the largest employers of labour in the country at this time, and 
Timaru and Hastings had by far the largest freezing workers' unions of the ten towns. Both towns 
had two works within their borough boundaries. The combined membership at the Tomoana and 
Whakatu Works in Hastings was 727 when the union first appeared in Labour Party records in 
1938, and had grown to 882 by 1960. Together, the Pareora and Smithfield Works in Timaru had a 
membership of 367 in 1928 which had grown to 650 by 1960. Gisborne, Invercargill, Palmerston 
North, and Wanganui all had unions of at least 400 by 1951. Napier and New Plymouth had 
comparatively small unions with only 150 and 250 members. Hamilton was the only town with no 
freezing workers' union for the whole period, and the union in Nelson was relatively small with 
less than a hundred members. In all towns except Hamilton and Nelson, the freezing workers' 
union was one of the dominant unions, and certainly represented the largest unionised workplace 
in the town. The freezing workers' unions in five of the towns (Invercargill, Napier, Nelson, New 
Plymouth, and Wanganui) appear to have disaffiliated from the Labour Party in the wake of the 
waterfront dispute. The Timaru freezing workers, however, remained affiliated to the party 
throughout the 1950s. 
The A.S.R.S. was present in all the towns except Nelson, which had no railway. It was strongest 
in Hamilton, Invercargill, Palmerston North and Wanganui, all of which had membership of 
between two and five hundred across the period. The Napier and Timaru unions had a membership 
of around 250, while Hastings, New Plymouth and Gisborne had small unions of no more 150. The 
other widespread and large unions in the period were the Hotel and Restaurant Employees', 
Workers', Engineers, Carpenters' and Drivers' Unions. However, these unions tended to playa 
43 NZ.L.P. Annual Conference Reports. 
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less significant role in the rise of the political labour movement. This was because their members 
tended to work in small groups or by themselves. Unions whose members worked together in 
larger workplaces (for example freezing workers' and watersiders' unions) often had more defined 
sense of identity, greater solidarity and an increased likelihood of political and industrial 
militancy.44 
It is informative to reexamine patterns of union membership in light of Chapman's criteria for 
"independent industrial development". Chapman argued that the presence of such industries made 
an electorate more likely to vote Labour. Labour Party records of affiliated union membership 
across the ten towns reinforce Chapman's argument to a large extent. Chapman's criteria, as stated 
above, are for the most part compatible with the kinds of unions which have been discussed thus 
far: ports, railways, freezing works, and also woollen mills, processing plants, fertilizer works, and 
light industry. Strongly Labour-voting towns Timaru, Napier and Wanganui all had moderately or 
very strong waterside workers', freezing workers' and railway workers' unions. They also had 
other mill, processing plant and light industrial unions with a membership of over fifty, such as the 
Tobacco Workers' Union in Napier, the Woollen and Flour Mills Workers' Unions in Timaru and 
the Timberworkers' and Chemical Workers' Unions in Wanganui. On the other hand, Hamilton, a 
strongly National-voting town, has neither a port nor freezing works. In fact, with the exception of 
the railway workers, no unions of significant size in Hamilton were associated with large 
workplaces. The match between the nature of union membership in the ten towns and Chapman's 
criteria for the kind of industrial development which characterised Labour-voting towns is not 
perfect, however. With its large Watersiders', Freezing Workers' and General Labourers' Unions, 
New Plymouth gave the impression of being strongly Labour-voting, but was in fact one of the 
strongest National-voting towns. 
The analysis shows that Timaru was characterised by high levels of unionisation during the 
period of Carr's career. This was undoubtedly an important factor in the electoral strength of 
Labour in the period. Furthermore, the presence of key unions such as the AS.R.S., Watersiders', 
Freezing Workers', and (to a lesser extent) Flour Mills Workers' Unions would have greatly 
increased the political influence of organised labour in the electorate. Members of these unions 
worked together in large workplaces and were known for their political activity. 
44 Beli Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand: Past and Present (Wellington: Reed Education, 1973), p. 41. 
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Religion 
The relationship between sectarianism and voting in New Zealand has not attracted the attention of 
many historians. The scarcity of secondary material on the subject can perhaps be interpreted as a 
kind of de facto historiographic consensus that sectarianism did not play an important role in 
twentieth century voting patterns. Catholics accounted for about fourteen percent of the overall 
New Zealand population in the period, but there was wide variation in the proportion of Catholics 
in any given locality. The proportion of Catholics was higher in small towns and poorer suburbs, 
and the West Coast, where 30 percent of the population were Catholic. Most Catholics in New 
Zealand were Irish, and many were unskilled, and this, combined with a degree of opposition from 
Protestants, helped to created solidarity among the Catholic population. Institutions such as the 
Catholic school system and the Catholic Federation (fonned in 1913) were the product and 
. f h h' 45 expressIOn 0 t at co eSlOn. 
Sectarianism and voting do arise in the New Zealand historiography in the period before Carr 
came to power in Timam. The Protestant Political Association emerged in the post World War 
One era under the charismatic and bigoted leadership of Howard Elliot. In its attacks, the P.P.A. 
would associate Catholics with the radical left. Elliott aligned himself with the Reform Party and 
was instmmental in the decline of the Liberals through his persistent criticisms of Liberal leader, 
Catholic Joseph Ward. The P.P.A. stirred up anti-Catholic sentiment amongst Protestants, but its 
activities were largely confined to the cities, and it went into decline in the 1920s, disappearing by 
1934.46 So, while there was a political alliance of sorts between certain radical Protestants and 
conservative politicians, evidence of strong Labour voting among Catholics during Carr's period is 
circumstantial at best. Neveliheless many (conservative, Protestant) contemporaries claimed that 
bloc voting by Roman Catholics was a factor in Carr's success in 1928. The impressive Catholic 
Basilica overlooking central Timam lent rhetorical weight to this argument. Table 3.7 shows 
Catholics as a percentage of the total population of each town. 
45 Olssen, "Towards a New Society," p. 270. 
46 Miles Fairburn, "The Fanners Take Over (1912-30)," in The Oxford Illustrated HistOlY a/New Zealand, ed. 
Keith Sinclair (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 192-195. 
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Table 3.7: Proportion of total population Catholic in ten provincial town 
electorates 1926-1961 47 
Town 1926 1936 1945 1951 1956 1961 
Gisbome 14.2% 14.7% 14.1% 13.4% 13.9% 14.0% 
Hamilton 13.3% 13.5% 13.5% 13.8% 14.3% 14.5% 
Hastings 14.8% 15.0% 15.2% 14.8% 13.7% 14.2% 
Invercargill 13.1% 13.5% 14.9% 14.9% 15.5% 15.9% 
Napier 14.6% 14.2% 14.5% 14.8% 15.7% 16.3% 
Nelson 10.1% 10.0% 10.2% 10.8% 10.8% 11.3% 
New Plymouth 10.5% 10.7% 12.5% 12.9% 12.8% 14.2% 
Palmerston North 12.5% 12.7% 12.6% 12.0% 12.9% 13.5% 
Timaru 14.0% 14.9% 15.4% 15.3% 15.7% 16.8% 
Wanganui 13.2% 14.7% 14.7% 15.3% 15.8% 16.7% 
There was comparatively little variation among the towns in terms of the proportion of Catholics 
across the period. The lowest proportion of Catholics in a town was ten percent (in Nelson in 
1936), the highest 16.8 percent (in Timanl in 1961). In most towns most of the time, about 
fourteen percent of the population were Catholic, which corresponded to the national average. 
Nevertheless, there appears to be a rough rank-order correlation between the proportion of 
Catholics and the Labour vote in these towns: National-voting Nelson and New Plymouth were 
lowest in terms of their proportion of Catholics, whereas Labour-voting Timaru, Napier and 
Wanganui all ranked highly. The other notable feature of the table is that every town except 
Gisbome and Hastings showed a marked growth in the proportion of Catholics across the period. 
There was a marked decline, on the other .hand, in the proportion of Anglicans in all towns across 
the period.48 All the towns except Invercargill and Timaru had very similar proportions of 
Anglicans. Invercargill and, to a lesser extent, Timaru had much lower proportions of Anglicans 
than the other towns, and correspondingly high proportions of Presbyterians. There was a very 
wide variation in the proportions of Anglicans in the period, from 49.9 percent in New Plymouth 
in 1926 to just 16.4 percent in Invercargill in 1961. There was also wide variation in the 
proportions of Presbyterians: from 13.6 percent in Nelson in 1936 to 45.3 percent in Invercargill in 
1951. The Methodists constituted a much smaller proportion of the population than the other major 
denominations, ranging between 4.4 percent in Gisbome in 1926 to 14.9 percent in New Plymouth 
in 1961. In general, the proportion of Methodists was declining gradually across the period. 
47 Data taken from N.z, CenslIs. 
48 Data on the pl'OpOliions of Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists in the ten towns is included in 
appendix three. 
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Correlation analyses between the proportions of each of the four major Christian denominations 
and Labour's share of the major party vote produced no statistically significant relationships. 
There is a weak positive correlation (correlation coefficient of 0.234) between the proportion of 
Catholics and the strength of the Labour vote in the towns. However, there is also a weak positive 
cOlTelation between the proportion of Anglicans and the Labour vote. The only statistically 
significant correlation was between the proportion of Methodists and the National vote. But 
Methodists account for very small number of voters (10 percent of the population even in strongly 
National-voting towns) so their voting preferences cannot have affected election results in the 
towns to any significant degree. It appears that religion did not playa decisive role in influencing 
the Labour vote in these towns in this period. 
Home Ownership 
While both major parties aimed their policies and campaigning at making home ownership an 
accessible goal for as much of the population as possible, it may be expected that a higher level of 
home ownership in a town would correlate with a higher National vote, and vice versa. Chapman 
found that voters who were boarding or flatting were less likely to swing away from Labour in 
1957.49 Where levels of home ownership were low, and there were greater proportions of voters in 
rental accommodation, the appeal of Labour's state housing and interventionist welfare policies 
would have been more popular. Table 3.8 shows the proportion of all dwellings in each town 
which were rented. 
Table 3.8: Proportion of all dwellings rented in ten provincial town electorates 1926-
1961 50 
Electorate 1926 1936 1945 
Gisbome 43.6% 52.1% 44.1% 
Hamilton 41.4% 57.4% 48.9% 
Hastings 35.2% 48.5% 43.1% 
Invercargill 23.5% 33.0% 22.9% 
Napier 42.9% 52.6% 47.6% 
Nelson 25.9% 33.7% 32.8% 
New Plymouth 31.2% 45.3% 39.8% 
Palmerston North 36.7% 48.7% 44.6% 
Timaru 30.8% 41.3% 34.5% 
Wanganui 36.7% 52.5% 42.8% 
49 Chapman, Jackson, and Mitchell, Politics in Action, p. 248. 
50 Data taken from N.2. CenslIs. 
1951 1956 1961 
33.7% 27.1% 25.8% 
39.9% 29.1% 27.5% 
33.7% 23.2% 22.9% 
18.1 % 14.8% 16.1% 
40.6% 29.5% 26.5% 
27.5% 21.9% 19.4% 
32.8% 24.9% 23.4% 
39.8% 32.6% 31.5% 
30.8% 25.0% 22.6% 
33.2% 24.7% 23.7% 
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I There was a fairly wide variation in levels of renting in the towns, from Invercargill at the end of 
the period where less than fifteen percent of inhabited dwellings were rented, to Hamilton in 1936 
where almost sixty percent were rented. Invercargill and Nelson had the lowest levels of renting, 
Hamilton, Napier and Palmerston North the highest. There was a general decline in renting in all 
towns over the period. Invercargill and Nelson also had the highest levels of mortgage holders, 
New Plymouth, Napier and Wanganui the lowest. 51 There was a gentle increase across all towns 
over the period in the number of households paying off their properties with a mortgage or time 
payment. There was a steeper increase across the period in the number of freehold properties, 
although the very highest level of home ownership, in New Plymouth in 1956, was still only 
slightly over a third of all households. Hamilton, Palmerston North and Napier showed the lowest 
rates of freehold ownership, New Plymouth, Nelson and Timam the highest. 
Correlation analyses of the relationship between dwelling tenure and strength of Labour vote 
reveal fairly consistent patterns. Levels of renting, and the combined number of freehold and 
mortgaged properties, correlate strongly with the Labour vote. The positive correlation between 
the proportion of rented properties and the Labour vote in the towns is statistically significant, with 
a correlation coefficient of 0.325. When the proportions of mortgaged and freehold properties are 
combined into a single "home owner" category, and this figure correlated with the Labour vote, 
the result is also statistically significant, with a coefficient of -0.336. Overall, there was a 
reasonably strong relationship between dwelling tenure and Labour vote in the ten towns in this 
period. Towns with a higher proportion of their citizens in rented accommodation were more likely 
to return a Labour member. 
Strangely, Timam appears to mn against these broader trends. For most of the period, there was a 
fairly low level of renting in Timam, much less than the other strongly Labour-voting towns 
Napier and Wanganui, and in fact considerably less than Hamilton, a strongly National-voting 
town. Furthermore, Timam had one of the highest rates of home ownership across the period, 
considerably higher than Hamilton. Levels of home ownership and renting were the product not 
only of income levels and occupational status (social factors which also influenced the Labour 
vote) but also of purely regional variation. While cheaper housing in the South Island may have 
51 Data on dwelling tenure in the ten towns is given in appendix three. 
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meant that home ownership was more accessible in South Island towns, this did not directly affect 
voter behaviour there. 
The Timam electorate won by Carr in 1928 was one which was socially and historically 
predisposed towards Labour voting. Timam's economy had been based on the processing of 
agricultural products since the end of the nineteenth century. In a town where light industrial and 
transport-related workplaces were prevalent, it was no surprise that there was a high level of 
unionisation. The strength of the unions in Timam created an environment in which there was 
widespread support for the ideals of the Labour Party, and assured a high level of funding for the 
local party organisation. Additionally, agricultural land ownership patterns dating back to the 
nineteenth century produced an oppositional sense of class consciousness, and it is possible that 
this acted to increase solidarity amongst Labour voters. A pattern of anti-conservative voting had 
been established in the electorate during the Liberal era in New Zealand politics, and 1925 was the 
only election at which Timam voted emphatically against Labour. 
Residential stability and slow population growth meant that the electoral geography of the 
electorate remained very stable, with the majority of polling booths dominated by Labour. The fact 
that most votes for the National Party were cast in predominantly Labour areas may have made the 
development of an effective National Party organisation more difficult. Timam's slow rate of 
population growth was a factor common to all the Labour-voting provincial town electorates. 
Timam also showed other social characteristics which were statistically associated with a high 
Labour vote, including high levels of union is at ion and a high Catholic population. 
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4. "A man like Carr": Clyde Carr establishes himself in 
Timaru, 1928 to 1938 
"If it had been anyone but Clyde Carr, we could have understood, but this is past comprehension." 
"Deeply regret the stupidity of electors ofTimaru." 
- Notes of consolation to Francis Rolleston after his defeat by Carr at the 1928 election! 
Chapters four and five give a detailed description of CmT' s career as MP for Timan! between 1928 
and 1962. CmT's political career is divided up into two periods: 1928 to 1938, and 1939 to 1962. 
Chapter four is concerned with Carr's initial win and work to establish himself in the electorate 
between 1928 and 1938. In the first decade of his career, CmT cut his political teeth with a series of 
well executed campaigns in Timam. He proved himself to be a forceful speaker and a capable 
parliamentarian, although he was not selected for cabinet by Savage in 1935. The mid and late 
1930s saw the high point of Carr's political career with his term as president of the Labour Party 
and the largest majorities of his career in 1935 and 1938. This was a period of ascendancy, 
popularity and success for Carr. 
After 1938, however, Carr's majorities began to slip as the Labour Party entered a gradual 
electoral decline which was only temporarily reversed in the mid and late 1950s. Nevertheless, 
Carr held his seat throughout the period. He continued to expound radical and progressive politics 
in his parliamentary speechmaking and earned the ire of both the Labour Party hierarchy and many 
voters in Timam though his association with dissident Labour MP John A. Lee. At the 1943 and 
1954 elections, Carr had to defend himself against strong third party candidates representing 
political positions he himself had once held. By the 1960 election, Carr was seventy-four, and only 
managed to hold the seat by a tiny margin. While the latter period of Carr's career was a 
challenging one, in many ways it defined Carr's political achievement. Despite his party's defeat 
at the polls and his frequently controversial politics, Carr held Til11aru at election after election to 
become one of the longest-serving MPs in New Zealand history. Appendix four shows the level of 
support for Carr and his opponents across the eleven elections that he won. 
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The bulk of chapters four and five is devoted to description and analysis of Carr's eleven election 
campaigns. The primary purpose of the election analyses is to identify those aspects of Carr's 
campaign technique and policy advocacy that ensured his continued success. A second theme in 
these sections is the identification of shifts in the nature of camp~igning which occurred across the 
three decades of Carr's term. Other sections within the chapters discuss aspects of Carr's life other 
than his election campaigns, specifically his policy interests, his family life and his involvement 
with Lee. 
1928 Election 
In many ways, the most remarkable achievement of Can"s parliamentary career was also his first: 
to win the Timam seat in 1928. It was at this election that Carr faced his most formidable 
opponent, and set the political style that he would maintain for the rest of his career. Carr was 
irreverent, fiercely egalitarian, witty, non-moralistic, sometimes eccentric and never afraid to 
provoke controversy when he felt it was warranted. These personality traits - and his main political 
concerns of social security and industrial development - would characterise all his later 
campaigns. 
Most contemporaries expected the incumbent, the Francis Rolleston, to comfortably hold Timam 
in 1928. Not only was it Carr's first election, but he was standing in a completely unfamiliar 
electorate. Carr had moved down to Timam just a month before the 1928 election, and was still a 
member of the Christchurch City Council when he won the seat? Carr's profile in Timam was 
negligible. Some Timamvians were familiar with him as an announcer on 3YA, but he was 
otherwise unknown in the town. Carr's experience of political campaigning was modest at best, 
limited to local body campaigns. and his work for Daniel Sullivan in 1922. 
But it was Rolleston's high status, as much as Carr's inexperience, which made the 1928 result so 
surprising. At the time of the election, Ro11eston was Minister of Defence and Justice, and 
Attorney General. He had been educated at Christ's College, then studied law at the University of 
New Zealand at Christchurch, establishing a law practice in Timam. Rolleston's record of 
involvement in local politics was extensive. At the 1905 general election he stood unsuccessfully 
against William Hall-Jones. He became mayor of Timam in 1921, standing down the next year 
I From FJ. Rolleston Papers, Canterbury Museum, Christchurch. 
2 NZ. Worker, 24 October 1928. 
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when he won the Timan! seat against Labour candidate Percy Vinnell. Rolleston retained the seat 
in 1925 and became a senior member of Coates' cabinet in January 1926. Rolleston derived nniher 
status as a member of a renowned Canterbury family. Francis' father, William, was premier of the 
Canterbury province and a cabinet minister between 1879 and 1884 and his brother Jolm was MP 
for Waitomo from 1922 to 1928. The Rolleston name was known in Timan! and across New 
Zealand and was strongly associated with politics. Rolleston entered the 1928 election campaign 
as a two term incumbent with a majority of almost 2500. 
There were two factors working in Carr's favour at the election, however. Firstly, there was no 
United Party candidate standing in Timan!. In many electorates at the 1928 election, United 
candidates took precious votes from Labour. Bn!ce Brown argued that many town workers and 
unionists at the 1928 election heard the "musical chinle of the seventy million" (a reference to 
Joseph Ward's election promise raising seventy million pound loan for development) and voted for 
United. Brown noted that Labour lost two urban seats, Auckland East and Grey Lynn, to United 
candidates.3 The second factor working in Carr's favour was that the 1928 election saw a massive 
nationwide swing away from Reform. In 1925, Reform had won fifty-five seats and 46.5 percent 
of the national vote, easily fornling the government as the Liberal Party's share of the vote slipped 
to just 20.4 percent and eleven seats. At the 1928 election, however, the rejuvenated Liberals (now 
named the United Party) increased their vote by almost ten percentage points. Labour's vote 
dropped slightly and Reform's fell by almost twelve percentage points (largely a result of their 
poor performance in office and the recession of 1926 and 1927), allowing United to form the 
government. It was a massive rejection of Reform, and Carr's success in Timan! in 1928 must be 
seen in this national context. 
As he entered the 1928 campaign, Rolleston must have been confident of victory, and perhaps a 
little complacent. At most of his campaign meetings, he received accolades from the local chair, 
usually with reference to his efforts as a local MP, his status as a senior cabinet minister, and his 
family's political heritage. The introduction by the chair of the Waimataitai School COl11l11ittee 
was typical, discussing the importance of Rolleston's family to the development of the Canterbury 
region, then thanking Rolleston for being "courteous and obliging to all sections of the community 
3 Brown, Rise a/New Zealand Labour, p. 103. 
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irrespective of their views.,,4 Rolleston had the respect of all sections of the community, not only 
because of his cabinet status and work as a local representative, but also his high degree of 
personal integrity. Newspaper reporters, editors and meeting chairpersons alike were glowing in 
their praise of Rolleston, showing him genuine respect. Perhaps more surprisingly, Rolleston's 
political opponents were quite prepared to acknowledge his ability. Spealdng at the Unitarian Hall 
in support of Carr's campaign, Daniel Sullivan opened his speech by describing his fellow 
parliamentarian Rolleston's reputation as a courteous and able gentleman. s Carr himself, on the 
victory dais on election night, claimed that he regretted the defeat of a gentlemen such as 
Rolleston, and repeated a comment that he had made earlier in the campaign, that "if Mr Rolleston 
would have stood as a Labour candidate, he would have preferred to see [Rolleston] in the seat.,,6 
While Rolleston's position in cabinet increased his personal prestige, it also placed demands on 
him which restricted the amount of campaigning he was able to do in his own electorate. As a 
senior minister in an apparently safe seat, Rolleston was frequently called upon to assist Reform 
candidates in other electorates. A telegram from Coates to Rolleston from October 1928 
demonstrated the pressure that Rolleston was under as his party stmggled to stem the tide of voters 
swinging to United: 
In addition to Sumner I tmst you will be able to take a meeting at Rangiora STOP My 
hands are more than full and I am unable to meet half the demands which are being made of 
me STOP I do hope ministers will hold themselves in readiness to render some outside 
assistance where desired ... 7 
The other factor which mitigated the effectiveness of Rolleston's campaigning was his own style. 
Rolleston's speeches were often defensive, delivered in response to Labour's criticisms of Reform 
policy. For example, at Rosewill and Waimataitai he began his addresses by dealing at some 
length with Carr's accusations that Reform's legislative support for farmers was reactionary.8 At 
Kensington, Rolleston began his speech by addressing Labour's criticisms of Reform's changes to 
4 Timaru Herald, 7 November 1928. 
5 ibid., 8 November 1928. 
6 ibid., 15 November 1928. 
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Industrial Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 9 The defensiveness in Rolleston's rhetoric even 
extended to his discussion of his own constituency work. Rolleston opened the first meeting of his 
campaign with an apology for not spending as much time in Timaru as he would have liked, as his 
ministerial duties required him to spend a great deal of time in Wellington. 10 Whether Rolleston 
was conscious of it or not, his defensiveness was a poor campaign strategy, as it served to repeat 
Can's criticisms of his own party, allowing Can to set the agenda, and placing himself on the back 
foot. By contrast, Can would usually open his speeches with either a criticism of the status quo 
under Reform or a positive expression of what Labour would do when elected to government. 
The most powerful aspect of Rolleston's speechmaking was his criticism of Labour. He accused 
the Labour Party of concealing its hue objectives of the socialisation of the means of production, 
distribution and exchange in its election policy statements. Therefore, Rolleston argued, Labour 
could not be trusted. In any case, Labour's policy proposals were unrealistic and too expensive to 
be implemented. II By contrast, Reform were prudent, and their administration of government 
during the recent economic difficulties had been sound. Rolleston defended the government's 
record on unemployment, claiming that the New Zealand situation still compared favourably with 
conditions in the rest of the world, and defended the limited progress made in closer land 
settlement by pointing out that much the land area of the large estates was made up of unimproved 
ttlssock land that was inappropriate for settlement by smaller land holders. 12 
Rolleston was most comfortable speaking, on rural issues, and tended to focus on these during the 
campaign. He frequently refened to the importance of Reform's protection of the wheat and flour 
industry, taking credit for a policy with strong local appeal. 13 At Otipua and Seadown, for 
example, the meeting reports simply state that Rolleston spoke on matters of interest to farmers. 14 
Elsewhere, Rolleston focused his speechmaking on Reform's land settlement and primary industry 
protection policies. By aligning himself with farmers and their interests, Rolleston risked 
alienating the large urban section of his electorate whose political interests lay elsewhere. Despite 
7 Coates to Rolleston, 31 October 1928, Item 66, Folder 10, FJ. Rolleston Papers, Canterbury Museum, 
Christchurch. Rangiora was in the Hurunui electorate, which had been held by United leader Forbes since 
1908, while Sumner was in Lyttelton, a very safe Labour seat. 
8 Timaru Hera/d, I and 7 November 1928. 
9 ibid., 13 November 1928. 
10 ibid., 21 October 1928. 
II ibid., 14 November 1928. 
12 For example ibid., 24 October 1928. 
13 ibid., 1 November 1928. 
14 ibid., 29 October and 3 November 1928, 
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his defensiveness and mral focus, there is no doubt that Rolleston was an effective and 
accomplished public speaker. Rolleston's speechwriting and presentation skills had been honed 
through extensive political experience. His speeches were well organised, easily comprehensible 
and persuasive. Rolleston also received strong support from the local press, in particular the 
Timal'll Herald. In its editorials, the Timartl Herald explicitly endorsed Rolleston's candidature 
and the Reform administration, as well as echoing Rolleston's criticisms of the "socialistic" 
Labour Party. IS The Herald also cast aspersions on Carr's abilities as a politician and 
complemented Rolleston on his reserved, proper behaviour, lack of ostentation and a refusal to 
make promises he could not CatTY out. 16 To all intents and purposes, the political voice of the 
Timanl Herald was that of the Reform Patiy, and it continued to actively support conservative 
political interests for the duration of Carr's term in Timam. 
Carr's campaign contrasted with Rolleston's in its fundamental approach, both in terms of his 
policy advocacy and his campaign style. Carr's main policy concerns were threefold. Firstly, at 
almost every meeting, he advocated the breaking up and closer settlement of large estates. I? This 
was Labour Party policy, and an issue of particular relevance to South Canterbury with its long-
established sheep-runs and their historical and symbolic association with the privileged land-
holding class. Secondly, Carr went to great lengths to emphasise Labour's plans for the protection 
and development of secondary industry, which contrasted with Reform's focus on issues 
concerning farmers and primary industry. 18 Carr argued that industrial development was needed to 
reduce the country's reliance on imported goods and create employment opportunities. He 
advocated the decentralisation of industry (and shipping) away from the four main centres to 
secondary centres like Timaru. Thirdly, Carr focused on the expansion and improvement of the 
social security system. He promised relief to the increasing number of people who were finding 
themselves out of work as export prices for New Zealand's agricultural goods fell, and the country 
entered into a serious depression. Labour's welfare plans provided a strong point of contrast with 
the United and Reform parties, which were portrayed by Carr as being completely insensitive to 
the needs of the unemployed. 
15 ibid., 5 November 1928. 
16 ibid., 24 October 1928. 
17 For example ibid., 12 November 1928. 
18 ibid., 31 October 1928. 
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Importantly, Labour's innovative welfare proposals also helped to forge its image as the 
progressive party of new ideas, Carr's campaign was generally positive, as he was able to suggest 
new policies and novel solutions to the problems faced by the country that the Reform government 
had not been able to address successfully, Carr would later describe the 1928 election as not so 
much a party political battle as "a clash of two worlds, one the world of the past and the other the 
world of the future .. " I was facing the future, thinking of the development of industry and 
commerce in this comparatively small town of Timaru and Mr Rolleston was thinking of it as had 
always been", as a secluded select community,,,19 
Other themes in Carr's speeches were targeted more deliberately at the Timaru electorate, For 
example, he championed the need for improvements to Timaru Harbour. The "sound 
administrator" Rolleston, on the other hand, defended the decision of the parliamentary committee 
which had ruled against further funding for harbour development. 2o In the final speech of his 
campaign, Carr listed of a whole raft of improvements and general amenities that he would push 
for if elected: harbour facilities, a new railway station, and three new post offices,21 
The defining aspect of Carr's campaigning, however, was not his policy advocacy, but his 
campaign style, which was distinguishable from Rolleston's on two counts, Firstly, Carr was a far 
more active campaigner, and secondly, his personality came across as a far more humane and 
sympathetic than Rolleston's, A count of meeting notices from the Tinlaru Herald during the 
campaign shows that Carr held approximately thirty meetings over twenty-one days of 
campaigning, and that Rolleston held twenty-one meetings over sixteen days of campaigning, 
However, it was the nature of his campaign meetings, rather than their number, which truly 
differentiated Carr's campaign from Rolleston's, 
Carr went to extraordinary efforts to reach the people whose votes he hoped to win, and to 
address them on their own terms, He held a number of large evening meetings outside the Crown 
Hotel in the central city, which were attended by up to five hundred people,z2 Outdoor meetings 
were considered rather unusual, and attracted condescending comment from the Timanl Herald, 
Carr's meetings ran late into the night, and, while they often commenced an hour or two after 
closing time, the strongly social character and high attendance at the meetings suggest that many 
19 N.Z.P,D" Vol. 274,10 September 1946, 
20 Timaru Herald, 8 November 1928, 
21 ibid" 13 November 1928, 
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of those present had begun their evening at the Crown Hotel. The pub was not the only unorthodox 
place used by Carr for campaign meetings. Carr visited the Timaru Old Men's Home, where he 
spoke on old age pensions, then entertained the men with songs and recitations. 23 The next 
afternoon, in teeming rain, CaIT held a meeting for relief workers at Cave. The meeting had to be 
held under the shelter of the bush due to the rain, and on the way to the site, Carr had to "walk the 
plank" as the Pareora River was flooded. At the meeting, Carr related his experience on the 
Labour-led Christchurch City Council where trade union wages had been paid to unemployed 
working on borough works, and explained Labour's proposals to introduce unemployment 
insurance. 24 Carr also attended a social held by the Young Peoples' Social Club, where, after his 
address, he sang songs to the seventy young people gathered there. At this meeting, Carr claimed 
that the labour movement was a youth movement in its vigour, hopes and ideals. 25 
Carr also held a number of meetings at remote stores in settlements outside of Timaru town. His 
meeting at Rosewill was attended by an audience of only twenty, but according to the report, they 
had travelled, despite the poor weather, from as far as eight miles away. Despite the difficulties of 
travelling in rural areas in such conditions (Carr's driver took a wrong turn in the darkness, 
. delaying the start of the meeting26), there were many willing volunteers prepared to drive Carr out 
to these settlements at little or no cost to the party.27 Further demonstrating his versatility, Carr 
lead a couple of services at the North Street Congregationalist Church at the end of his campaign, 
which would surely have provided an opportunity for him promote his political views from the 
pUlpit.28 
Carr tailored his campaign speeches to specific audiences. At the freezing workers' community 
of Pareora, he dealt with over-capitalisation in the freezing industry and its negative effect on 
workers' wage rates, and on the general downturn in rural work 29 At a meeting for women at 
Caroline Bay Hall, Carr spoke of how "the future welfare of the world lies in its womanhood", 
22 ibid., 10 November 1928. 
23 ibid., 27 October 1928. 
24 ibid., 29 October 1928. 
25 NZ. Worker, 24 October 1928. 
26 Tin/ani Hera/d, 31 October 1928. 
27 NZ. Worker, 7 November 1928. 
28 Tin/am Herald, 10 November 1928. 
29 ibid., 2 November 1928. 
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quoting feminist philosopher Benjamin Kidd and urging women to take full advantage of 
opportunities to participate in local and central govemment. 30 
Carr's experience both as a minister of religion and a broadcaster proved very valuable during the 
campaign. In contrast to the austere Rolleston, Carr's warmth and humanity was demonstrated in 
both his personality and policy advocacy. His meetings generally were not only well attended, but 
comparatively informal, relaxed and warm affairs. Meetings often ran past their allotted times, and 
occasionally musical performances or dances followed the official proceedings.3] Aside from the 
friendly banter, Carr displayed a quick wit and natural sense of humour at his meetings. When the 
Timal'll Herald failed to publish his full biographical statement in their candidate profiles, CalT 
quipped sarcastically that they had done so deliberately, as "it would not do to unduly popularise a 
Labour candidate at election time." Later in the same speech Carr bemoaned the fact that under 
Refoffil, the number of horses on the land had decreased, but "the number of asses, goats and 
mules had greatly increased.,,32 The atmosphere of Carr's meetings could not have contrasted more 
strongly with Rolleston's. 
Interestingly, there is some evidence that Carr had some profile in Timaru as a radio announcer. 
Radio audiences in Timaru would have heard Carr's 3YA broadcasts from Christchurch.33 At 
Fairview, the chairman of the meeting introduced Carr, mentioning that "his voice was familiar to 
wireless listeners.,,34 In The Radio Years, Patrick Day stated that radio announcers at the time were 
very well known, being among "the first to experience the mass recognition that broadcasting 
conferred ... .it was evident that Clyde Carr's announcing position at 3YA helped him win the 
Timaru seat in 1928.,,35 
Also crucial to CalT's first campaign was the support of three guest speakers who held meetings 
on his behalf in Timaru: party leader Henry Holland, MP for Avon Daniel Sullivan, and party 
president and mayor of Christchurch, Rev 1.K. Archer. Archer was an important figure for Carr, 
both as a fellow Labour member on the Christchurch City Council and as a minister of religion 
whose religious beliefs and went hand in hand with his passionate involvement in labour politics. 
30 ibid., 5 November 1928. 
31 ibid., 22 October 1928. 
32 ibid., 13 November 1928. 
33 Jim Sullivan, Tuning in to Till1aru .' Fifty Years of Radio in South CanterblllY. 1949-1999 (Timaru: Radio 
Reunion, 1999), p. 3. 
34 Timanl Herald, 25 October 1928. 
35 Pattick Day, The Radio Years.' A History of Broadcasting in New Zealand.' Vo!t/lne One (Auckland: 
Auckland University Press in association with the Broadcasting History Trust, 1994), p. 165. 
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Accordingly, when Archer attended the opening meeting of his campaign, Carr described Labour 
as a movement for Christian values, trying to achieve justice, freedom and equality for all 
people. 36 Carr also alluded to the fact that Archer was described by the Christchurch newspapers 
as "Mr" Archer, because they refused to believe the Labour Party could have "respectable men" in 
it. This helps explain Carr's insistence on holding on to the honorific Reverend years after having 
left the Church. Carr took care to describe himself as "minister of the Gospel" whenever possible 
during the 1928 campaign, and to associate Labour with Christian principles. 37 Perhaps the most 
explicit statement of this nature came in his address at the Theatre Royal when he quoted Archer, 
saying that "the only chance [the Church] had to save itself was to recognise that the Gospel 
needed to be an economic one, and must apply itself to the needs of the Church. Labour needed the 
Church, and the Church needed Labour.,,38 In the campaign advertising he placed in the Timanl 
Herald, Carr further elucidated his political philosophy, accusing Reform of being the 
willing tool. .. of the squatter, the banker, the middleman and the money lender and its 
members cannot serve these masters and you at the same time, any more than they can 
serve God and ManmlOn .... As a minister of the Gospel, I am proud to belong to such a 
noble and high-minded Party [as the Labour Party]; for, in my opinion, it is the only Party 
that is strenuously and consistently trying to put the Christian religion into practice.39 
In its editorial comment on the election campaign, the Timanl Herald was quite explicitly partisan 
in its support of Rolleston, focusing its criticisms of Carr and the Labour Party on a number of 
issues. In one editorial, the Herald accused Labour MPs of opposing the 1927 Customs 
Amendment Act which was intended to afford greater protection to the wheat growing industry in 
New Zealand, and thus of having "voted against the wheat grower.,,40 A couple of days later it 
accused the party of doing its "utmost to bring disaster to this district" over the wheat industry 
protection issue.41 Elsewhere, editorials accused both Carr and Archer of being "cogs in the 
machine of the Party," portraying the Labour Party as a dictatorial institution, whose MPs had no 
36 Tima/'ll Herald, 20 October 1928. 
37 ibid., 12 November 1928. 
38 ibid., 13 November 1928. 
39 ibid., 12 November 1928. 
40 ibid., 20 October 1928. 
I 
f 
I 
r 
f 
62 
freedom except to follow the orders of Holland and the caucus. 42 The newspaper sarcastically cast 
aspersions on Carr's lrnowledge of Labour's policy platforms: "Doubtless the average elector will 
wonder why it should be necessary for the President of the New Zealand Labour Party [Archer] to 
come to the rescue of the candidate who has such a superior knowledge of the Labour Party's 
policy? People who have listened to Mr Carr lrnow why!,,43 To the extent that the Timanl Herald 
made any conunents on the personalities of the candidates, they portrayed Carr as an incompetent, 
untrustworthy, radical outsider, and Rolleston as a brilliant, honourable and dedicated local MP. 
Rolleston's reserved and prudent temperament was contrasted with the "vote-catching practices of 
the Socialists.,,44 Carr also came in for some personal criticism for being resident outside the 
electorate, the newspaper describing his non-Timaruvian status as a "severe handicap.,,45 
The candidates themselves, however, carried out the campaign in a gracious and polite manner, 
and on election day both men "moved among the people, and talked about the weather and other 
similarly important subjects ... on one occasion the two candidates met in the street, shook hands 
heartily, and catTied on a conversation with much cordiality .... ,,46 When the results were 
announced in the evening, Carr had polled 5547 votes to Rolleston's 5080. This gave Carr a 
majority of 467 votes, or 4.4 percent of the total vote. While Carr's majority was modest, the result 
represented a remarkable swing of almost fifteen percent towards Labour in Timaru between the 
1925 and 1928 elections. 
Upon the announcement of the result, Carr was carried shoulder high to the election platform. His 
victory speech was gracious, beginning by thanking the electors of Timaru and accepting the 
honour of winning "not so much personally, as for the Party which he represented." Carr then went 
on to thank Rolleston for a clean, fair fight, and acknowledged the high regard with which his 
opponent was held. Carr said that he "regretted the defeat of a gentleman like the Hon Mr 
Rolleston, and ... had said from the conunencement that if Mr Rolleston would have stood as a 
Labour candidate, he would have preferred to have seen him in the seat.,,47 Having won the 
election, Carr seemed genuinely reluctant to accept the credit for winning the seat himself. Instead, 
he saw his victory as the result of the attractiveness of the policies of his party, and the "persistent 
41 ibid., 23 November 1928. 
42 ibid., 22 October 1928. 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid., 24 October 1928. 
45 ibid., 31 October 1928. 
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and well-directed efforts of the little band of Labour stalwarts in this constituency who had been 
working for years to attain the victory which had been won that day.,,48 Carr also acknowledged 
the work of Percy Vinnell at previous elections, claiming that Vinnell should be standing where he 
was that day. 
In its coverage of election day, the Timanl Herald paid more attention to Rolleston's loss than to 
Carr's win. The tone of its reportage was one of surprise at the result, a sense of regret at the loss 
of a great politician, and an intimation that Carr had somehow been lucky to win the seat. The 
opinion that Rolleston's loss was a temporary aberration, and that he would be returned at the next 
election was often expressed. The Christchurch Press described Rolleston's defeat as "perhaps the 
most sensational of the General Election.,,49 The Christchurch Star, in its editorial on the election, 
claimed that "since the election ... Timaru is greatly disgusted with itself."sO It also made the useful 
observation that the Timaru result demonstrated the strong appeal of Labour in urban electorates. 
If Labour was to be beaten in such electorates, it argued, it could only be done by United. Thus, 
the newspaper was tacitly describing the lack of appeal of the Refonn Party for working class 
urban electors. The Timaru result was echoed, the Star noted, in other urban electorates where the 
absence of a United candidate had allowed a Labour candidate to defeat Reform, such as Dunedin 
North, Napier, Wellington East and Wellington North. 
Responses to Carr's victory among Refonn supporters ranged from surprise to dismay. Rolleston 
received letters of commiseration from all over the country, from all kinds of people. Even Labour 
MP for Westland, James O'Brien, admitted that "while politically pleased at Labour's win, I am 
personally very sorry for your defeat." The letters revealed a particular disgust that Timaru had 
chosen "a man like Carr" in favour of Rolleston. Carr is described variously as a "nothing more 
nor less than an adventurer", a "half-pie outsider", and a "regular carpet bagger ... with [an] 
unsavoury past." Fonner Prime Minister Sir Francis Dillon Bell described Carr as a "rotter" and a 
"discredited dissembling parson", while another correspondent wrote simply, "If it had been 
anyone but Clyde Carr, we could have understood, but this is past comprehension." There was a 
decided note of superiority in the tone of the many letter writers who described the voters of 
46 ibid., 15 November 1928. 
47 ibid. 
48 ibid. 
49 Press, 15 November 1928. 
50 Christchurch Star, 19 November 1928. 
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Timaru as ignorant, unappreciative and stupid. One wrote that "constituencies are fickle creatures 
and quite unmindful of benefits received or good work done", while another put it more bluntly: 
"the public is an ass and will never become anything better.,,51 As late as 1974, Carr's upset 
victory was still a sore point for conservatives in Timaru. Author George Guy wrote of the 1928 
result: 
To have a member of the Labour Party representing them [Timaru's conservative interests] 
in parliament was indignity enough, but it was far worse when the defeated member was 
the son of a fomler Provincial Superintendent, whereas the new member was a stranger 
from Christchurch who conducted most of his campaign at street comers where he was 
known to sing with his supporters. 52 
Where letter writers offered something in the way of an explanation for Carr's win, they tended 
towards a number of themes. There was a general sense that the national result reflected a general 
and growing sense of dissatisfaction with Reform. Some writers consoled Rolleston with the idea 
that his loss was merely the result of the govemmenfs overly long term in power. Others believed 
bloc voting by Catholics, or the civil service, or both, was responsible for Carr's win. A number of 
writers identified Rolleston's supposed support for the bible-in-schools movement and 
prohibitionism as factors that counted against him in Timaru. 53 Another explanation offered in 
consolation to Rolleston was closer to the truth: "It is hard to realise that you who have been 
almost a part of Timaru should be thrust out by a person who doesn't even live in the place! -
which all goes to show what organised labour can do in a democratic town." Indeed, Carr's victory 
in Timaru in 1928 was as much the culmination of two decades of political labour organisation in 
the electorate as itwas the result of his energetic and innovative campaigning. As illustrated in 
chapter three, the Timaru electorate was already demographically inclined to Labour voting, 
largely because of the presence of large highly unionised workforces. In addition to this, the 
United Party was weak in the electorate, having not stood a candidate since 1919, leaving voters 
51 All these letters are held in the F.J. Rolleston Papers, Canterbury Museum, Chtistchurch. 
52 George Guy, Thomas o/Timarll (Christchurch: Pegasus, 1974), p. 83. 
53 In fact, while Rolleston took a moral view of indulgences like gaming and "the drink evil", he was by no 
means outspoken on either issue. He actually voted against the Religious Exercises in Schools Bill in 1924, 
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with Labour as the single opposition party. It was these factors which set the context for Carr's 
victory. Carr's communication skills, personality and energetic and thoughtful campaigning 
allowed him to fully capitalise on the opportunity that the Timaru electorate presented to him. 
Figure 4.1: Caricature of Clyde Carr by Stuart Peterson54 
1931 Election 
Carr had an easier time at the 1931 election than in 1928, as he defended the seat in his first 
election as an incumbent. Carr carried out his campaign in much the same way as he had done at 
the previous election, with the advantage 'of a three year track record and a much higher local 
profile. Carr's cause was assisted by two other external factors which helped weaken any potential 
conservative backlash against him. These two factors were the onset of the depression, which was 
turning voters towards Labour all over the country, and the division of anti-Labour forces within 
the Timaru electorate. 
In September 1931, Prime Minister Forbes announced the formation of a coalition government in 
response to the ongoing and deepening economic crisis faced by the country. The intention behind 
the fornlation of the Coalition was to allow the United and Refornl parties to fight Labour together 
at the general election in December. This created a problem at the electorate level, however, as the 
local United and Refornl party organisations were called upon to agree on a single candidate to 
saying in Parliament that " ... ifyou want to teach religion into the young mind the proper person to do it is the 
parson or the priest, not an unwilling school master." N.Z.P.D., Vol. 207, 20 August 1924. 
54 Taken from The Bulletin, 25 May 1932, p. 13. 
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fight Labour. Nowhere did this present more of a problem than in Timaru, where, once Rolleston 
had decided against standing, the United and Reform organisations could not agree on a single 
candidate. Consequently, two candidates opposed Carr, splitting the anti-Labour vote. Carr's 
opponents spent as much time attacking each other as they did Labour, and on election day Carr 
held the seat with an increased majority. 
Following Rolleston's decision to not stand for the Coalition, a number of meetings were held 
between United and Reform in an attempt to find a compromise candidate. The parties' attempts at 
agreement were unsuccessful, and on November 7, the United Party announced that Herbert Hall 
would oppose Carr as a Coalition-United candidate. Hall was bom and educated in Christchurch, 
having moved to Timaru in 1907 to work as an architect. He designed a number of public and 
commercial buildings in the town, including the war memorial column, and gained something of a 
public profile for his work. 55 A few days later, Reform announced the candidature of Herbert 
Armstrong. Armstrong had moved to Timaru in January 1931. The newspaper notice placed by 
Reform announcing Armstrong's candidature went into some detail describing the efforts that 
Armstrong and Reform had gone to avoid a triangular contest in Timaru.56 There was already a 
considerable amount of animosity between the parties at this point, and this animosity intensified 
and became more public as the campaign progressed. 
Am1strong, not Hall, was Carr's chief opponent in the campaign. He was a superior campaigner, 
and aligned himself more closely with the Coalition than Hall did. The result on election day 
showed that the campaign had been a two-way fight, with Hall figuring only as a minor candidate. 
All he had achieved by standing was to spilt the anti-Labour vote and allow Carr to win the seat. 
While the two Coalition candidates' parties were trying unsuccessfully to settle on a single 
candidate to oppose Labour, Carr had already begun his campaign. On November 13, Carr 
addressed a large outdoor crowd at Crown Hotel Comer. The dominant theme of Carr's speech 
was a thoroughgoing critique of the Coalition govemment's attempts to deal with the effects of the 
depression on the people. Carr's particular focus was on the inequality of sacrifice under the 
Coalition administration. In spite of the hardships being suffered by many people, Carr argued, the 
government had introduced wage cuts to rank and file public servants, and had reduced spending 
on education. The Coalition had approved extravagant spending on projects like the Auckland 
55 Till/Gnl Post, 26 November 1931. 
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Railway Station and the Tongarairo Chateau, had increased salaries and bonuses to senior public 
servants, and were allowing immigration to continue despite the number of unemployed New 
Zealand workers. 57 During the campaign, Carr often described the poor conditions of workers on 
the government's relief work schemes, then contrasted this with quotes of the untaxed dividends 
paid out to shareholders from highly profitable private companies. 58 Carr railed against the 
international monetary system and the strength of the big banks with radical rhetoric, refelTing to 
the "international banking octopus of America [that was] rapidly getting its tentacles upon the 
lifeblood of world industry.,,59 The solutions to the problems faced by the country were, according 
to Carr, to be found in the policy proposals contained in Labour's manifesto. These included 
promising the abolition of the Arbitration Court, the establishment of a state-owned central bank, 
the introduction of a more equitable taxation scheme, and assisting in the development of 
secondary industry. 
The conditions of relief workers became something of a local issue when controversy arose over 
the treatment of relief workers at Lindis Pass Camp. In a heated meeting of the Timaru 
Unemployment Committee on November 12, the chair, Mr O'Hagan, resigned after refusing to 
allow the use of committee funds to pay the fares of Timaru workers at Lindis Pass relief camp to 
get back home.60 According to the unemployed men at the meeting, conditions at the camp were 
unacceptable, and incredibly, some workers had travelled from the camp to Timaru on foot rather 
than continue working there. However, O'Hagan argued that paying the men's fares while the 
matter was still under investigation by the government would be tantamount to inciting a strike. 
The next day, E.W. Hessell, a heavily indebted young man who had worked at Lindis Pass camp, 
confronted Joseph Coates about not being able to pay his bills because he not been paid for the 
work he had done at the camp. Hessell went on to describe conditions at the camp, where workers 
were asked to work for 7/- per week, sometimes up to their knees in water with no gumboots. 
According to Hessell, the sleeping quarters at the camp were inadequate and the food was "not fit 
for a dog". Coates' response to Hessell could hardly have been less sympathetic. He simply told 
Hessell that he should have stayed in the camp, related a story of the hardships he himself had 
56 Timaru Herald, 10 November 1931. 
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suffered as a young man, and told the audience that the govemment was doing all it could for the 
unemployed with the tax revenue it had at its disposal. There were cries of "shame" from some 
audience members in response to Coates' speech. 61 Coates had provided all the evidence Carr 
could have hoped for of the Coalition's lack of sympathy for the unemployed. 
Carr made a point of emphasising his diligent service to the electorate during his first term as 
MP: "I have missed no known opportunity for service, for that was my idea and ideal of 
Parliamentary representation, as of alllife.,,62 At South School, in a strongly Labour-voting area, 
Carr was thanked for securing a grant for a new school building.6} Carr even received an 
endorsement of sorts from the mayor, who chaired Carr's final meeting at Scottish Hall, praising 
him for being willing to do whatever was asked of him in the interests of Timaru. 64 Carr's 
emphasis on his service to the electorate during his first term marked the beginning of the most 
important and consistent theme in his campaign style. At every subsequent election, Carr made a 
point of listing his achievements on behalf of the electorate. 
Typically; Carr distinguished himself from his opponents through his personality and campaign 
style. He held a number of large outdoor meetings in the town centre which were highly accessible 
to audiences because of their convenient time and location, and attracted large crowds. In 
comparison to the dry and self-important Hall, Carr appeared very much in sympathy with those 
suffering under depression conditions. Newspaper reports of Carr's meetings refer to him "driving 
his points home with homely illustrations which the audience were quick to appreciate.,,65 
Coalition-Refol111 candidate Amlstrong's policy advocacy followed fairly closely official 
Coalition policy of reducing offshore debt, favouring public work schemes over an unemployment 
benefit, and group settlement of undeveloped land. Amlstrong advocated a more flexible 
Arbitration Court, and continued protection for the wheat and flour industry.66 At his opening 
meeting at the Scottish Hall, Armstrong related a story that served to show the personal animosity 
that existed between the two anti-Labour candidates. According to Armstrong, he had passed Hall 
on the street before the campaign had begun, and Hall had told him that if he (Armstrong) was 
chosen by the Coalition cabinet to stand in Timaru, then Hall would run against him regardless. 
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Accused by an audience member at the Scottish Hall meeting of dishonestly representing himself 
as the official Coalition candidate, Armstrong answered by admitting that he was not an official 
candidate, but that he did support the Coalition. 67 A week later, at West End, Armstrong was again 
asked about the triangular contest, and he again voiced his full support for Coalition policy. 
Armstrong's support for the Coalition was in contrast to Hall's, who at this stage of the campaign 
had already stated rather flippantly that the Coalition did not know its own policy.68 Another factor 
that distinguished Armstrong from Hall was the former's willingness to confront the issue of the 
unemployment. Armstrong addressed this issue at almost all of his meetings, even if it were simply 
to reiterate his opposition to the dole system and his belief that the unemployed should be made to 
work on public works. 69 At Pareora, he emphasised the need for the country to find a solution to 
the problem of rising levels of unemployment and argued that one of the major benefits of a policy 
of group settlement would be that it would provide a useful outlet for unemployed labour. 70 By 
contrast, Hall had very little to say about the unemployment problem, or the conditions of the 
unemployed, whom he refused to treat as "a class apart".71 
By the end of the campaign, Armstrong and Hall were spending more energy fighting each other 
than Carr. Both candidates ran full column public notices in an issue of the Timartl Post attacking 
each other for various statements made in speeches during the campaign.72 In the same issue of the 
newspaper, each ran a large display advertisement. The first pictured Hall with George Forbes, 
Prime Minister and leader of the United Party, with the caption, "The Prime Minister, on his way 
to Dunedin, greets Mr Herbert Hall, our candidate at Timaru." The advertisement also featured 
large portraits of Forbes, Coates and Hall, and was a fairly transparent attempt to portray Hall as 
the officially endorsed Coalition candidate. 73 Armstrong's advertisement ran on the front page of 
the newspaper, and protested Hall's "unfair" use of the photo of himself with Forbes. Armstrong's 
advertisement also featured a facsimile of a telegram from Forbes that confirmed that he had no 
knowledge of Hall's use of the photo in his election campaign. 
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Coalition-United Herbert Hall's campaign was the last to begin, a week after Armstrong's and 
nine days after Carr's. Hall's late start was the result of his decision to delay opening his campaign 
until the Prime Minister had made his policy speech.74 Hall must later have regretted this decision 
as it left him with just two weeks in which to campaign, and he seemed unimpressed with Forbes' 
speech in any case. When Hall did open his campaign at Caroline Bay on November 21, it was 
heralded by the Timaru Post as one of largest ever political meetings in Timam, attended by 800 
people. The newspaper emphatically endorsed Hall's candidature: "here was a man whose 
exposition of the financial problems easily eclipsed that of any man who has dealt with politics in 
Timam for years ... He is indisputably the only candidate in the field for Timanl who possesses a 
political vision beyond that of a roads and bridges politician.,,75 The repOli included a detailed 
description of Hall's speech, which amounted to three and a half columns of dense economic 
argument, an in-depth discussion of currency standards and the exchange rate. This must surely 
have made for a tedious speech for the large crowd present. Given the questions asked of him, 
most of the audience were more interested in Reform and United's inability to cooperate than the 
amortisation of foreign debt. Hall did his best to evade this question, simply restating his belief 
that Timaruvians had the right to the widest and best possible range of candidates. 76 In fact, at 
almost all of their meetings, both Hall and Armstrong were questioned over their failure to avoid a 
triangular contest. At one of Hall's meetings, an audience member claimed that the Labour Party 
had decided not to interfere in his campaign, as his campaign was assisting Carr by splitting 
Armstrong's vote. 77 
Hall's attitude towards the Coalition was ambivalent at best. When asked about Coalition policy, 
he said, "seeing as they don't know it themselves, it is not possible for me to give it.,,78 Hall made 
several other Politically naive policy statements during the campaign, for example when he 
asserted that too much money was being spent on education, or that, despite their suffering, the 
unemployed must not be considered "a class apart.,,79 Hall often came across as not only 
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insensitive, but positively egotistical, at one point speaking unapologetically of his own 
"superiority complex. ,,80 
The division among conservative groups within Timaru went beyond the candidates and local 
party organisations to include the two local newspapers, the Timanl Herald and the Timaru Post. 
The Herald explicitly supported Armstrong, the Post Hall, and there was tension between the two 
newspapers over their paliisanship. This rivalry came to a head in the wake of Reform leader 
Coates' speech at the Little Playhouse, which was criticised by the Post as being a tacit Coalition 
endorsement of Armstrong. The editorial described Coates' meeting as "spontaneous and ill-
advised", and criticised the Herald for omitting from its report of the meeting Coates' caveat that it 
the Coalition did not officially endorse either candidate. 81 The next day, the Herald responded to 
the Post's attacks: 
It is only too obvious that the outburst of anger by the local journalistic supporter of Mr 
Hall, is not so much due to our hard worked reporter's little lapse, but the attack is offered 
as a counter blast to our expressed opinion that Mr Armstrong has the better chance of 
defeating Labour. 82 
In other editorials, the Herald was more explicitly partisan, repeatedly asking its readers to vote 
for Armstrong to avoid the defeat by Labour of both "moderate" candidates. 83 At times, the 
Timaru Herald was more critical of Hall than it was of Carr. The tone of its editorial description of 
Hall's opening speech, for example, was a combination of mocking and serious criticism: 
we rather fancy that if Mr Hall desires to be understood by the average elector who has a 
vote to cast, he will be compelled to descend from the polished counters of high finance and 
vacate the exclusive chairs of the economic theorists, and come right down to the breakfast 
table of the everyday citizen. The Parliament of New Zealand is not a lace for the theorist; 
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what is needed to-day IS men of everyday experience, human sympathy and 
84 
commonsense. 
The Post, too, was highly partisan right from the beginning, often emphasising the importance of 
having a "local man" as a representative. This was meant to be read as an endorsement of Hall, the 
candidate who had lived in Timaru the longest. According to the newspaper, the people of Timaru 
had had 
one experience of the folly of acclaiming a stranger. To-day they are resolved that no-one, 
either one of their own number or of Wellington, shall be allowed to bring in another such 
stranger. 'Timaru for Timaruvians!' is the current catchword ... If the sitting member is to 
be ejected, and it is high time he was, he will be given his conge by one whose permanent 
address is Timaru, and whose occupation, substance, standing and repute are known to all. 85 
The Post was not above veiled attacks on Carr's character either, as its editorial on the eve of the 
election showed, when it asked whether Timaru would continue to "consort with a Socialist" after 
"three years' bitter experience of representation by a man who, to put it mildly, is more reverend in 
the title that he claims than in his habits or manners .... ,,86 This was an early reference to the 
accusations about Carr's personal life which emerged commonly through his career. 
On election day, Carr won 46.7 percent of the vote, increasing his majority to 820 votes. 
Armstrong won 4l.1 percent of the vote, and Hall just 10.4 percent. Armstrong and Hall's 
combined vote was 345 votes higher than Carr's. Once his reelection had been confirmed, Carr 
was carried along Sophia Street on the shoulders of the crowd. In his speech he thanked his fellow 
candidates for a clean fight, and reiterated his pledge to work as an effective constituency MP: "as 
your member I will endeavour to serve all ran1es, classes and individuals in my constituency 
impartially." Once again, Carr thanked his campaign committee, stating that the victory was not 
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his but theirs. Hall was less than gracious in defeat, putting his loss down to an unsuccessful 
attempt to "teach Timaru the value of a superiority complex.,,87 
The 1931 election saw several factors outside Carr's control work in his favour. The most 
important of these was the inability of the conservative parties in Timaru to agree upon a single 
candidate to oppose him. Also, the national tide of opinion was swinging towards Labour, largely 
as a result of the Coalition's lack of effective solutions to the country's economic crisis. Carr's 
constituency work during his first term as MP certainly won him some support, or at least 
strengthened his existing support. Once again, Carr conducted a more extensive and effective 
campaign than either of his opponents. Newspaper meeting notices show that Carr held twenty-
seven meetings on seventeen days, in comparison to Annstrong's twenty-five meetings on fifteen 
days and Hall's seventeen meetings on nine days. As well as covering the outlying areas of the 
electorate, Carr addressed his core areas of support with outdoor meetings at the Crown Hotel and 
the Smithfield Freezing Works. 
1935 Election 
The 1935 election saw Labour sweep to power, and Carr comfortably hold the Timaru seat, 
increasing his majority to over one thousand votes. A number of factors which emerged at this 
election would also characterise later campaigns: the poor quality of the conservative candidate, 
the strength of Labour organisation in Timanl, and Carr's growing confidence as a politician. 
In the wake of the triangular contest at the 1931 election, the Reform and United party 
organisations in Timaru agreed to amalgamate into one "anti-Socialist" political organisation. 
However, despite the establishment of such a group in August 1932, a dispute over the 1935 
Coalition candidacy arose regardless. In May 1935 W. Angland, a former mayor of Timaru, 
announced his candidacy for the seat in the upcoming election. The anti-Socialist group fomled in 
1932 was caught unawares by Angland's announcement, and nominated William Thomas to stand 
in the seat. Angland was angry that Thomas was trying to "pinch his platform", but eventually, 
after a public and protracted debate between supporters of both nominees, Angland withdrew and 
Thomas was announced as the official candidate. 88 As fonner rector of Timaru Boys' High School, 
Thomas was a prominent Timaruvian and had the backing of many business and professional men 
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in the town and the Rotary Club,89 However, while Thomas was a capable man, he was a poorly 
suited to the mood of the time, Neither Thomas nor his friends were affected by the depression, 
and he and his wife had "attained what might be described as 'ringside seats' in Timaru Society,,,90 
Furthermore, Thomas had no previous experience in political campaigning, either at local or 
central government level. 
Thomas was a social conservative and had a tendency to sound moralistic and patronising in his 
speeches, He was a tee-totaller, though he denied that he was a prohibitionist or opposed to 
betting,91 He actively supported the socially conservative bible-in-schools movement, whose 
supporters had recently introduced the Religious Instruction in Public Schools Bill to Parliament. 92 
Thomas's conservatism, political inexperience and lack of "common touch" showed in his 
insensitivity towards and ignorance of the issue of unemployment. At Waimataitai, he angered 
some members of his audience by arguing that civil servants on low wages were just as badly off 
as the unemployed,93 Where Thomas made specific policy promises, these too were poorly judged, 
given the largely urban nature of the Timaru electorate, His main policy focus was on the 
importance of developing primary industry, and at one point he argued that New Zealand should 
not increase its secondary industry until the population had increased to two or three times its 
cUlTent level. 94 This was in marked contrast to CalT'S frequent statements on the urgent need for 
New Zealand to develop its secondary industries, and for that industry to be located in secondary 
centres such as Timaru, Rather than offer .novel policy proposals to deal with the country's dire 
economic situation, Thomas simply promised more of the same, emphasising the economic 
expertise of the Coalition,95 The Timarll Post generally did a more effective job of annunciating 
National's criticisms of Labour's policy than Thomas, describing Labour as "political quacks 
hawking elixirs with attractive trade names like 'money service at cost', 'guaranteed prices' and so 
forth,,,9G 
One of the most striking features of the campaign was the highly organised and vocal opposition 
that Thomas faced from Labour supporters at his meetings, At a special meeting for women at the 
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y'W,C,A., Thomas faced his most adversarial and demanding audience, The most provocative 
questions put to him betrayed an obvious loyalty to the Labour Party and showed the influence of 
CalT's political bias and interests; for example when Thomas was asked why, if socialism would 
lead to economic disaster, there was no unemployment in Russia,97 At the close of Thomas' 
meeting at South End, two audience members attempted to pass a motion that the audience express 
its regret that Mr Thomas, who had done so much for the conmlUnity in the past, had aligned 
himself with the "reactionary party" lead by Forbes and Coates,98 The motion was lost, but the 
episode must have been humiliating for Thomas, At Thomas' last meeting at the Theatre Royal, 
there were loud calls for "Joe Savage" by Labour supporters present. 99 The local Labour Party 
organisation did not limit their disruptive tactics to just the local candidate's meetings, When 
Forbes addressed an audience at the Theatre Royal, there were many sarcastic groans and 
wisecracks as he described the govemment's record over its last term, and the 
intermittent balTage of heckling", keyed the audience to an unusual pitch of excitement 
several times, when the concerted fire of intelj ection drowned out the sound of Mr Forbes' 
voice, The Mayor, Mr T.W, Satterthwaite, chairman, exasperated by the noisy 
demonstration, in an endeavour to stem the rising tide of heckling attempted to appeal for a 
fair hearing for the P,M" but only succeeded in provoking increased uproar, which finally 
submerged his plea in a crashing flood of pandemonium, 100 
At the end of the meeting the mayor criticised the crowd for not hearing Forbes fairly, and noted 
that Savage had been treated completely differently at his meeting ten days earlier, This comment 
was greeted with more shouting, and a voice from the crowd asked, "Why don't you kiss him?,,/ol 
CalT's audiences, on the other hand, were generally attentive, CalT had the confidence of a 
candidate who was established in his seat and had the national tide of opinion swinging in favour 
of his party, and spoke passionately on the need for radical reform of the monetary system. He 
promised the establishment of a central reserve bank that would make interest-free loans available 
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to the people. 102 Can also spoke on the need to develop New Zealand's secondary industry and 
transport infrastructure. Can saw the potential benefits that such a policy could bring to Timaru in 
terms of manufacturing and use of the port. 103 CUlT'S policy statements were not limited to 
economic development, however. He also dealt with social policy issues, stressing the need to 
keep the school entry age at five to keep teachers in work and help foster a sense of community, 
and his opposition to the Religious Instruction in Public Schools Bill, arguing that it was the 
responsibility of the church, not the state, to educate children on religion. Can quipped that the 
recitation of the Lord's Prayer in schools was an exercise in repetition, not devotion. 104 
Most importantly, Carr reminded his electors of the diligent and non-partisan work he had 
performed for the people ofTimaru over his seven years as their representative: 
Clyde Can has never turned a deaf ear to any request for assistance in securing homes, 
jobs, pensions or any form of relief. It has not been unusual for him to dispatch 20 letters 
and more a day. He has received hundreds of acknowledgements from individuals, 
associations, and local bodies of his unfailing courtesy and consideration, his promptitude 
and persistence in all matters refened to him by rich and poor, friend and foe. He has 
placed the cause of the destitute and afflicted above his private interests and his personal 
dignity. lOS 
The 1935 result in Timaru saw Can consolidate his hold on the Timaru seat, and enjoy the benefits 
of a nationwide swing in favour of his party. His majority was 1059, or 8.8 percent of the total 
vote in Timan!. 
Through the early and mid 1930s, Can advanced up the ranks of the parliamentary Labour Party. 
In 1931 and 1932 he was active in travelling outside Timaru speaking on behalf of the party, 
assisting at the Motueka by-election and in the formation of Labour Party branches in Oamaru, 
Geraldine and Temuka. 106 Can had sought election to the vice presidency of the party at least 
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twice before he eventually won the job in 1933. As vice president, CalT was required to undertake 
more travel outside the electorate, and in August 1933 he was successful in settling a procedural 
dispute between the Kaitanga branch and the Otago L.R.C. in Dunedin. 107 
Although he failed to win a second term as vice president, at. the 1936 conference CalT was 
elected party president. CalT'S responsibilities as president saw him travel the length and breadth 
of the country, addressing meetings, assisting at by-elections and helping to form new branches. 
CalY'S childhood experience of life on the road and his excellent speaking skills were invaluable 
during this time. His outspokenness caused some problems, however. Towards the end of his term 
as president, in December 1936, CalT made a controversial speech from Timaru in which he 
refelTed to the National Party as "ultra-reactionaries with Fascist sympathies". In the speech he 
made veiled threats to Arbitration Court judges and other civil servants who were not cooperating 
with the new Labour government: 
RefelTing to industrial legislation, [CalT] said that though the results in many cases left 
much to be desired, these were merely difficulties that remained to be overcome either by 
change in the personnel of certain administrative and judicial positions or by an assumption 
of more direct power by the government itself. 108 
It was easy to imagine, Carr said, the fate of those senior civil servants who "had become 
innoculated with conservative ideals, and found it difficult to adapt themselves to the new spirit 
and the new ideals." In its editorial the next day, the Dominion claimed that CalT and Labour were 
planning to destroy the independence of the Arbitration Court and "reduce it to the status of a 
rubber-stamp for the government." The editorial made a great deal out of the implications of 
CalT's suggestion, arguing that it would reduce officers of the Crown to "automatons" and that the 
civil life of the nation would be "brought under the tutelage of trade union dictatorship." 109 
CalT's presidential address to the 1937 conference concerned itself mostly with the economic and 
social policy achievements of the first Labour government. His radicalism and idealism emerged 
in his discussion of world affairs, however: 
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It is only by the workers of the world uniting for liberty and peace that the war-mongers -
big business, high finance and their slave press - with Church and State in the old bad sense 
to aid and abet them, can be enslaved or themselves set free for the common good, the 
growing good of man. 110 
At the end of his address, Carr also made an oblique plea to be considered for a cabinet position: 
Our only regret is that some of us have been unable to participate 111 the effort and 
contribute to the result to the extent desired. Our Ministers have, perhaps more or less 
inevitably, taken too much on themselves, with a resultant shortening of lives of great 
usefulness, while some of us less deserving have been spared to an unwelcome degree. I I I 
To his disappointment, Carr was never seriously considered for a cabinet position, and his single 
term as president proved to be the highest office he attained within the Labour Party. In 1935 and 
1938, Carr was almost immediately deleted from cabinet consideration by Savage. 112 
The Labour Party in Timaru 
The Labour Party organisation in Timaru was, for the most part, active and adequately funded. 
There seems to have been plenty of logistical support for Carr during his campaigns, and strong 
financial support from the unions within the L.R.C. If anything, the electoral strength of the local 
party probably contributed to its culture of vigorous intemal debate. In contrast, political 
organisation among conservatives in Timaru was very poor. The failure of the local United and 
Refoml parties to coordinate was a major factor in Carr's win in 1931, and in the post-war period 
the National Party was under-funded, unenthusiastic and in apparent disarray. 
Through the 1930s, Labour Party branch meetings were well attended and membership remained 
strong. The general political attitudes of the branch seem to have been fairly compatible with 
Carr's, and there was healthy debate within the branch in the late 1930s on issues such as 
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education, international relations and pacifism. Even as attendance at branch meetings gradually 
declined through the 1940s, Carr remained firmly in control of the branch. 113 Disputes 
occasionally arose within the local party, however. The first and most major of these during Carr's 
term arose over the Labour candidacy for the Timaru mayoralty in 1935. A local Labour man, 
A.M. Patterson, ran for the mayoralty against the official Labour candidate, G.T. Koller. At the 
election, Patterson polled higher than Koller, and the latter lost his £1 0 deposit. I 14 The resulting 
dispute between the two men continued for at least a year and eventually required intervention 
from head office. Patterson claimed that Koller's nomination had been irregular, and was 
unrepentant, referring to Koller as an "obnoxious person." Carr sided with Patterson on the issue, 
accusing Koller of seeking "personal aggrandisement.,,115 The dispute left a strong legacy of 
discontent within the branch, with Koller bringing the matter up at every opportunity. In August, 
the Labour Party National Executive sent party president Walter Nash to Timaru to resolve the 
dispute, but his efforts must have been unsuccessful because in May 1936 the matter was still 
"live", the executive having set up a subcommittee to investigate. 116 The subcommittee's report 
concluded that Patterson had violated the constitution by standing against Koller for the mayoralty, 
but that "the lack of co-operation in Timaru is based upon even more deeply rooted causes than 
even the correspondence [between the national executive and various interested parties and 
individuals in Timaru] reveals.,,117 
Local disputes continued to arise within the Timanl branch, as in March 1938 when a local 
member McKee was expelled after a disagreement over Labour policy on secular education. I 18 
McKee later shifted allegiance to John A. Lee's Democratic Soldiers' Labour Party. Carr himself 
was the centre of controversy in August 1937 when unspecified "moral" rumours that were 
circulating about Carr were discussed at a branch meeting. A movement that the matter be referred 
to the L.R.C. for further investigation failed. 119 The effect of Carr's association with Lee on the 
local party is described in the section on Carr and Lee in chapter five. 
IIJ Michael Bassett's notes from Timaru Labour Pmiy Branch Minute Books. Unfortunately, the minute 
books of the Timanl branch of the Labour Party are missing. Michael Bassett took notes tl'om them in the 
1960s, and believes they were deposited in the Auckland University Library. However, the librmy does not 
hold them. Bassett kindly allowed use of his notes for this thesis. 
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1938 Election 
The 1938 election saw the peak both of Carr's popularity in Timaru and Labour's popularity 
nationally, Labour took fifty-three seats and 55,8 percent of the national vote, and Carr increased 
his majority to 17,7 percent of the total vote in Timaru, the largest of his career. In his 
campaigning, Carr focused on Labour's social welfare proposals, received widespread praise for 
his constituency work, and continued his strident criticism of the big banks, privileged classes and 
the newly formed National Party, 
If Carr's previous opponents had suffered from being authoritarian and failing to grasp issues of 
importance to common people, then the 1938 National Party candidate, William Hall, was no 
exception, Hall was a sitting Borough Councillor who had lived in Timaru since his infancy, He 
prided himself on having received no education other than primary school and the "school of hard 
knocks", Hall's image of himself as a "self-made man" informed his thrifty and disciplinarian 
views: for example, he opposed government borrowing on the grounds that in his own life, "what I 
could not afford I did without.,,12o Elsewhere, Hall advocated compulsory military training and 
drilling (but not on Sundays), 121 During his campaign, Hall expressed a number of chauvinist 
opinions reg'arding race and gender roles, He believed that teaching mothering skills to girls was 
essential in order to increase New Zealand's population as a defence against the "hungry hordes of 
Asia", complaining that "at present a girl is taught everything but her real job in life, to be a home 
maker,,,122 He later stressed the importance of National's family allowance as a way of increasing 
the country's population, which was "the hope for a future white New Zealand,,,123 
Hall's strength was in his criticism of Labour policy, rather than his exposition of his own party's 
ideals, He argued that Labour's trade protection policies had failed to build industry, and that 
Labour's generous unemployment relief had now made it hard for farmers to find labourers, as the 
labourers would rather receive a government benefit than work 124 The latter comment would not 
have won Hall many voters among unemployed farm labourers, Hall accused Labour of being 
unduly influenced by union officials, and described compulsory unionism as a racket to benefit the 
120 Timaru Post, 4 October 1938, 
121 ibid" 13 October 1938, 
122 ibid" 27 September 1938, 
123 ibid" 8 October 1938, 
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"official class" of labour. 125 The local Labour Party organisation continued its tactic of tough 
questioning and disruptions at Hall's meetings in 1938. At both Scottish Hall and West End, Hall 
was confronted over the closing of Timaru Woollen Mills under National during the depression. 126 
Hall faced another tough, argumentative audience at Pareora, when he attempted to make political 
mileage out of Carr's involvement with Lee. 127 
The high point of the National campaign in Timaru came when a massive rally held at the Timaru 
Showgrounds was addressed by party leader Adam Hamilton and the National candidates for the 
tlu'ee South Canterbury electorates. The rally was attended by an estimated three thousand 
people. 128 Each of the speakers emphasised the benefits of private enterprise, low taxes, 
competition and private ownership, as opposed to Labour's "risky socialistic experiments." 
Although the attendance at the rally was very impressive, it is possible that many in attendance 
were not there entirely of their own volition. The previous day, Carr had warned his audiences 
against employee intimidation to attend the rally, and a letter to the editor on the day following the 
rally described the meeting as lacking animation and having a "funereal air. ,,129 
Carr opened his campaign with a meeting at the Scottish Hall, contrasting the wage cuts 
introduced by the Coalition with Labour's successful implementation of the guaranteed price 
scheme and wage restorations. Carr claimed that anything good in National Party policy had been 
taken from Labour's platform, and that Labour's record over the last three years in overcoming the 
worst economic and social effects of the depression spoke for itself. 130 Throughout the campaign, 
Carr was strongly critical of the behaviour of the banks during the depression, stressed the need to 
expand New Zealand's intemalmarket to reduce the country's reliance on imports, and spoke in 
detail about Labour's proposed social security scheme. 131 
During the campaign, Carr was frequently thanked for his work for the electorate over his first 
two terms as MP. At Gleniti, the chair of the meeting paid tribute to Carr's efforts in procuring 
improvements to t1~e local school. 132 At Scottish Hall, the mayor thanked Carr for his hard work 
125 ibid., 6 October 1938. 
126 ibid., 27 and 29 September 1938. 
127 ibid., 13 October 1938. 
128 ibid., 11 October 1938. 
129 ibid., 11 and 12 October 1938. 
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for the electorate. 133 Towards the end of the campaign, Carr ran an ad which emphasised his 
constituency service: 
During the past ten years I have endeavored to carry out the ideals [of Christianity] in my 
individual relationships with my constituents and as member of the Labour Party ... 
Irrespective, moreover, of party affiliations, my people have enjoyed my impartial 
championship and unstinted service. I could do no other. 134 
Some of the benefits of Carr's "unstinted service" were slow to materialise, however, and he was 
only able to answer with further promises audience questions about when Timan! would get its 
own radio station and a new police station. 135 
Carr faced a number of difficult audiences and opposition to his radical political statements, in 
particular his association with Lee. At the National stronghold of Highfield, the large audience 
expressed their dissatisfaction with Labour with a great deal of foot stomping and hostile 
questioning over price rises, the lack of military preparations for war and increased taxes. 136 At 
Otipua, hostile questioning over the implications of Labour's policies for farmers went on for so 
long that Carr's next meeting started late. 137 A particularly combative letter to the editor described 
Carr as a "pronounced extremist," who was rumoured to be persona non grata with both the local 
party and the parliamentary party organisations. The writer referred specifically to Carr's 
aspirations to be "I.A. Lee's lieutenant", quoting Carr as saying he would follow Lee to "the hot 
place".138 The degree of animosity that had built up during the campaign boiled over on the final 
night of the campaign, when Carr's and Hall's were held in venues across the road from one 
another. After the meetings, some of Carr's supporters booed Hall as he closed his meeting. 139 
On election night, Carr's victory speech was uncharacteristically bitter: "It is customary on these 
, 
occasions to thank the other side on a good clean fight but I am sorry I cannot do that tonight." He 
described the National Party's campaign as appealing to fear and ignorance, and of being full of 
133 ibid., 21 September 1938. 
134 ibid., 14 October 1938. 
135 ibid., 24 September 1938. 
136 ibid., 30 September 1938. 
137 ibid., 14 October 1938. 
138 ibid., II October 1938. 
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"calumny, misrepresentation and falsehood.,,140 Hall then appeared on stage to loud booing, and 
said that while he had planned to come on stage and thank Carr on a good clean fight, after Carr's 
remarks he could no longer do so, claiming "tonight you have seen the real Clyde Carr." There 
was more booing as Hall left the stage. 
Carr's Policy Interests 
In both his campaigning and his parliamentary speaking, Carr's key policy concel11S remained 
fairly consistent across his career. They were industrial development, intel11ational relations, social 
justice, broadcasting, literature and the arts. 
CalT pushed a number of themes regarding the development of secondary industry in New 
Zealand, all involving various forms of govel11ment intervention and protection of local 
manufacturing. Aside from the most obvious forms of govemment assistance to industry such as 
trade barriers and subsidies, Carr suggested other ways in which govemment programmes could 
encourage the development of manufacturing. These included funding scientific research which 
may lead to the development of new industries, introducing schemes to encourage the public to 
buy locally produced goods, and the extension and coordination of the transport infrastmcture of 
the country.141 Carr also urged that the govel11ment do all it could to decentralise industry away 
from the main centres. The trend towards the centralisation of industry and population, and the 
gradual migration of population northwards were recognised by Carr as highly damaging to his 
electorate. 
Carr would often discuss potential new industries in parliament, industries as diverse as the flax 
industry, fellmongery, possum trapping, pulp and paper, tobacco, aluminium smelting, coal 
carbonisation, tourism, and the steel industry. The corollary to Can"s emphasis on the importance 
of developing secondary industry was his criticism of the conservative parties for favouring the 
farmer at the expense of the rest of the country. He described the United govemment in August 
1929 as being like the Cyclops, "seeing nothing in the future of the country but sheep.,,142 Social 
Credit monetary reform was a major economic theme in Carr's parliamentary speeches in the 
1930s. 143 This too was strongly related to his concem with the development of secondary industry. 
140 ibid., 17 October 1938. 
141 NZ.P.D., Vol. 222, 9 August 1929. 
142 ibid., Vol. 222,27 August 1929. 
143 For example ibid., Vol. 228, 16 July 1931. 
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Carr saw government issue of cheap credit as a potential means of increasing the purchasing power 
of the public, and building the internal market for New Zealand manufactured goods. 
The second of Carr's key areas of interest was the peace movement and international relations. 
Throughout his career, Carr voiced his strong and often unorthodox views on issues such as 
opening up New Zealand's relations with Communist countries, especially the U.S.S.R.; self-
determination for colonial countries; and opposition to Cold War militarism and nuclear 
proliferation. Early in his parliamentary career, CalT was a strident critic of New Zealand's 
colonial administration of Samoa. While Carr's attitude towards the Samoans themselves was 
paternalistic to say the least, he argued forcefully for their self-government, and the removal of the 
New Zealand administration, claiming that "to set a military man the task of governing the 
Samoans is analogous to setting a prison warden the task of managing a kindergarten.,,144 
Despite his involvement with the peace movement and pressure from conscientious objectors' 
organisations,14S Carr was one of many long-time anti-militarists within the Labour caucus who 
did not oppose the introduction of conscription by the Labour government in 1940. 146 In fact, far 
from opposing conscription during World War Two, Carr actually signed up, and served one and a 
half years of home service. 147 A soldier who served alongside Carr in the Seventh Canterqury 
Regiment at this time remembers Carr resembling Ghandi because of his wiry frame and the fact 
he wore shorts most of the time. 148 Carr drew upon his experience in the army and his influence as 
an MP to campaign for better conditions for rank-and-file soldiers, and attacked the class privilege 
he observed within the army, where "selection is made for officers from the O.T.C. (Officers' 
Training Corps) and the O.S.T.B. (Cld School Tie Brigade)." 149 He also spoke out against what he 
saw as undue jingoism during wartime, attracting strong protest in August 1941 for a speech in 
parliament which ridiculed the proposal that children should salute the flag in class. 150 
The international issue foremost in Carr's mind was his desire for closer trade relations between 
New Zealand and the U.S.S.R. Carr was a strong suppOlier of the young Soviet Union, and saw the 
144 ibid., Vol. 222, 5 September 1929. 
145 Lincoln Efford to Clyde Can', 6 July 1942, Lincoln Efford Papers, MS-Papers-445-26, Alexander Turnbull 
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U.S.S.R. as a model for a new and better world to develop out of the Second World War. 151 
Support for the Soviet Union was a problematic issue within the Labour Party, as its leadership 
was highly sensitive to potentially electorally damaging accusations of being Communist 
sympathisers. In 1933, the Labour Party conference voted to .investigate the activities of the 
Friends of the Soviet Union, which was suspected of being a front organisation for the Communist 
Party. After a long and heated debate at the 1934 Conference, membership of the F.S.U. was 
deemed incompatible with Labour Party membership. 152 While it is not clear whether Carr was a 
member of the F .S. u., he was certainly a member of a similar organisation formed in August 1941, 
the Society for Closer Relations with Russia. Other MPs who were members included friends of 
Carr, such as Harry Atmore, and William Barnard, who had resigned from the Labour Party in 
sympathy with Lee in 1940. Carr was one of the vice presidents on the national executive of the 
S.C.R.R. 153 While a member of the S.C.R.R., Carr was the occasional thorn in the side of the 
Labour administration, particularly on issues like freedom of speech and political thought. When 
he referred to the importance of maintaining liberty of thought during wartime, he was making a 
veiled attack on the Labour Party's strict attitude towards members of the S.C.R.R. and 
communists. 154 Carr claimed that the dominance of capitalism in world economics had brought 
about the emergence of the huge industrial and banking cartels which were destroying 
competition. New Zealand, Carr urged, should "catch the spirit" of the U.S.S.R. in order to achieve 
"freedom from capitalism.,,155 By the late 1940s, Labour had become vehemently opposed to any 
perceived communist influence within the party, and the national executive asked all MPs who 
were members of the S.C.R.R. to end their participation in that organisation. All such members 
"agreed to immediately tender their resignations. ,,156 
Carr's approach to a range of political issues was characterised by conunon themes of democracy 
and social justice. Carr's radical egalitarianism was informed by his observation of the suffering 
experienced by many people during the depression. He typically aligned himself with the point of 
view of the "common" person, as he attacked undeserved privilege in all its forms. COlmnon 
151 ibid., Vol. 262, [8 June 1943. 
152 Brown, Rise of New Zealand Laboltr, p. 176. 
153 Society for Closer Relations with Russia Archives, [941, ATL 94- [06-20/02, A[exander Turnbull Library, 
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154 N.M. Tay[or, The New Zealand People at War,' The Home Front (Wellington: Department of Internal 
Affairs Historical Publications Branch, [986), p. 229. 
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targets for Carr's attacks were the big banks, big employers, and the stock and station agents and 
large mn-holders that owned much of South Canterbury. In a piece written for the New Zealand 
Worker in 1928 on his first impressions of parliament, Carr wrote from the perspective of an 
ordinary man who could not stop thinking of the families of unemployed men on relief as he was 
"treading the heavy carpeted marble halls [of the parliament buildings], or reclining in luxurious 
chairs and lounges .... " Carr showed little respect for the symbols of entrenched power: "the Clerk 
of the House shoulders menacingly the Mace, golden emblem of the old time club, or places it on 
the table, a costly barbIe, a glorious anachronism .... ,,157 In his first term of parliament, Carr spoke 
a great deal on the conditions of relief workers and the urgent need to address the growing social 
problem of unemployment. Carr would describe the plight of members of his electorate to 
illustrate his points, for example referring to a family who were so poor they could no afford 
clothes, so the children had to stay in a bed made of sacks to keep warm. ISS Based on his own 
experience working with constituents trying to get psychiatric patients discharged from hospitals, 
Carr believed that half-way houses should be established as an intermediate step between hospitals 
and the public. Carr also believed that many prison inmates were in fact suffering from mental 
illness, and that psychiatrists were needed in jails as well as hospitals.1 59 In other speeches he 
pleased the case of widows, vagrants, conscientious objectors, returned soldiers, low-ranking 
public servants, old age pensioners, the blind, and children with special needs. 
Education was the policy area with which Carr was most deeply concerned, once saying, "If there 
is a Minister I do envy, it is probably the Minister of Education.,,16o During his first term, he was a 
member of the parliamentary committee on education under Harry Atmore. The 1930 report of that 
committee proved to be instrumental in many of the reforms to the education system over the next 
few decades. Carr outlined his vision for the education system in the speech he gave at the 
presentation of the report. In this speech, he was critical of the current system for failing to 
recognise and foster the individual talents of each pupil, and of separating the cultural and the 
technical aspects of each child's education. Carr recommended that the grammar and technical 
schools should work together more effectively, that an intennediate school system be established 
to bridge the gap between primary and secondary schools, that the great number of small country 
157 N.z. Worker, 19 December 1928. 
158 N.Z.P.D., Vol. 221,17 July 1929. 
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schools be consolidated, and that control of education be decentralised to education authorities in 
the districts,161 Carr steadfastly opposed the compulsory teaching of religious education in state 
schools, as he feared it would introduce a sectarian bitterness to the school system, He believed 
that compulsory religious education was artificial, an "enforced piety", 162 
Carr's egalitarianism was also present in his irreverence, frankness and tolerance attitude towards 
"moral issues" like alcohol and gambling, Carr's social liberalism extended to a liberal approach to 
marital fidelity, and he believed that tolerance of a certain amount of infidelity had the potential to 
help save many man'iages, As a clergyman, Carr had seen many cases of infidelity resolved, the 
couples able to overlook their shortcomings and resolve to live happily together: "in spite of the 
fact that none of us believes in what I might bluntly call 'legalized prostitution', at the same time I 
contend", that anything that serves to discourage", separation or divorce proceedings is all to the 
good,,,163 Later, Carr made further reference to his beliefs about malTiage and sex: 
sex", whether we like it or not." is responsible for most of our mental and physical ills", a 
large proportion of our orthodox moral code is artificial, outdated and cruel, and a large 
propOliion of our population suffer as a result and manifest the effect of their suffering, 164 
Such views would not have endeared Carr to the puritanical Fraser, and eventually he and Carr 
opposed each other in the house over another moral issue, the consumption of liquor in dancehalls, 
Carr was adamant that all things were good in moderation, and that the consumption of liquor was 
part of the "merriment and jollification" of the dances: 
I think that many people who dance will probably be heard to say that they can dance better 
after they have had a couple of "spots", and", it wi11make for the greater success of the 
dance and the effectiveness of the performance if people who so desire are enabled, as one 
160 ibid" Vol. 222, 27 August 1929, 
161 ibid" Vol. 224,17 July 1930, 
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of my friends described it, to get a couple of "stings" in them .... The clause is calculated to 
spoil a lot of innocent fun, and even in wartime people need some fun. 165 
Carr drew upon his experience as a radio announcer and an author to become a spokesperson for 
broadcasting and cultural affairs in parliament. One of Carr's chief concems in the administration 
of radio was that this new medium should not fall prey to the same wealthy conservative forces 
which owned, operated and determined the editorial policy of the major daily newspapers. 166 Carr 
was a member of the parliamentary committee on broadcasting and reported to the Labour caucus 
on matters to do with broadcasting. 167 There was also a local dimension to Can"s interest in 
broadcasting, as he campaigned vigorously for a station for Timaru. Carr brought the issue up 
frequently in parliament, complaining that other towns of a similar size had had stations 
established before Timaru. 168 When, in 1949, Timaru's 3XC was finally opened after "twenty 
years of pestering", Carr considered the occasion a personal triumph: "This is a great day for 
Timaru and a thrilling moment for me.,,169 
Carr opposed censorship, and would often speak out against unnecessary restrictions on what the 
public could or could not read, hear on the radio or see in cinemas. He accused the Coalition 
govemment of making political decisions regarding film censorship, for example by banning films 
from the U.S.S.R. like The Five Yea/' Plan, but allowing the screening of salacious material from 
other parts of the world. 17O Carr's concerns went beyond the protection of freedom of speech, 
however, and on many occasions he was strongly critical of the "tedious and monotonous" content 
broadcast by the RB.C. 171 Carr felt that radio programmers should make more concessions to 
popular taste, for example by featuring band music and employing announcers with more "zip", 
"pep" and humour. 172 Similarly, Carr wanted to hear swing and boogie-woogie as well as classical 
music: "everybody's tastes should be catered for up to the limits of decency, even to the extent of a 
slight admixture of vulgarity at odd moments.,,173 In September 1944, Carr was a lone voice 
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arguing that politicians should not be squeamish and hasty to ban any programming considered too 
vulgar for a young audience: "We don't want to take a too grandmotherly attitude over these 
serials and we don't want a lot of old men and women coming along and telling the kids what to 
read and dO.,,174 He argued for as diverse a range of content as possible, preferring "wisecracking" 
American programs over "stodgy and uninspiring" British content. 175 Carr was also concerned that 
as much high-quality local content as possible be programmed on the radio, and made frequent 
pleas for more locally produced drama and music to be broadcast on radio. 176 
It was the written word which as closest to Carr's heart, however. Throughout his career, Carr 
prided himself on being a man of letters, having spent several years at university and having 
experience writing and editing for a variety of publications. Carr loved to put his extensive and 
obscure vocabulary to use and was never short of an anecdote, biblical quotation or extract of 
poetry to lend an air of erudition to his speechmaking. Carr contributed articles to magazines at 
various times, but the creative outlet he valued most highly was poetry. Clyde'S son Rae believed 
his father was "at bottom a poet", and that he was "never happier than when writing poetry.,,177 In 
the 1930s, Carr contributed his low-brow and humorous poems to the Australian magazine Aussie. 
He also wrote dance band lyrics for bands in Christchurch like the Billy Marsden Band. 178 In 1944, 
a collection of Carr's work was published as Poems by the Progressive Publishing Society.179 
Critic Patrick Evans described Carr's work as belonging to "the lR. Hervey tradition of tremulous 
clerical lyricism.',180 Carr also published Politicalities, a collection of short sketches of 
parliamentarians written in a colourful, conversational style. 181 
Carr's Family Life 
After the election win in 1928, Carr and his family settled in Timaru at 31 Selwyn Street, just 
north of the town centre. While much of the evidence about Carr's family life is anecdotal, 
consistent themes emerge of a close-knit family whose behaviour was considered unconventional 
and even eccentric by many Timaruvians. Laurie, a former teacher, schooled the children at home. 
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Daughter Diane was considered a tomboy and son Rae was a musician, which was not considered 
by one friend to be a very "manly" interest. 182 Laurie herself claimed to have been an atheist since 
birth, a fact that she kept from Clyde until they were married. She was a reader of Rationalist 
literature and would, according to Rae, "descend on peripatetic bible punchers with glee, with 
exquisite sweetness and disarming innocence tearing their arguments to bits." It was as a result of 
Laurie's influence that Clyde eventually became a cheerful agnostic, and "would use his extensive 
biblical knowledge to take the opposite side from whoever argued with him, for or against 
religion.,,183 Laurie made home brewed stout, parsnip wine, and potheen, and home brew would be 
a part of the music evenings the family held at house. 184 
The Carr's home life seems to have been an enigma to many of their neighbours. Many people 
remember the house itself as an eccentric, disorderly place - there were no doors in the house and 
it was so untidy at times that a plumber who visited the house to do a job described it as the 
"nearest thing I have seen to a pigsty.,,185 Doug Shears, who delivered groceries to the Carr's as a 
boy, remembered delivering groceries to the house, which was very messy: "One strange thing 
[Carr] did was to open a pound of butter and slap it on a 6 inch nail which was situated under the 
budgie cage. The old butter papers were never removed and were covered with bird droppings, 
seeds and feathers etc from the cage when the bird stared flapping its wings." Carr liked to cook, 
and would often cook a stew in a large pot, cook it all day then leave it on the stove to be reheated 
again and again through the week 186 
If many Timamvians found the Carr household out of the ordinary, the Carrs found the town 
itself to be unfriendly place. According to Rae, they had few friends there and few people turned 
up to the parties they arranged. Laurie in particular "always loathed the place".187 Laurie did not 
enjoy "hobnobbing" as the wife of a politician, so she simply did not attend campaign meetings or 
public functions. One of the very few occasions that Laurie appeared at a fornlal function with 
Clyde was Queen Elizabeth II's visit to Timam in January 1954. 188 
Understandably, Clyde made more of an effort to assimilate himself, and Saturday night dances 
were a favourite pastime of his. Carr was a regular at dance halls in both Timam and Christchurch, 
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a tall, gangly and rather clumsy figure who earned the nickname "Slide Far". 189 Oliver Gavigan, a 
local Labour Party organiser, remembered that Carr's favourite recreation was dancing all night: 
"He never missed a dance at the Scottish Hall ... he'd come there with dancing pumps and get 
changed." CalT was still attending dances in the late 1940s as he approached 60 years ofage. 190 
CalT's enjoyment of Saturday night dances, his tolerance of gambling and fondness for alcohol 
and tobacco distinguished him from many of his opponents, and conservative forces within the 
electorate. While his home life and personal interests outraged some of his political opponents 
(both outside and within the Labour Party), they suggest a politician at ease among the majority of 
his electors. 
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5. "Good old Clyde": The long incumbency, 1939 to 1962. 
"I intend never to retire." 
- Clyde CaIT I 
The Lee Affair 
The period 1937 to 1940 saw CalT as close as he ever came to the centre of the political life of the 
country, through his involvement with dissident Labour MP Jolm A. Lee. By the late 1930s, Social 
Credit had became a divisive force within the Labour Party. The party leadership, particularly 
Fraser and Nash, insisted on following orthodox economic policy and rejected Social Credit, 
claiming it was founded in unsound economic principles. By contrast, members of the "rebel 
caucus" - a dissenting minority group within caucus led by Lee - were strong proponents of Social 
Credit. CalT was a core member of the rebel caucus. He and Lee shared a common approach to 
politics, a love of controversy, and an interest in monetary reform and literature. Lee was 
everything CalT aspired to be: an electrifying speaker, a highly successful author of fiction, an 
iconoclast and a controversial public figure whose radical views commanded the attention of 
politicians across the political spectrum. When, in the late 1930s, Lee attracted around himself a 
loose-knit but numerically powerful group within caucus, it was only natural that CalT became 
involved. 
CalT attended the formal meetings of Lee's group from their initiation in September 1937? 
Initially, Lee's focus was on organising opposition to what he saw as Labour's increasingly 
conservative approach to economic policy. Clifton estimates that over half the Labour caucus 
leading up to the 1935 election was in favour of monetary reform, and many supporters of Social 
I N2.P.D., Vol. 286,18 August 1949. 
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Barnard, David Barnes, Charles Chapman, Harry Combs, Joseph Cotterill, William Denham, Fred Frost, 
Horace HelTing, Edwin Howard, Gordon Hultquist, Frank Langstone, Leonard Lowry, Jack Lyon, Robert 
McKeen, David McMillan, James Munro, Peter Neilson, Arnold Nordmeyer, James O'Brien, Arthur 
Osborne, Atihur Richards, Frederick Schramm, Clarence Skinner, Catherine SteWati, Charles Williams and 
Ormond Wilson. This list has been compiled from Gustafson, From the Cradle to the Grave, p. 200; Erik 
OIssen, John A. Lee (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1977), p. 115. 
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Credit were also members of the rebel caucus.3 Aside from monetary reform, the other force that 
was instrumental in binding the group together was resentment at having been passed over for 
cabinet positions by Savage. The rebel caucus became increasingly critical of the party leadership 
after Lee was passed over for cabinet after Labour's 1938 victory. After that election, when for a 
second time Lee was passed over for a position in Savage's cabinet, Can and Lee moved in caucus 
that the caucus, not the party leader, should elect cabinet.4 The issue was brought up a few months 
later at the Easter Conference in 1939, when a compromise proposal was passed, whereby cabinet 
appointments were to be made by the party leader but had to be endorsed by caucus. This was not 
satisfactory to Lee, and his single-minded detennination to oust Savage from the party leadership 
dates from this point. 
In caucus meetings, CatT defended Lee against Peter Fraser's attempts to control him, and in 
September 1939, Can and Arnold Nordmeyer tried to move a motion of no confidence in Fraser as 
deputy-leader in caucus, a motion which was lost by thirty-nine votes to three. 5 The relationship 
between Lee and Prime Minister Savage deteriorated rapidly, until Lee resorted to publishing 
thinly veiled attacks on Savage, most famously the article "Psychopathology in Politics" published 
in the left-wing journal, Tomorrovv, in December 1939. At the time of its publication, Savage was 
dying of cancer, and his health problems and the demands of wartime administration made it 
difficult to deal with Lee's attacks. Savage and Lee's feud reached a climax at the Easter 
Conference of 1940, when, under very dramatic circumstances, Savage issued a deathbed 
condemnation of Lee, the conference voted to expel Lee, and then Savage died, all within a 
twenty-four hour period.6 
Imnlediately after Savage's death, Lee believed rather optimistically that he had the firm support 
of thirteen members of his rebel caucus. In the end, only one MP, William Barnard, followed Lee 
out of the party. Lee's retrospective response to the desertion of his allies was typically egocentric: 
"my expulsion dispersed the rebel element. I was the force that held them together .... There was 
no sustained pressure after the spearpoint had been expelled.,,7 In fact, it seems that most of the 
rebel caucus, rather than being left disillusioned and directionless without their "spearpoint", made 
3 R. Clifton, "Douglas Credit and the Labour Pmiy, 1930-1935" (Master of Arts, Victoria University of 
Wellington,1961),p.219. 
4 Gustafson, From the Cradle to the Grave, p. 232. 
5 New Zealand Labour Pmiy Caucus Minute Books, 10 September 1939. 
6 Gustafson, From the Cradle to the Grave, pp. 268-269. 
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quite pragmatic decisions about their electoral futures. Rather than continuing to align themselves 
with Lee after his provocative behaviour and dramatic expulsion, the great majority of Lee's 
supporters chose the safe option of staying with the Labour Party. Like many of the rebel MPs, 
Carr felt that with the publication of "Psychopathology", Lee had gone too far, and this was the 
point at which he abandoned his support for Lee. 
In an interview published in the Timaru Herald immediately after Lee's expulsion and Barnard's 
resignation from the party, Carr was critical of the Labour Party leadership's handling of the affair. 
Carr said that he considered Barnard a close friend and he had the "very highest regard not only 
for [his] lofty ideals and unimpeachable character, but for his well-balanced judgement and 
judicial mind." It was clear that Carr was largely agreed with Barnard's view that the Labour Party 
"no longer followed the ideals that had led him to join them" and that the method of Lee's 
expulsion at conference had been irregular. At the end of the interview, however, Carr was careful 
to explicitly (if somewhat gmdgingly) state his support for Fraser as the new party leader, saying 
that he was "prepared to give Mr Fraser every opportunity of proving himself .... ,,8 
Carr's fiustration with Fraser must have been a major factor in his decision in April 1940 to stand 
for the party leadership following Savage's death. The final vote went Fraser thirty-three, David 
McMillan twelve, and Carr three. 9 It is difficult to understand the reasons behind Carr's 
nomination, or what he hoped to achieve by challenging Fraser's authority in this way, as Carr had 
no chance of winning the vote. One explanation that has been advanced is that Carr stood because 
he saw himself as senior to McMillan and thus more deserving of the leadership.lo Elsewhere, it 
has been suggested that Carr was "put up" for the leadership to ensure a genuinely plural vote. II 
This suggestion is interesting, and may have been a tactic on the part of Fraser to split the dissident 
vote within caucus. Whether Carr's leadership nomination reflected a genuine division within the 
rebel caucus, or a shrewd divide-and-conquer tactic on the part of Fraser, there was never any 
question of Carr's success. This makes Carr's decision to stand against Fraser appear to be a 
strangely suicidal political manoeuver. With no chance of success, it seems that all Carr stood to 
gain by standing was to alienate Fraser and the patty orthodoxy. 
7 John A. Lee, The John A. Lee Diaries 1936-40 (Christchurch: Whitcoulls, 1981), p. 210. 
8 Timaru Herald, 19 March 1940. 
9 Carr was nominated by Barnard, suggesting that he had the suppoti of the more staunch supporters of Lee 
within caucus. New Zealand Labour Party Caucus Minute Books, 4 April 1940. 
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At the Timaru Labour Party branch meeting following Lee's expulsion, the thirty-one members 
present had a protracted discussion of the conference. The official report of the Annual Conference 
was read, and Carr and others claimed that aspects of the report were "contrary to fact". There is 
no more detail of this discussion, however, and at the conclusion of the meeting, the branch swore 
its "unswerving loyalty" to Fraser and the government. 12 The political fallout from Carr's 
involvement with Lee had created sufficient disunity within the local party that 1941 a rival 
Labour candidate for Timaru, David Barnes, was nominated. In an effort to minimise the potential 
damage such an ongoing dispute could cause in the electorate, the national executive sent party 
president James Roberts and party secretary Michael Moohan to Timaru to investigate the dispute. 
In a three hour meeting, twenty-six local party members met with Carr, Moohan and Roberts to 
discuss Carr's involvement with Lee and the effect of that involvement on Labour's electoral 
chances in Timan!. Some party members took issue with Carr having been "associated very 
closely with Jolm A. Lee and expressed the opinion that they did not think [Carr] could be 
trusted .... ,,13 Two statements in particular by Carr had attracted the ire of party members: 
"attention was drawn to the statement made by Mr Carr in 1938 that he was 'prepared to follow 
Jack Lee to Hell', and also that at a later date that he had stated that he was 'awaiting some very 
important funerals. '" In his own defence, Carr pointed out that at the first statement was made at a 
time when Lee was "fighting for the Party's banner", and, regarding the second, Carr disputed 
exactly what had been said and also "the general atmosphere in which the statement had been 
made." Importantly, no one at the meeting had any criticisms to make of Carr regarding his 
constituency work and other duties as MP. According to the report, "the stand taken by 
delegates ... against Mr Carr was in the interests of the Patiy unity, and the fact that they thought 
Mr Carr, through his association with Lee had lost so much support it was doubtful if he could 
hold the seat." Carr denied that this was true, and stressed that he had had nothing to do with Lee 
since his expulsion. After further consideration, it was resolved that Carr should be endorsed as the 
party's candidate for the forthcoming election. 
10 Michael Bassett and Michael King, Tomorrow Comes the Song: A Life of Peter Fraser (Auckland: 
Penguin, 2000), p. 184. 
II Martyn Finlay to Colin Brown, 17 February 1996. 
12 Michael Bassett's notes from Timaru Labour Pmiy Branch Minute Books, 27 April 1940. 
\3 Minutes of National Executive of New Zealand Labour Party, 2 August 1941. 
96 
The Lee affair took a heavy toll on the local party. Membership of Labour Party branches within 
Timaru dropped from 781 in 1940, to 467 in 1941, to 272 in 1944. While this drop in participation 
reflected the effect of World War Two as well as dissatisfaction within the party over the Lee 
affair, it nevertheless represented a serious blow to the patiy organisation. Interestingly, the effect 
on membership of affiliated unions was much less dramatic. Affiliated union membership within 
the Timaru L.R.C. fell from 2935 in 1940 to 2699 in 1943, and by 1944 had already begun to rise 
again. 14 In his article on the impact of Lee's expulsion on the Labour Party, Erik Olssen also noted 
the relatively small drop in affiliated union membership, and argued that the effect of the affair and 
the threat of a split in the Labour movement was that most unions were brought "into line behind 
Labour.,,15 
John A. Lee himself was bitter about CalT's refusal to resign from the Labour Party: 
Clyde has abundant intelligence and literary appreciation but he finally degenerated into an 
MP detelmined to hold his seat and adjust his position accordingly. He feared my fate and 
surrendered. That was the end of him. Once a person swallows all that in which he believes 
he becomes just so much meat on the hoof. 16 
Lee's analysis seems somewhat unfair and self-serving. Carr's support for Lee was initially based 
on a political and personal meeting of minds. Along with a group of (overwhelmingly backbench) 
MPs, Carr lent his support to Lee in the hope of influencing the party's political direction. When 
Carr judged that Lee's vendetta with Savage had become personal and unreasonable, he withdrew 
his support, though not before having put his own political career at risk. In so doing, Carr almost 
certainly saved his political skin. Timaru election results in 1943 and 1946 demonstrated that Carr 
could not have afforded to lose any more support and still have retained the seat. 
1943 Election 
By 1943, the honeymoon period of the first Labour government was over. After two terms of 
unprecedented popular support, in the early 1940s the administration struggled through a 
14 N.z.L.P. Annual Conference Reports, 1940-1944. 
15 Erik Olssen, "The Impact of John A Lee's Expulsion Upon the Labour Party," New Zealand Journal of 
HistOlY 12, no. I (1978), p. 38. 
16 lA. Lee Manuscript, John A. Lee Papers, FII, Series 23, NZMS 828, Auckland Public Library, Auckland. 
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succession of difficult issues: the onset of the Second World War, the Lee affair and the death of 
Savage, After his expulsion from the Labour Party three years earlier, Lee led a party of his own, 
the Democratic Soldiers' Labour Party, to the polls in 1943, While the D,S,L.P, lacked a consistent 
and clear policy, it benefitted from the personal charisma, high profile and determination of its 
leader, The D,S,L.P, posed a particular threat to CalT in Timaru, given his close association with 
and subsequent renunciation of Lee, On election day, the D,S,L.P, won a higher share of the vote 
in Timaru that in any other provincial town seat. Carr's 1943 campaign was a lively one, with 
many heated meetings and debates on a wide range of issues, CalT was required to defend his own 
record as a constituency MP and was publicly called to account over his association with Lee, 
The D,S,L.P, candidate for Timaru was Douglas Cresswell, Cresswell was a passionate and 
talented public speaker, though his personal politics were an odd mixture, A self-described 
conservative representing a radical party, Cresswell claimed that before joining the D,S,L.P" he 
had always been a National voter,17 Cresswell was an early and relatively senior member of the 
D,S,L.P,: he had been considered by Lee to contest the Christchurch East by-election in 1942, and 
by 1944 he had risen to the rank of South Island organiser, responsible for negotiations with the 
Labour Party, 18 Cresswell came to Timanl to contest CalT'S seat, although it is not clear where he 
lived before the election, 19 
Jack Satterthwaite, the National candidate for Timaru in 1943, had strong credentials as a local 
man, He worked for the council, and his work was frequently acknowledged by the chairs of his 
campaign meetings,20 His father, T,W, Satterthwaite, had been mayor of Timaru, Satterthwaite 
tended to support socially conservative causes such as the teaching of religion in schools, and 
made frequent reference during the campaign to the importance of family values?1 
At the opening meeting of his campaign, CalT set a tone of radical egalitarianism, saying that it 
would not WOlTY him "if there were no rich people left in New Zealand,,,22 In his speeches, CalT 
set up an opposition between Labour as the party of the common people and National as the party 
of high incomes and high status occupations, Labour leaders, CalT argued, were different from the 
National Patiy hierarchy because they had personally felt the pinch of the depression, Labour's 
17 Timaru Herald, 18 September 1943, 
IS Olssen, Lee, pp, 179, 197, 
19 Timaru Herald, 22 September 1943, 
20 ibid" 21 and 18 September 1943, 
21 ibid" 16 September 1943, 
98 
generous and successful social security policy was the product of this experience. 23 Typically, Carr 
emphasised the importance of industrial growth if New Zealand was to progress beyond its status 
as a "glorified market garden or cowyard. ,,24 Later, Carr widened the focus of his message to 
include farmers and rural communities, speaking on the economic interdependence of rural and 
urban communities. 25 
A major issue at the 1943 election was Labour's management of the war effort. There was 
widespread criticism of the heavy regulations and shortages experienced during the war. The focus 
of many of these criticisms was the Intemal Marketing Division, the government organisation 
responsible for coordinating the production, distribution and pricing of essential household goods. 
At a special meeting for women at the Little Playhouse, Carr was called upon to justify the 
activities of the LM.D. to an extremely hostile audience, some of whom pointedly left the meeting 
before the vote of thanks had been made. The audience were particularly incensed over high 
household food prices, a concern widely considered the domain of women in this period.26 At 
Kensington, Carr had a bizarre run-in with an eccentric audience member who was outraged with 
the high tobacco and beer shortages?7 The man constantly inteljected in Carr's speech with 
questions bearing little or no relation to Carr's comments. The situation gave rise to some comic 
non sequiturs, and gave Carr the opportunity to display his dry wit and ability to handle difficult 
audiences: 
The inteljector. .. called out, "no tobacco, no tobacco." 
Mr Carr: I am as heavy a smoker as anyone but I call it a small sacrifice indeed to curtail 
my smoking to the minimum during the present time of sacrifice. 
The interjector: Hooey! 
Mr Carr: It is not hooey. When life and death are at stake, to introduce side issues is to trifle 
with reality. Maybe your shoes pinch you, but this is no time to air a personal grudge. 
22 ibid., 1 September 1943. 
23 ibid., 4 September 1943. 
24 ibid., 9 September 1943. 
25 ibid., 16 September 1943. 
26 ibid., 17 September 1943. 
27 ibid., 11 September 1943. 
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When the interjector came again, another member of the audience rose and said: "I move 
that the speaker be allowed to continue. We did not come here to listen to an inteljector-
we want to hear the candidate." 
... "You remind me of one of those boiling mud pools at Rotorua," Mr Carr told the 
inteljector when he came again, and the interjector replied, "Yes I am a mud pool at 
Rotorua all right." 
After a few minutes the voice of the interjector was heard again . 
.. . When Mr CalT asked what was more important, tobacco or food, medicine or beer, the 
interjector shouted: "The beer's been cut down!" 
Mr CalT: That is what I am telling you. 
Much to the visible discomfort of the audience, the interjector persisted at intervals, but he 
was ignored by the speaker. When Mr CalT mentioned coal the interjector said; "you cannot 
get it," the candidate replying, "you may not have any coal my friend but you have plenty 
of gas.,,28 
In general, CalT's response to the public's complaints about high prices and shortages was to stres~ 
the need for sacrifice during wartime. In response to criticism of Labour's deployment of New 
Zealand armed forces, Carr often quoted Winston Churchill's statement that New Zealand had not 
put a foot wrong during the war, and pointed out that neither Lee nor Holland had opposed 
Labour's decisions on deployment when the issue was debated in Parliament.29 
CalT also had to respond to pointed questions about his past involvement with Lee. Initially, 
CalT's response to the electoral threat posed by Cresswell was to issue generalised wamings to 
Labour voters about the dangers of vote splitting, and to make fairly mild criticisms of the 
D.S.L.P. At Watlington, CalT claimed to find three things wrong with the Democratic Labour 
Party, that "it was not democratic, it did not represent labour, and it was not a party.,,30 Later in the 
campaign, CalT expanded upon his reasons for disassociating himself with the rebel caucus, 
describing Lee as a "wrecker" who was "actuated by vindictiveness and a deep and growing 
28 ibid. 
29 ibid., 24 September 1943. 
30 ibid., 11 September 1943. 
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grudge" in forming the D.S.L.P. to fight Labour. 31 At his final address at Theatre Royal, CalT's 
speech was constantly interrupted by interjections from OJ. McKee, a former Labour Party 
member who had stood for the D.S.L.P. against Mabel Howard in the Christchurch East by-
election earlier in the year. In a heated exchange which raised calls from the crowd for his ejection, 
McKee accused CalT of abandoning Lee: 
"You said you would follow John A Lee to hell, but you did not do it!" cried Mr McKee 
amid boos and cheers. 
Mr Carr: I said that I would follow Mr Lee to the hot place, but I never said I would go with 
him when he was attacking another man (the late Rt. Hon MJ. Savage) who was on his 
way to heaven .... when Lee was told that all he was out to do was destroy the Labour Party 
which he had helped to create he just sat and grinned. 32 
CalT claimed that it was with the publication of Lee's article "Psychopathology in Politics" that he 
finally withdrew his support for Lee. When McKee continued to disrupt the meeting by attacking 
the speaker, Carr accused him of being a wrecker: "John A. Lee is a wrecker and you are a 
wrecker ... If you and Lee were in a boat together one of you would throwaway the oars and the 
other would pull out the plug in the bung hole." 
Despite his defensiveness over his relationship with Lee, Can"s campaign was more positive than 
those of either of his opponents, and he expressed optimism and enthusiasm about the Clln'ent 
administration. CalT spoke of his pride in being a New Zealander, the strength of character of 
young New Zealanders, and the need for the country to increase its population, saying "There's 
only one problem with New Zealanders, there aren't enough of them.,,33 CalT still worked very 
hard during his campaigns, attending up to three meetings per day and once more holding more 
meetings over a longer period than either of his opponents. CalT held twenty-five meetings on 
twenty-two days as opposed to Satterthwaite's twenty meetings on seventeen days and Cresswell's 
twenty-one meetings on fourteen days. CalT's superior level of organisation reflected the degree of 
31 ibid., 9 September 1943. 
32 ibid., 25 September 1943. 
33 ibid., 18 September 1943. 
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funding, experience, unity and enthusiasm within Labour Party in Timaru. With each successive 
election Carr fought, it became easier to coordinate the logistics of his schedule of meetings. 
Satterthwaite began his campaign two days after Carr with a meeting at the Theatre Royal. At this 
meeting, the essential problem of the National Party at the 1943 ,election manifested itself: they 
had nothing radically different from Labour to offer voters. Satterthwaite simply promised the 
continuation of Labour's social security scheme, increased production to boost the war effort, and 
tax relief for families. 34 Deciding that it might be more fruitful to focus his efforts on attacking 
Labour rather than trying to convince his audiences that National had new and innovative policies 
to offer, Satterthwaite based his criticisms of Labour around three themes. The first of these was 
over-regulation by the Labour government; the second was the poor deployment of New Zealand's 
war time resources, especially man- and woman-power; and the last was the domination of the 
Labour caucus by outside interests, specifically the large trade unions. The I.M.D. came in for 
particular attention throughout the campaign, especially because of its effect on farmers. 
According to Satterthwaite, the result of central control of primaty production was that "the man 
on the land is not a free man today".35 The I.M.D. was criticised for increasing the prices of goods 
but not their quality, and Satterthwaite promised that National would abolish it. Satterthwaite 
argued that Labour had made poor decisions on the deployment of the country's resources and that 
its excessive spending during wartime had lead to mounting national debt. He highlighted the 
desperate need for more men and women to work in essential industries.36 
In keeping with a major aspect of his party's campaigning, Satterthwaite accused Labour of being 
the puppets of the large trade unions. He adopted the rhetorical device of referring to the strong 
trade unions as "gangsters", saying at Kensington that "we laughed at gangster control when it was 
AI Capone in Chicago ... but we never dreamed that we would have it here in New Zealand.,,37 The 
party also pushed this theme in its display advertisements in the Timal'Ll Herald. Campaign 
advertising was becoming more sophisticated graphically, moving beyond simple archetypal 
portraits of target audience members (the farmer, the young couple, the retired couple, the worker 
and so on) of previous campaigns, to include more sophisticated visual elements like political 
cartoons. One famous National Party advertisement showed the hands of union leaders like Walsh 
34 ibid., 3 September 1943. 
35 ibid., 7 September 1943. 
36 ibid., 16 September 1943. 
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and Roberts pushing Labour cabinet ministers around a chessboard, The headline ran, "The 
National Party will abolish outside domination ofParliament.,,38 
The D,S,L.P.'s main planks for the 1943 election were outlined in the Timanl Herald at the 
beginning of the campaign, and directly reflected the personal concerns of Lee, The party 
promised the socialisation of banking, the reduction of overseas military commitments, a more 
generous soldier rehabilitation scheme, increased pensions and endowments, and an overhaul of 
the civil service pay scheme, However, it is likely that Cresswell received little in the way of 
prescriptive policy guidelines to follow, According to Erik Olssen, D,S,L.P, candidates at the 1943 
election "received from head-office only a four-page policy statement and best wishes,,,39 
Cresswell's own policy statements were an idiosyncratic mix, He advocated a range of policies, 
many of which were common to the political platforms of other parties; for example the abolition 
of the internal marketing division, improved wages to civil servants, support for a central state 
balUC and industrial unionism, and reduction of overseas debt. During the course of his campaign 
Cresswell echoed the both National Party (in his frequent reference to the big unions' "gangster 
control" of the government) and Labour (in his advocacy of progressive social policy such as 
introducing a generous motherhood endowment), In a single speech he claimed to stand one 
hundred per cent for private enterprise, and demand the socialisation of the banks, 40 
While his policy advocacy was somewhat muddled, Cresswell was a savvy campaigner and 
tailored his speeches to specific audiences, At Pareora, a strongly Labour-voting community of 
freezing workers, Cresswell encouraged skepticism about the success of Labour's policies in 
bringing about a fair distribution of consumer goods, claiming there were very few washing 
machines and telephones at Pareora in comparison with wealthy areas of Timaru such as Waiiti 
Road,41 At rural Kingsdown, on the other hand, Cresswell explained the D,S,L.P.'s plans to create 
farmers' co-operatives through state-owned stock and station agents, thus improving financial 
conditions for farmers,42 Cresswell was dismissive of both the major parties, referring to them 
collectively as the "two-headed Goliath,,,43 In the end, however, Labour was more often the target 
of Cresswell's attacks than National. This reflected both his earlier support for National and the 
37 ibid" 15 September 1943, 
38 ibid, 
39 0lssen, Lee, p, 187, 
40 Timaru Herald, 21 September 1943, 
41 ibid" 1 7 September 1943, 
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lingering resentment felt by many members of the D.S.L.P. towards Labour, which Cresswell 
described as the "party of the Judas Kiss.,,44 At the first meeting of his campaign, Cresswell 
referred to Carr's involvement with Lee, unintentionally damning Lee and himself in the process: 
"I won't say that I will follow Jack Lee to hell then not do it, I will follow him to hell!,,45 
The effectiveness of Cresswell's campaign was severely restricted by the financial limitations of 
his party organisation. Without the same ability as Labour and National to raise funds through a 
network of branches and affiliated unions and businesses, Cresswell resorted to asking for 
donations at his meetings in order to fund the campaign. The fact that Cresswell started his 
campaign a full week after Carr and Satterthwaite had begun theirs was another symptom of the 
organisational weakness of the D.S.L.P. 
Election day saw Cresswell win 1504 votes, or twelve percent of the total vote in Timan!. While 
he took votes from both Labour and National, Labour was hit the hardest, its share of the vote 
dropping by slightly over eight percentage points between 1938 and 1943. CalT's majority was 
reduced by 4.2 percentage points, from 17.7 percent in 1938 to 13.5 percent in 1943. By ending his 
involvement with Lee upon the publication of "Psychopathology in Politics", then diplomatically 
silencing his criticisms of the Labour hierarchy of Fraser and Nash, Carr proved himself to be an 
expedient judge of public opinion. Had he resigned from the Labour Party in sympathy with Lee in 
1940, Can' would have had little hope of holding the seat in 1943. Instead, although his majority 
was reduced, the seat remained safe. 
It is difficult to describe precisely the effect of Carr's public association with Lee on his electoral 
success in Timaru. There are many ways to read Cresswell's relatively high 'vote. Based on the 
magnitude of the fall in support for the major parties at the 1943 election, the D.S.L.P. vote 
appears to have been made up of a combination of fonner Labour voters who had previously 
supported Carr but who were now protesting his desertion of Lee, and swinging National voters. 
Two thirds of Cresswell's vote may be accounted for by the reduction in Carr's vote, suggesting 
that even three years after his expulsion, there was still a measure of support for Lee in the 
electorate. However, the drop in the National vote in 1943 was equivalent to one third of the 
D.S.L.P. vote, which suggests that perhaps not all the party's support was taken from Labour. It is 
42 ibid., 18 September 1943. 
43 ibid., 24 September 1943. 
44 ibid., 18 September 1943. 
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impossible to guess, however, what proportion of Labour voters had disapproved of Carr's support 
for Lee but continued to vote for Labour, or what proportion, like Carr, supported Lee up to a point 
but who had "returned to the fold" by 1943. Judged on the relatively small drop in support for 
Labour in 1943, it seems the majority of Labour voters in TimarU.tolerated or approved of Can"s 
involvement with Lee. Two factors reduced the risk the D.S.L.P. posed for Carr. Firstly, his large 
existing majority provided a "buffer" against any loss of suppOli. Secondly, a substantial minority 
of the D.S.L.P. vote appears to have come from National rather than Labour. Had Cresswell's 
share of the vote come entirely from Labour voters, the situation would have been far worse for 
Carr. 
Significantly, the Labour vote in Timaru did not return to its 1938 level at the next election, when 
there was no third party. In 1946, the National vote rose by a greater proportion of the vote than 
the D.S.L.P. had won in 1943, while the increase in the Labour vote was very small. In other 
words, between 1938 and 1946, whether through his involvement with Lee, or as a result of the 
broader swing away from Labour, or some combination of both factors, Carr lost a substantial 
proportion of his support in Timaru to National. Carr's involvement with Lee had a negative, 
though not catastrophic, effect on his electoral fortunes. His majority remained relatively slim in 
1946, 1949 and 1951. It was not until 1954, when Social Credit won a significant number of votes 
at the expense of National, that Timaru looked truly safe for Carr again. 
1946 Election 
The 1946 campaign in Timaru was a fairly uneventful two-way race. The National candidate was 
Jack Acland, sitting member for the neighbouring and predominantly rural electorate of Temuka, 
which had been absorbed into the Ashburton electorate in the recent electoral redistribution. 
Somewhat unusually, there was no animosity between the candidates. In fact, during the campaign 
Carr said he considered Acland a personal friend. 46 Their friendship was based not only on their 
professional relationship as fellow South Canterbury MPs, but also on their very similar personal 
politics. Acland had a reputation for being liberal and independent-minded National MP, and on 
occasion had voted against his party in parliament.47 Acland was a strong advocate for the social 
security scheme, and pledged never to reduce wages, social security benefits or the family 
45 ibid., 7 September 1943. 
46 ibid., 5 November 1946. 
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allowance. Acland staunchly defended his membership of the National Party on the grounds that it 
allowed him the freedom to stand up for the causes he believed in, saying "I am a Liberal and in 
the National Party there is a place for the Liberal, who has freedom to vote according to his 
principles. ,,48 
Many of Acland's policy statements were similar to Can's. He emphasised the need for Timaru 
to reverse the flow of population to the North Island by developing its port and attracting more 
industry to create opportunities for its young people.49 Despite his personal liberalism, Acland still 
bore the bnmt of the public perception that National policies were overly generous to farmers. At 
Cullmantown, his speech was intemlpted by interjectors, mostly farm labourers, who accused 
National of proposing to "spoon feed" farmers. At Kensington, audience members accused 
National of simply being the Reform Party under a different name, "like a criminal who changes 
their name in order to evade the police." When National Party leader Sydney Holland spoke at the 
Theatre Royal to an audience of a thousand, he did little to change people's perceptions of 
National as the party of the farmer, arguing that "it is sheer madness to talk of establishing new 
industries when we have not the labour, electric power of fuel for our existing industries." Instead, 
he said, government' support would go to primary producers. 50 
Dominating Carr's campaign was the controversy over the Timaru Park land 'transfer. In 1944, 
Can had opposed the transfer of one and a half acres of Timaru Park to the South Canterbury 
Hospital Board for the purposes of constructing an addition to the hospital. The Hospital Board 
accused Can of presenting their case to the Parliamentary Lands Committee unfavourably, and 
attempting to slow or halt the transfer at every given opportunity. Eventually, the Board asked 
Acland to make representations to the Land Committee on their behalf rather than Can. Claiming 
to have the support of the majority of Timaruvians, the Board presented a petition to parliament on 
the issue in December 1944.51 Then, during the 1946 election campaign, a group calling itself the 
Timaru Citizens' Committee publicly passed a motion of no-confidence in Can to Prime Minister 
Fraser over Can's handling of the Timaru Park transfer. The chair of the Timaru Citizens' 
Committee, Mr F. Hilton, attacked Can, saying, "in this town it has been demonstrated that we 
47 Press, 6 November 1946. 
48 Timal'll Herald, 26 November 1946. 
49 ibid., 29 October 1946. 
50 ibid., 6 November 1946. 
51 N.z.P.D., Vol. 267, 7 December 1944. 
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have not a representative of the people but a dictator who arbitrarily subordinates the wishes of the 
peop Ie to his own will. ,,52 
Despite the unfavourable publicity it brought him, it seems as though Carr's judgement of the 
controversy was very astute. While there was considerable protest directed at him for his 
opposition to the transfer, many letters to the editor expressed support for Carr's point of view. 
These letters pointed out that the hospital already had land at its disposal, and that on no less than 
four occasions, parliamentary committees had declined to allow the hospital use of the land. The 
idea that the Hospital Board and the Citizens' Committee were trying to gain political mileage out 
of the controversy was frequently expressed in letters to the editor.53 
Otherwise, during the campaign, Can' followed his personal policy interests, speaking on issues 
such as international relations and education, and the success of the Labour government in its last 
eleven years in power. Carr expressed progressive views on education during the campaign, 
arguing that children should have more freedom at school to study those subjects which interested 
them the most, and referring to people who preferred private over public schools as "snobbish". 54 
Carr also emphasised the importance of economic planning for New Zealand: "The future of this 
country is either a planned and prosperous New Zealand or a chaotic free-for-all existence like that 
in the United States today. ,,55 
Carr's discussion of the achievements of Labour government focused on housing, which was an 
especially important issue in Timaru in the post-war period. 56 Carr responded to complaints about 
goods shortages by arguing that they were the result of years of war, not Labour's economic 
administration. 57 In a typically colourful way, Carr offered proof of Labour's success in 
controlling prices during the war by holding up a newspaper advertisement from 1937 advertising 
"Scanties: one bob a pair," which made the women at the Kingsdown meeting smile. In 1937, Carr 
argued, National were trying to "capitalise on advertisements like that, saying prices would go 
though the roof, but they haven't. ... Well, a person is entitled to be a Tory is he wants to - if that 
is as far as his intelligence takes him. ,,58 
52 Timaru Hera/d, 31 October 1946. 
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In a series of "open letter" style advertisements in the last week of the campaign, Carr described 
the work he had done for his electorate and for his electors: 
There can be few families in Timaru that have not received some service, directly or 
indirectly, by reason of the fact that the Member is always on the job .... A conscientious 
Member of Parliament is the personal link between the people and the govel1lment, both of 
which he represents .. " For service and satisfaction, Vote Clyde Carr and Labour again and 
again and again. 59 
Carr also highlighted his success in attracting new industry to Timaru, and in reopening industries 
which were closed under National, for example the woollen mills and the boot factory. Carr 
claimed to have taken an active part in attracting industries like the Tekau Knitting Factory, the 
macaroni factory, and the Linen Flax Corporation to Timaru. 60 
A number of letters to the editor of the Til1la/'l[ Herald praised Carr's work for the electorate. One 
related the story of Carr's assistance in getting the local Jockey Club the use of a train to transport 
people to one of its race meetings during the war. The same writer also praised Carr for his 
willingness to enlist during the Second World War: "He joined the forces as a private and marched 
and worked with his comrades in arms and in Parliament was a keen advocate for the better 
conditions for men in camp and soldiers generally.,,61 Such letters illustrated a perception among 
the public of Carr as a "man of the people", willing to lend his support in small but practical ways, 
and to "muck in" and do his bit along side his fellow citizens. 
Carr's victory on election day saw much cheering and singing of "for he's a jolly good fellow" 
for "Good old Clyde". "Although the combined musical effect was not pleasing to musical ears, 
there was no mistaking the sincerity and spontaneity of the effort," commented the Til1lan[ 
Herald. 62 In his victory speech, Carr thanked his local party organisation, remarking that it was 
only because of their commitment and ability that he was able to compete and win "against an 
expenditure of tremendous sums of money by our opponents.,,63 The Til1la/'l[ Herald's editorial 
59 ibid., 26 November 1946. 
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congratulated Carr on his win, "the hardest contest of his career," which, the newspaper argued 
was "largely on account of assiduous attention to his Parliamentary duties.,,64 
The 1946 election saw Carr's majority dramatically reduced from its 1943 level. Twelve percent 
of the vote was won by the D.S.L.P. in 1943, the National vote dropping by 3.8 percentage points, 
and the Labour vote by 8.1 percentage points. At the 1946 election however, in a two-way race, 
support for the major parties did not return to their previous levels. Rather, as table 5.1 shows, 
Labour's share of the vote in Timaru only increased by 1.1 percentage points between 1943 and 
1946, whereas the National vote leapt up by 10.8 percentage points. 
Table 5.1: Effect of D.S.L.P. on major parties' share of vote in Timaru 1938-1946 
Party 1938 1943 1946 
Labour 58.9% 50.8% (-8.1) 51.9% (+1.1) 
National 41.1% 37.3% (-3.8) 5l.9% (+10.8) 
D.S.L.P. 12.0% 
One interpretation of these results is that most votes for the D.S.L.P. in 1943 came from fonner 
Labour voters, the majority of whom did not swing back to Labour in 1943, but instead showed 
their continuing disapproval of Carr and Labour by switching their vote to National in 1946. Carr's 
majority plummeted to just 3.9 percent of the total vote, or 520 votes. Acland had come as close as 
any National candidate up until that point to beating Carr. Meanwhile, Labour's parliamentary 
majority was cut to just four seats, and their winning margin was less than three percent of the 
national vote. It was to be the last election won by Labour for over a decade. 
After the 1946 election, Carr was nominated in caucus for a cabinet position, but was once again 
unsuccessfu1. 65 He was, however, elected as Deputy Speaker and Chairman of Committees. While 
Carr made no secret of the fact he hoped for a ministerial position, he made little effort to change 
those aspects of his personal and political behaviour which put him out of favour with his patiy 
hierarchy: chiefly, his close association with Lee and his outspoken support for the Soviet Union. 
There is also anecdotal evidence that Carr's private life was another factor in keeping him out of 
favour with the party hierarchy. Apparently, representatives from the Timaru Branch of the Labour 
Party once met Fraser on the platform of the Timaru Railway Station with the intention of 
64 ibid. 
65 New Zealand Labour Party Caucus Minute Books, 13 May 1947. 
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advancing Carr's case for a cabinet position. Fraser "agreed with them in their estimate of Carr's 
abilities but asked if the committee would take responsibility for their MP's private life; they 
declined.,,66 According to another story, Fraser once caught Carr in flagrante delicto with a woman 
in the caucus room late one night. 67 
John A. Lee recounted similar stories of Carr's behaviour. He claimed that in November 1937 the 
New Zealand Truth had a photo of Carr "kissing a girl on the Wellington Wharf and [was] trying 
to blackmail him into lobbying against the Judicial Reports Bill.,,68 Elsewhere, Lee shed more light 
on Carr and Fraser's relationship, claiming that Cal! 
had been too strictly brought up and like many of his kind went very far the other way, but 
always insisted on being called "the Rev" by the Speaker. 
Once in Bellamy's Dr McMillan said there was one sure way to discover if a woman had 
venereal disease. Now this was learning dear to Clyde's heart. 
"Tell me," he said, "tell me." 
"Well," said the Doc, "you go with her and bed down with her and if in about a week you 
are ill you know for sure." The laughter rocked around Bellamy's. 
Fraser's disapproving face when Clyde told a dripper was one of the sights of Wellington. 
Clyde knew and told his worst loudly when Fraser could not get away. 69 
Given his taste for salacious gossip and exaggeration, Lee's anecdotes must me taken with a grain 
of salt. Nevertheless, if such stories were tme, it is entirely possible that the puritanical Fraser 
refused to promote Carr partly on the grounds of Carr's womanising. However, Carr's radicalism 
would have been as least as much a barrier to his advancement within the party. In its obituary 
editorial on Carr, the Timan! Herald discussed Carr's aspiration to cabinet, saying that "he was 
disappointed in not attaining the ministerial rank to which he aspired and to which, by comparison 
of his abilities with those of some of the chosen, he was entitled. Perhaps he contributed to his own 
66 Michael Vance to Colin Brown, II March 1996. 
67 Michael Bassett to Stephen Ken', 13 February 2001. 
68 Lee, Lee Diaries, p. 42. 
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failure in this respect; fearless speech and independence of thought are, unfortunately, rarely 
regarded as attributes in political circles these days.,,70 
After 1946, Carr's adversarial attitude toward the party leadership mellowed somewhat. Robert 
Tizard has suggested that Carr's appointment to the role of Chairman of Committees and Deputy 
Speaker may have been a ploy on the part of Fraser to assure Carr's regular attendance in 
parliament at a time when Labour had a majority of just four. Fraser may have judged that the 
small flat which came with the job would be enough of a can"ot to keep CalT in Wellington at all 
times during the session.71 If Carr's appointment was a strategy intended to bring him back into 
line with the party, it was successful. Almost immediately, Can" appeared to shift towards the 
centre of the political spectrum. In his first speech in parliament as Chairman of Committees, Carr 
expressed his loyalty to the Crown ("the heart-centre of our Commonwealth") and emphasised the 
Labour Party's role in mitigating the influence of the "dangerous" radical left. 72 
The National Party in Timaru 
The National Party in Timaru was characterised by poor levels of organisation. This was both a 
result and a cause of Labour's dominance in the electorate. Despite being within close reach of 
winning the seat for significant periods of Carr's term, National were constantly struggling to raise 
funds and to motivate themselves in the face of defeat after defeat by Carr. 
The key issue that the local party organisation struggled with was fund-raising. The National 
Party relied heavily on paid membership, donations, and subscriptions to the party periodical 
Freedom for its campaign funds. Funding shortfalls were never overcome, even during Labour's 
decline in the late 1940s and early 1950s, when the potential for the paliy to capitalise on 
optimism among National voters was at its peak. In May 1947, the party estimated it needed a 
thousand more members, and to collect all unpaid fees by existing members, in order to gather the 
resources necessary to fight the next election. 73 In July, Timaru was the only electorate 
organisation to default on its payment of its levy to the National head office. In an attempt to 
improve the situation, the National Party divisional office in Christchurch sent a professional 
70 Timam Herald, 19 September 1962. 
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canvasser to Timaru to help raise funds. 74 The canvasser's effOlis were unsuccessful, as they 
received an apathetic response even in strongly National-voting areas such as Highfield. In fact, 
the entire episode was counterproductive, as it left a legacy of resentment in Timaru at what was 
perceived as undue interference by the divisional office. 
On its part, the divisional office was frustrated at the poor level of activity and motivation shown 
by the party in Timaru, the divisional chair in April 1948 stating that he "deplored the apathy 
evidenced by the absence of regular Branch meetings ... in Timaru.,,75 It was quite true that the 
attendance at and frequency of National Party branch meetings in Timaru was haphazard at best, 
with only the Women's and Youth branches maintaining a stable level of membership. In fact, 
compared to the Labour Party, the level of membership of the National Party was quite healthy. 
However, it was not party membership per se which gave Labour its strength, but the activity and 
commitment of those members and, more importantly, the support of affiliated unions. The 
National Party had no equivalent affiliated bodies to support it. According to party records, in 
April 1949, the National Party in Timaru had 2269 members in eleven branches, compared to 
Labour's 751 members in seven branches. However, Labour also had an additional 3354 members 
of twenty-one affiliated unions to contribute financially to the campaign fund. 76 Also crucial to 
Labour's success were its volunteer campaign workers, who were more active and motivated than 
their National counterparts. This was noted by members of the National Party themselves; for 
example by the Hospital Branch who observed that the Labour Party was very active in inviting 
nurses and other hospital staff to their functions. 77 The problem of apathy and inactivity was not 
limited to the lower levels of the National Party, either: in his report of April 1949, the electorate 
chair urged that there must be a change to the present state of almost absolute inactivity by senior 
branch members. 78 
A financial report from March 1953 demonstrated the effect that Carr's incumbency was having 
on National. The report conceded that "in an electorate which has not the advantage of having a 
sitting member it has always been difficult to present a case to supporters to donate sufficient 
funds." Squeezing subscription funds from members was a constant battle, and an attempt to raise 
74 Timaru National Party Minute Books, 7 September 1948. 
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funds through a direct appeal to 200 firms and individuals had had very disappointing results. 79 
Worse was to come for the party in 1953, when it lost its secretary and closed its office. The 
situation had improved by the time it came to prepare for the 1954 election, however. While 
membership had fallen, another financial drive had been relatively successful. It was the Women's 
section of the party who had remained strong and active throughout the period, organising social 
functions and raising campaign funds. 8o 
Meanwhile, tension between the local party organisation and the national-level organisation 
continued to bubble away, the Timaru organisation committee complaining about what it saw as 
the National Party's "domineering, dictatorial attitude", and a lack of support from head office. 
The frustration of the local party with the national organisation was palpable, and they went so far 
as to praise Carr, in their internal cOlTespondence at least, for his criticisms of the National 
government. Discussing a letter that Carr had written to the editor of the Timal'll Herald, party 
members agreed that Carr's analysis: 
was exactly as members of the Committee had so often said, the country is bureaucratically 
controlled: The Rev. Clyde Carr is to be congratulated on bringing this before the public. It 
reads well from a Labour member when a National government is in power on a supposed 
platform of free enterprise. 81 
A visit to the electorate in May 1957 by Dean Eyre, Minister of Social Security, intended to build 
enthusiasm amongst the National faithful in Timaru was described by the Timaru chair as a "flop", 
"worthless" and "a mass ofbaloney.,,82 
1949 Election 
In August 1949, debate over the introduction of compulsory military training created a bitter 
dispute within the Timaru branch of the Labour Party. Carr had not opposed the introduction of 
compulsory military training in caucus. 83 However, several long-standing party members were 
bitterly opposed to the measure, and the matter caused personal antagonisms to flare. The issue 
79 Timaru National Party Minute Books, 23 March 1953. 
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became a focus for dissatisfaction with Carr from within the branch, and once again, he faced 
competition for the Timaru candidacy. Carr won the vote within the branch, but a fairly large 
minority of the branch voted against him. 84 More damaging at a wider level were the resignations 
from the L.R.C. over the issue. After 1949, membership of the Labour Patiy in Timaru went into 
steady decline during the 1950s, falling from 855 in 1949 to 269 in 1957.85 All over the country, 
the issue was having a similarly destructive effect at a grass-roots leve1. 86 
After Acland' s encouraging result in 1946, the National Party identified Timaru as one of eight 
Labour-held seats to be targeted for special attention at the 1949 election. This strategy was very 
successful: of the eight seats targeted in this way, only Timaru remained in Labour's hands after 
the election. 87 The tide of national opinion was running against Labour. The National Patiy 
showed a new political confidence, shifting their rhetoric away from a focus on the potential 
disaster of "ultimate Socialism" under Labour, to promoting the positive values of personal 
freedom, initiative and self-sufficiency. The candidate for Timaru, Jack Lockington was a great 
exponent of this philosophy, and a strong opponent for Carr. Originally from the West Coast, 
Lockington, like Acland in 1946, claimed to have been "brought up in the Liberal tradition," and 
saw himself as a political descendent of Richard Seddon. 88 Lockington was a strong speaker and 
campaigner, and carried with him considerable kudos from having served as an Air Force pilot 
during the Second World War. He often played on his military experience during the campaign.89 
Three months before the beginning of the campaign, Lockington arranged meetings all over the 
electorate in order to introduce himself to National Party supporters. He was rightfully concerned 
with the poor turnout at these meetings: at Washdyke, a booth which National had narrowly won 
for the first time in 1946, only one member attended the meeting, while other meetings were called 
off altogether.9o Despite this inauspicious start, Lockington carried out an energetic and highly 
effective campaign. At his opening meeting at the Scottish Hall, in front of an audience of five 
hundred, Lockington spoke of the need to reduce taxation to give ordinary people the freedom to 
decide where their own money was spent. He complained about price rises and import restrictions 
83 Grant, "Anti-Conscription, Conscription and the Referendum," p. 140. 
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under Labour and claimed that by increasing production, tightening the eligibility criteria for 
benefits and cutting tax rates, National would increase the standard of living without cutting the 
social security scheme. 9J The idea that controls and high taxes were stifling individuals' freedom 
was characteristic of all of Lockington's speeches. He was also critical of Labour for being 
dominated by the militant unions and for failing to bring more secondary industry to Timam. 
Lockington's meetings were generally well attended, and he dealt with interjectors more 
effectively than previous National candidates. He was also a more inventive campaigner than his 
predecessors. One of his innovations was to hold three large outdoor meetings in the suburbs of 
Timam on the eve of the election. 92 Lockington had a number of novel suggestions of how the 
South Canterbury economy could be developed, arguing that primary production in South 
Canterbury could be massively increased by fertilising and developing much of the land which 
was currently considered margina1. 93 
The Timanl Herald presented contrasting images of Carr as a dutiful "yes man" and Lockington 
as young and relatively inexperienced, but very much "his own man". Lockington brought the 
"eagemess of youth" to the campaign, whereas Carr, the newspaper claimed, "tend[ ed] to speak 
from habit; already he is flogging the arguments he used in other campaigns .. ,," The description 
of Carr as a political "yes man" is surprising, given his history of political radicalism and 
controversy: 
Mr Carr has kept unimaginatively to the "party line." It is clear that he has no intention of 
ever being anything more than a dutiful cipher of the Labour Party, which is controlled 
largely by forces outside Parliament. Those who are content to see the country going the 
way the ... extra-parliamentary Labour Party [a reference to large trade unions] determine, 
will cling to Mr Carr, knowing that in essentials he is prepared to allow others to do his 
political thinking for him. 94 
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Carr's campaign was characterised by small meeting attendances and relatively hostile crowds, 
The low attendance at Can"s meetings did not necessarily reflect a lack of support for Can, but 
rather was a symptom of the changing nature of election campaigning, and of a certain over-
familiarity with Can, After fourteen years in power, the Labour government were now held 
accountable for almost every aspect of life that voters found to be not to their satisfaction, 
including goods shortages, price rises, housing, the state of the health system, and even the poor 
quality of records played on the New Zealand Broadcasting Service and the lack of good motion 
pictures showing at cinemas!95 Can adopted the same rhetoric and strategies which had served him 
well in previous elections: describing the achievements of the Labour Party during its time in 
power and, most importantly, his own achievements on behalf of his electors, His speechmaking 
was not up to the standard of his earlier campaigns, however, and tended to consist of either dry 
expositions on export prices and the exchange rate, or generalised promises of increased 
population and production under a Labour government. 
As ever, Can emphasised his local service, for example in a print advertisement which explicitly 
listed his achievements for the electorate: 
Airport - land acquired and work imminent 
Radio Station 3XC is on the air 
Railway Station and Yards - plans approved for early construction 
Harbour developments - an improved harbour for city and country 
Dispersal and development of Industry - some in operation, others being negotiated 
Housing - Marchwiel and other areas 
Extension of telephone services 
Soil erosion - one of the early advocates for conservation 
Sea erosion - action at present being taken, 
AND He has AL WAYS been available to give assistance to business firms and 
individuals,96 
95 ibid" 25 November 1949, 
96 ibid" 29 November 1949, 
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For the most part, however, Carr had little new to say, and spent most of the campaign reiterating 
Labour's past policy innovations, many of which were now also part of National's platform, 
Coverage of election day in the Til71Gru Herald was dominated by comment on the significance of 
National's win, the first change of government since 1935,97 Despite the nationwide a swing to 
National and the quality of his opponent, Carr actually increased his majority to 832 votes or six 
percent of the total vote in Timan!. Carr was one of only four Labour MPs to have increased their 
majority in 1949,98 The fact that Carr was able to defeat such a vigorous and able candidate, while 
putting in a fairly perfunctory effort himself, is suggestive of the "voter credit" he had built up 
over six elections, and the strength of the Labour-voting proclivity of Timaru, 
1951 Election 
The 1951 general election was called less than two years after National's victory in 1949, in the 
wake of the waterfront dispute from February to April 1951. The dispute placed labour relations 
and the issue of the political power of unions at the forefront of national political debate, 
Intensifying the ideological division between the two major parties, was in the international 
climate of Cold War and the fear of the spread of communism, The waterfront dispute was often 
mentioned in the context of the international "war on communism,,,99 On election day, Labour 
suffered one of its greatest defeats, 
Increasing use of mass print and broadcast media had substantially changed the nature of 
campaigning since beginning of Carr's political career in 1928, Attendance at campaign meetings 
had dropped away to the point where the only people who could be relied upon to attend meetings 
were the party faithful. Candidates responded to the drop in meeting attendance by holding fewer 
meetings over the course of the campaign, Accordingly, newspapers and radio played an 
increasingly significant role in disseminating candidates' political views to the public, Campaign 
meetings had becorile in effect proto-press conferences, sometimes attended only by a handful of 
party faithful and a reporter, 
Carr's opponent in 1951 was the sitting mayor, W,L, Richards, Richards had been on the Timam 
Borough Council since 1944, and was elected mayor in 1950, Originally a school teacher, 
97 ibid" [ December [949, 
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Richards had been resident in Timaru for 23 years at the time of the election. 100 His profile as a 
local politician was largely built on the prominent role he had taken during the waterfront dispute 
earlier in the year. As mayor, Richards had been instructed by the Waterfront Commission to 
establish an Emergency Committee in Timaru to oversee the loading of cargo by army servicemen 
on to ships in the port. 101 Richards received almost daily exposure in the newspapers making 
announcements on the current progress in port throughout the dispute, and was present as each 
ship loaded by servicemen departed port. These were symbolic events, showing the resolve of the 
people in the face of industrial unrest and the ability of servicemen to minimise the disruption 
caused by the watersiders. As chair of the Emergency Committee, Richards was responsible for 
making public announcements during the dispute. In this role, Richards was often the bearer of 
good news, for example when he announced the arrival of 250 tonnes of tobacco and cigarettes to 
relieve the South Island's tobacco shortage. 102 
Although the effects of the waterfront dispute in Timaru were relatively minor and shortages of 
essential household goods were more a threat than a reality, the dispute created a great deal of 
antipathy towards the waterside unions. The National Party capitalised on this by proclaiming 
itself the enemy of militant unions, and by consciously conflating the threat of militant unions with 
the wider perceived threat of the international spread of communism. When the President of the 
National Party, Sir Wilfrid Sim, spoke at Timaru during the dispute he made this connection 
explicit: "the strength and unity of the National Party might well prove the sheet and anchor and 
salvation of New Zealand in the dose of the Communist "Cold War" to which [the country is] 
being subjected at present in the form of the strike of the Watersiders.,,103 
The national tide of opinion and high profile of his opponent gave Carr serious cause for concern 
at the 1951 election. However, a stroke of luck worked in his favour. Before he could hold his first 
campaign meeting, Richards was stuck down by influenza and had to be hospitalised. Richards' 
meetings for the rest of the week were cancelled and in fact Richards only managed to hold one 
meeting the following week, leaving him just one week in which to run his campaign. As a show 
of good grace, Carr postponed his first week of meetings also. As well as severely limiting his 
ability to campaign, Richards' illness created doubt in the minds of the electors as to his fitness for 
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the job of representing Timanl in parliament, and added fuel to rumours that he was reluctant to 
stand for the Timaru seat. 104 
As Richards lay in hospital, Prime Minister Sydney Holland addressed a capacity audience at the 
Theatre Royal. Holland opened his speech by reassuring his audience that Richards' sickness was 
not too serious, then went on at some length about how gracious Carr had been in cancelling his 
campaign meetings so as to not enjoy any unfair advantage over his opponent. Holland discussed 
the waterfront dispute, claiming that National's actions had been meant to "prize wretched 
Communist influence from its hiding place in the country and destroy it.,,105 In a later speech, 
Deputy Prime Minister Holyoake used similarly militant language when he warned his audience to 
be wary of the "fifth column" in every democracy who preached peace but were trying to disarm 
democracy. Such people were "un-British; they were wreckers playing a Communist role .... That 
was exemplified by the waterfront dispute.,,106 
Richards himself showed little of his leaders' anti-Communist fervour when he eventually held 
his first meeting of the campaign. Richards was obliged to deal with the issue of his health at some 
length, saying "I am here to show you that you have a candidate that is fit to take part in 
electioneering - that I am not an invalid. I am not seeking sympathy votes." Richards thanked Carr 
for his generosity in postponing his meetings until Richards had recovered from his illness. Next, 
he responded to rumours that he was a reluctant candidate: 
I say in all humbleness that I believe there are better men than I who could represent my 
Party in this city, but for various reasons they are not able to do so, so I felt it was my duty 
to step into the breach. I am not ashamed of the Party, but after an exhausting period as 
chairman of the Emergency Committee when I worked from early morning until late at 
night to help keep supplies flowing smoothly through the pOli, I was not sure that I was fit 
enough to d; the job. I now know that I am. IO? 
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This was remarkably poor (if honest) opening speech, and conveyed the impression of an 
exhausted candidate who was under some duress to stand and lacked confidence 111 his own 
abilities to do the job, 
The biggest challenge of Richards' campaign, however, occurred at his final meeting outside the 
Crown Hotel. At a gathering described by the Timal'll Herald as the stormiest in the history of 
Timam, Richards was heckled constantly by a vocal minority in the audience, including a "an 
elderly woman performing a rather amateurish version of the Maori haka (perhaps unconsciously), 
a uniformed sailor who wanted to know some of Mr Richards' past history; backed by several 
reinforcements who were, perhaps, still feeling the effect of an invigorating tonic before 
teatime,,,los Richards rose to the occasion by accusing the interjectors of being "friends of the 
Moscow regime," In the midst of the disruptions, the content of Richards' speech was a typically 
uncompromising National Party interpretation of the waterfront dispute, 
In the end, as a result of his illness, Richards only held around six meetings, Interestingly, 
Richards' illness may not have been as damaging to his campaign as it would have been to 
National Party candidates at earlier elections, because of the shift in the importance of meetings 
from events-in-themselves to proto-press conferences, Richards maintained a presence in the 
Timonl Herald even during the hiatus in his meetings by mnning a series of adveliisements in 
which he expressed his opinions on issues such as price rises, socialism, the waterfront dispute, 
and military defence, Most of Richards' advertisements featured images of him in his mayoral 
robes which, while the cause of some controversy, helped to emphasise his high status, political 
experience, and personal commitment to the Timanl electorate, 109 
Richards adopted the rhetorical technique of associating the Labour Party with the worldwide 
menace of communism, mmling a full page advertisement immediately before the election which 
featured a number of specially commissioned political cartoons portraying Carr and Nash 
attempting to disguise their tme attitudes towards socialism, the U.S,S,R" militant waterside 
, d I ' ,110 Ul11ons, an leavy state 1I1terventlOn, 
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Figure 5.1 Cartoon from Richards' campaign advertisement111 
SOCIALISATION I 
Carr was in a good position to fight the 1951 election, despite the tide of national opinion mnning 
against his party. Firstly, his opponent had fallen ill for the first two weeks of the campaign. 
Secondly, Carr seemed much more passionately opposed to National's policy than Richards was to 
Labour's. As a result, Carr's campaign was more forceful and convincing that Richard's. Carr's 
love of language and sense of humour meant that while attendances at his meetings was very low 
(with sometimes fewer than ten people attending) his amusing and memorable speeches were 
frequently quoted in the newspaper. Carr still loved to be provocative as he now turned his 
attentions to international relations during the Cold War. 
Carr's campaign began on August 20, after he had postponed several of his scheduled meetings 
the previous week while Richards was in hospital. Ultimately, Carr's decision to postpone these 
meetings worked in his favour, as it earned him favourable conunent from the press, the Prime 
Minister and from Richards himself. The postponements themselves probably did little or no 
damage to Carr's campaigning, as almost every meeting was rescheduled closer to election day. 
III ibid. 
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With attendances at Carr's meetings being so small at this time, it is hard to believe that delaying 
the meetings would had any significant negative impact on his vote. Instead, Richards' illness gave 
Carr the opportunity to appear gracious and generous, and he received additional exposure by 
making the gesture of postponing the meetings. 
As his term in Timaru lengthened, Carr tended to face an increasing number of questions on 
outstanding local issues. These required great diplomacy, as Carr generally had to acknowledge 
the legitimacy of his constituents' requests, while conceding that his own efforts as MP had been 
unsuccessful in addressing them. When asked about the need for Pare ora to have a new Post Office 
building, Carr responded by saying that the government received many requests which it had to 
prioritise and that Pareora would get a new building when the time came. At Washdyke, there 
were locally-oriented questions on housing and funding of local schools. 112 In Carr's last two 
meetings, at Gleniti and West End, he was confronted over progress on the police station, for 
which he had been lobbying since 1928. Carr claimed to have had an assurance from the Minister 
of Works that it would be ready within a year. In fact, the new police station would eventually 
open nine years later, in 1960. 
Carr's natural wit and wordplay meant that his political style was well suited to the truncated 
style of meeting reports in the newspapers. His quips were often reported for their entertainment 
value, for example discussing claims a rumour that Hitler was alive and living in Argentina, Carr 
joked, "I do not believe that to be correct. They have found him in Holland.,,113 At South School, 
Carr engaged with the audience over meat price rises, telling a story about a man who ate horse 
steak then choked when someone said "whoa.,,114 
Carr's campaigning became more impassioned and less jovial as election day drew near, perhaps 
reflecting the growing realisation within the Labour Party that a large defeat loomed. At St 
Patrick's Hall, Carr was highly condemnatory of National's record in government, which he 
described as "deplorable." As government, they had relaxed all price controls, allowing essential 
consumer goods like butter to rise in price, increasing the burden to normal households. In Carr's 
eyes, National sUlTendered all controls "to irresponsible to exploiters, profiteers and selfish 
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individuals with no sense of social responsibility." Any economy needed controls, Carr argued, 
something that National did not understand: 
remove controls and chaos follows. After all, what do~s Socialism mean but planned 
economy and playing the game according to the mles. Apparently, a game without mles -
like football without a referee - is the Nationalist conception of Society. It is also termed 
'mgged individualism' .115 
Carr's other chief criticism of National's administration was that' it had placed repressive controls 
on the country during the waterfront dispute. Carr claimed that if National won the election, it 
would mean the most repressive legislation New Zealand had ever experienced. Carr also 
discussed international relations, emphasising the need for New Zealand to make its own decisions 
in this sphere rather than simply becoming the puppet of America, Here again, Carr's radical side 
emerged, expressing considerable cynicism at American companies' newfound close trade 
relations with Japan, and stating that New Zealand should refuse to fight in support of comJpt 
governments, such as those opposed by Communists in China and Korea. 116 
The waterfront dispute and the passions it aroused in voters loomed large in letters to the editor. 
One writer associated Holland's fight against the militant unions with Christianity, the Cold War 
and the universal right to personal freedom: "If the Timam electors will vote so as to increase Mr 
Holland's majority and reduce the opposition by one, we shall have scored one point in the terribly 
real global war whose shadow is growing ever darker.,,117 Another letter referred specifically to 
Carr's far-left politics: "Our amiable Rev Clyde Carr ... was instmmental in the leading of the 
singing of the 'Red Flag' during a past session of Parliament, [and] is on the committee of the 
'Friendly Relations with Russia. ' [sic] Seemingly he has not changed his little 'red' coat.,,118 
Election day saw Carr's majority drop to 564, or four percent of the total vote in Timan!. Labour 
suffered its heaviest ever defeat, winning just thirty seats in parliament and 45.8 percent of the 
vote, to National's fifty seats and 54.0 percent. In his election day speech, Carr thanked his 
conunittee, and promised to continue to serve the electorate to the utmost of his ability. Richards 
115 ibid., 29 August 1951. 
116 ibid. 
117 ibid., 21 August 1951. 
123 
was gracious in defeat, thanking Carr for the courtesy he had shown during the campaign: "Mr 
Carr could have made it very difficult for me in a perfectly legitimate manner, but he never 
changed the attitude he adopted from the start, and I would like publicly to thank Mr Carr for his 
forbearance.,,119 In its editorial on the election, the Timartl Herald congratulated Carr, saying that 
"friends and opponents alike agree that Mr Carr places himselfungrudgingly and impatiially at the 
service of his constituents. This known conscientiousness has helped him in his election 
contests.,,120 Possibly, the idea that Carr's constituency work was the cause of the Labour's success 
in Timaru was more palatable to the editors of the newspaper than accepting that the electorate 
was by its very nature strongly inclined to Labour voting. 
The 1951 election in Timaru was a good example of how fortunate circumstance played a role in 
Carr's career. At the beginning of the campaign, Richards appeared to be a serious threat to Carr. 
The National Party had come closer to winning the seat at the previous two elections than at any 
other time in Carr's career. Nationally, there was a strong swing towards National, Richards was 
the sitting mayor of Timaru and had had a high-profile role during the waterfront dispute. 
However, each of these potential threats to Carr was mitigated through factors outside of Carr's 
control. Firstly, the negative effects of the waterfront dispute on the general population of Timaru 
were kept to a minimum. The port had seen relatively little conflict during the dispute, and the 
Timaru watersiders were among the first in the country to reregister. Secondly, Richards was a 
lack-lustre campaigner, who was obviously still exhausted from his efforts during the dispute six 
months earlier, and who at times expressed ambivalence about standing as a National candidate. 
He then fell ill for two-thirds of the campaign. This not only gave Carr the benefit of fighting an 
opponent who was unwell, but the opportunity to gain credit for curtailing his own campaign in 
sympathy for them. Nevertheless, Carr rose to the occasion, campaigning with a political savvy 
and energy that he had been lacking at his previous two campaigns. 
1954 Election 
National's share of the vote at the 1954 election dropped by ten percentage points from its 1951 
level and was now only 0.2 percent higher than Labour's. This change in the political landscape 
was brought about in large part by the emergence of the Social Credit Paliy which, at its first 
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election, won 11.1 percent of the vote. In a period of relative prosperity, the policies of the two 
major parties had converged, which had the effect of intensifying political apathy within the 
electorate. According to Keith Sinclair, "the lack of fervour [at the 1954 election] reflected the fact 
that Labour and National had politically drawn so close together that a failure to tell one from the 
other was excusable.,,121 Timaruvians had as much reason as anyone to be apathetic, and there, as 
in the rest of the country, it was Social Credit who demonstrated and attracted the most 
enthusiasm. The presence of Social Credit at the election placed Can in a similar situation to 1943, 
facing a strong third party candidate representing a political position that Can had himself had 
once held. At the 1943 election, Can was publicly called to account over his earlier support for 
Lee. In 1954, he had to justify his past advocacy of Social Credit. 
The Social Credit candidate in Timaru was George Edmonds, a thirty-four year old refrigerator 
factory manager from Christchurch. While his own advertising emphasised his character and war 
service (he had been wounded four times during his service in Libya, Crete, Greece and Western 
Desert) more than any political agenda or expertise, Edmonds conducted an energetic and 
innovative campaign, and managed to attract over twenty percent of the Timaru vote, a feat only 
bettered by a Social Credit candidate in a provincial town seat by Marks in Wanganui. The 
National Party stood yet another uninspiring socially conservative candidate in 1954 in Vic 
Wilson. Wilson had moved to Timaru at the age of four, and attended Timaru Boys' High School. 
He then became a farmer, rising through the ranles to become a member of the Executive of 
Federated Farmers. Wilson had some campaign experience, having stood unsuccessfully for 
National in Riccarton in 1946. 122 
Can's campaign in 1954 was notably later starting and more subdued than in previous years. Can 
he may have judged that Edmonds would take votes away from National, rather than Labour, and 
thus split the conservative vote. Alternately, Can, now sixty-eight, may have felt that he had 
already reached the great majority of his electors at previous elections, and that he had little to gain 
by stretching himself. Furthermore, Can would have realised that campaign meetings were no 
longer attended by large groups of uncommitted voters. In fact, meeting attendances were often as 
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low as single figures and Carr cancelled at least one meeting during the 1954 campaign due to lack 
of interest. 123 
Carr's campaign began with two small meetings at Gleniti and Kensington. At these meetings, 
Carr outlined his achievements as a local representative and Labour~s family welfare, housing and 
superannuation policies. 124 Under National, Carr claimed, the country's offshore reserves had been 
depleted, the cost of living had increased, and national levels of savings were down. Furthermore, 
National had done a poor job of marketing New Zealand's overseas produce.125 Initially, Carr 
made little effort to criticise the Social Credit Party. However, once Edmonds had brought up the 
issue of Carr's previous support for Social Credit polices, and had suggested that Carr's current 
opposition to Social Credit was hypocritical, he was forced to address the issue. Rather than 
issuing a comprehensive denial, Carr admitted to having supported some aspects of monetary 
reform, in particular the establishment of a central reserve bank and state ownership of the Ban1e of 
New Zealand. He admitted to criticising Savage in the late 1930s for being too cautious in his 
monetary reform legislation, but claimed that he had since realised the wisdom of Savage's 
approach of not legislating too far ahead of public opinion. 126 In fact, Carr's main opposition to 
Social Credit in 1954 was party political rather than being based on substantive objections to the 
party's economic ideas. Carr accused Social Credit of being anti-Socialist and of supporting the 
"tories." 127 
Perhaps as a means of increasing his local prestige by casting for himself a role as an "elder 
statesman", Carr emphasised his political achievements at a national level to a far greater extent in 
1954 than he had done at earlier elections. He described his work as a member of a deputation of 
five Labour MPs who advised Holland on possible solutions to the waterfront dispute, and as chair 
of the parliamentary committee which had had the massive job of reassessing wartime regulations 
after the war. 128 Carr also made more use of his position as incumbent MP to increase his public 
profile than at previous campaigns. During the campaign, he appeared opening the new Army 
Administration Block and the new Old Peoples' Home. 129 Such appearances helped reinforce in 
the minds of electors the good work that Carr was doing for the electorate. Even traditionally 
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conservative groups appreciated Can's efforts, for example the Chamber of Commerce, which 
Can thanked for its constant courtesy and cooperation at his R,S,A, Hall meeting, 130 
Social Credit candidate George Edmonds' campaign was remarkable for not only the energy he 
devoted to it, but for his novel approach to campaigning, which .included the innovative use of 
teclmology, Edmonds' meetings were generally better attended than those of CmT or Wilson, This 
was not so much a sign of widespread suppoli, but rather the result of the electorate responding to 
the novelty of a third candidate, There was widespread interest in Social Credit's policy, and 
Edmonds' meetings were unique in the campaign in that they provoked searching policy questions 
and many inteljections, both friendly and otherwise, from the audience, Nationally, Social Credit 
were riding a wave of popularity, and, like Labour's in its early years, "Social Credit meetings had 
a revivalist atmosphere, ,,131 What the local Social Credit organisation lacked in resources, it made 
up for in enthusiasm and ingenuity, In the second half of the campaign, Edmonds held a number of 
meetings each evening in the same suburb, One evening, he held three meetings on street comers 
around Marchwiel, each attended by between 33 and 50 people despite the teeming rain, These 
were very high attendances in comparison to Wilson and Can's meetings,132 At other times, 
Edmonds held up to five such street comer meetings in a day, This was an impressive innovation 
in campaign technique, While the Labour and National campaign organisations were investing 
time and money organising meetings in community halls which were often attended by less than 
ten people, Edmonds reached far more people at far less cost. Even more unusual and illliovative 
were Edmonds' "virtual meetings" , where recordings of his speeches were played on the street up 
to seven times a day,133 While these speeches would obviously have lacked the appeal and impact 
of a real campaign meeting, they were nevertheless a way for Edmonds to reach many more voters 
than would otherwise have been possible, 
Edmonds also demonstrated a good understanding of the electorate in his choice of policy 
advocacy, Recognising the importance of industrial development to the electorate, he emphasised 
the potential for Social Credit to help Timaru reach its full potential as an industrial centre, Social 
Credit would allow the creation of interest-free loans to the people, allowing them to buy local 
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assets such as the Town Hall and the gasworks. Edmonds claimed that Carr believed in Social 
Credit, had done all his life, and was only denying it at this election because of the imperatives of 
party discipline. 
Wilson proved himself to be a worthy successor to the previous dour National Party candidates in 
Timam, emphasising the importance of self-reliance, initiative and thrift, of competition rather 
than state control, love for Queen and country, and six o'clock closing. Later in the campaign, 
Wilson described his concern at rising levels of juvenile delinquency and declining moral 
standards. At West End, he voiced his support for the death penalty and increased spending on 
military defence. 134 Wilson also related his conservative Christian moralising to the provision of 
state welfare, specifically family benefits, the health system, and superatilluation. Wilson was not 
an enormously able, experienced or inspirational speaker, and he often faced hostile audiences. At 
Washdyke, an angry audience of nine harangued him over the local water supply, one of whom 
claimed, "It is time we had another Bob Semple.,,135 At a meeting for women at Trinity Church 
two days later, Wilson once again came up against a small but hostile audience which confronted 
him with many questions on a wide range of policy issues, frequent interjections and foot-
stomping. 136 It is likely that both these examples were the result of a coordinated effort on the part 
of the Labour Party to dismpt Wilson's campaigning. 
Wilson's weak campaigning probably accounted in part for the success of Social Credit in 
Timam. The National vote in 1954 dropped by 13.4 percentage points from its 1951 level, but the 
Labour vote only dropped by 7.1 percentage points. Meanwhile, Edmonds attracted 20.5 percent of 
the total vote in Timam for his party. While his share of the vote dropped by seven percentage 
points, Carr's majority more than doubled, to 10.2 percent of the total vote. In his acceptance 
speech, Carr aclmowledged the assistance he had received from "those not of a Labour persuasion" 
and promised to "continue to serve all [his constituents] irrespective of party affiliation.,,137 Even 
the Timo/'ll Herald had come gmdgingly to admire Carr's achievement in Timaru, once again 
emphasising his independence and constituency service rather than his political alignment: 
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Mr Carr's hold on Timaru has been retained not so much on account of his party allegiance 
as by his earnest application to the needs of the community he has from time to time been 
elected to serve. Although he is a sound party man, and that is proved by the positions he 
has held in the Labour movement, the requirements of his constituents are Mr Carr's first 
concern. 138 
1957 Election 
In 1957, Labour built upon the electoral gains they had made in 1954 to win the election, albeit 
with a tiny majority. After its encouraging result in 1954, Social Credit's share of the national vote 
in 1957 dropped to just 7.2 percent. The 1957 election saw another three-way contest in Timaru. 
The National candidate, Alf Davey, was the sitting member for Waimate, a rural electorate which 
had disappeared in the recent electoral redistribution. The third candidate in 1957 was a fanner 
from Fairlie, C. Isitt, standing for Social Credit. 139 Isitt was by no mean as capable or energetic a 
campaigner as Edmonds had been in 1954, although there was little doubting his passion for the 
cause. Despite Isitt's enthusiasm, election day saw Social Credit's share of the Timaru vote 
plununet from 20.5 percent to just 3.6 percent of the vote. 
Despite his experience as MP for Waimate, Davey was a mediocre campaigner. His 
speechmaking consisted of fairly typical National Party claims about the benefits of freedom and 
private enterprise, and the threat of price rises under a Labour government. Like previous National 
candidates, Davey applauded thrift, independence and self-reliance as character traits. 140 Davey 
made some effort to relate his speeches to specific audiences. At Marchwiel, he spoke on 
National's achievements with regard to housing, an issue of particular relevance to that suburb. 141 
At rural Gleniti, Davey argued that more wheat should be grown in South Canterbury to guard 
against shortage if supply :from Australia was cut off. When questioned, however, he had to 
concede that there was nothing in National Party policy to encourage this. 142 
Davey'S greatest wealmess as a campaigner was his inability to respond to pressure from a hostile 
audience. At his meeting at Labour stronghold Marchwiel, Davey's responses to questions were 
often evasive, unnecessarily defensive, or simply weak. When questioned on differential prices for 
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electricity, a major source of contention for Marchwiel residents, Davey admitted outright that 
"there is nothing in the National Party policy to deal with this". Other flippant or vague answers 
included his response to a question on the excess of butter on the international market which was 
affecting the export price: "Maybe they'll want it someday"; his ,response to a complaint about 
high retail prices under National: "I know it isn't easy to stop them"; and his response to a 
question about the shortage of competent engineers on the railways: "I can't explain why it 
occurred. I don't recall the incident; I may have been out of the house.,,143 Many of these questions 
were obviously asked by Labour supporters, suggesting the continuing effectiveness of the local 
party organisation in putting National candidates to the test in the campaign meeting context. With 
the declining number of audience members at most meetings, it was becoming easier to "load" a 
meeting with partisan interjectors. 
In a series of columns in the Timal'll Herald entitled "A.J. Davey comments", Davey emphasised 
the philosophical differences between the parties, which he described as an opposition between 
Socialism and free enterprise. 144 Davey's focus on the rhetoric of political philosophy was 
understandable as there was no great distinction in practice between the policy proposals on offer 
from the two major parties. Occasionally, the two parties were making exactly the same offers to 
electors, for example during the campaign in Timaru, both Carr and Davey promised to provide 
assembly halls for all schools. 145 
Much of Carr's campaigning was devoted to criticising National's administration since 1949. His 
main line of argument was that National had placed the country in a balance of payments crisis by 
allowing its overseas cash reserves to be spent on luxury imports "like cooked snails, or frogs legs, 
tablecloths priced at £100 ... [and] very rare china", instead of saving for less prosperous times. 
Now, Carr argued, intemalmonetary policy was so tight that the country was at risk of entering 
recession. 146 Elsewhere, Carr argued that New Zealand needed to develop its internal markets to 
reduce its reliance on export revenue, and needed to work harder to encourage technical experts to 
stay in the country. 147 He claimed that National's only success in government had been where its 
policy had followed Labour's, and promised to encourage manufacturers to relocate to the South 
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Island on the grounds of its plentiful electricity.148 Labour Party leader Walter Nash made a 
successful speech at Scottish Hall, where he also dealt with industrial development. Nash chose his 
subject matter carefully to suit the electorate, speaking on the need to further develop and 
decentralise industry to secondary towns like Timaru and Lower Hutt. 149 
A recording of one of Carr's campaign speeches from 1957 survives, providing good evidence of 
Carr's ability as a speaker. In the speech, Carr sounded relaxed and humorous, although his age 
was beginning to show in his sometimes garbled allegorical economic and philosophical 
pronouncements. Also apparent was CaIT'S continuing interest in monetary policy: 
The money that's available is being issued and withdrawn the whole time - like water in a 
reservoir or tank. It always seems to me to be better overflowing than mnning dry .... There 
should always be enough money available for the production and purchase by the 
community of those goods and services it is capable of producing .... ,,150 
Carr would not, however, go so far as to explicitly support Social Credit, whom he described in the 
same speech as "avowed Tories and capitalists - the sworn enemies of Labour." In this speech, 
Carr was also outspoken on international relations, and succinctly expressed his view of the Cold 
War: "Most of what they tell us of our alleged enemies is palpably untme. Nobody wants war 
unless it is the big corporations. And you don't find big corporations in the U.S.S.R." He was 
further critical of the American administration for wasting money on developing nuclear weapons 
rather than feeding the population of starving people in the world, and for putting a Nazi in charge 
ofN.A.T.O. 
When the perennial Timaru issue of the police station cropped up again early in the campaign, 
Carr claimed to have been assured by the Commissioner of Works that the plans for the new police 
station would definitely go ahead. He claimed to have been pursuing the issue a lot recently as the 
whole affair had become a "ghastly joke".151 He received something of a boost a fortnight later 
when, less than a week before election day, the Minister of Police announced confirmation of a 
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new £78000 three-storey police station for Timam l52 Can-'s print advertising had become slightly 
more sophisticated over the years, but his central theme remained the same: service. In one 
advertisement, he compared himself to an automobile, asking voters to continue to support "the 
Carr that has proved successful through the years by performance, service and reliability." I 53 
The TiI11(1/'u Herald decried public apathy during the campaign, an apathy it blamed on the 
prosperity the country was enjoying at the present time. It mentioned that both Isitt and Can- had 
had to abandon meetings due to lack of interest, and described the election, which was "now 
fluttering to a close", as one of the tamest in Timaru's history. 154 Aside from the bemoaning the 
poor turnout at political meetings, the Tima1'lt Herald made its customary endorsement of the 
National Patiy candidate, arguing that Labour's policies appealed to the laziness in people by 
offering reward without effOli. 155 However, an election survey run by the newspaper on the eve of 
the election was more sympathetic to Carr. The piece mentioned that Carr had defeated some 
formidable contenders over the previous 29 years, and argued that his incumbency was "due 
largely to his outstanding personal attention to his constituents. ,,156 
The electorate rewarded Carr with another healthy majority on election day. Support for the 
Social Credit Party within Timaru was reduced by 16.9 percentage points. Labour and National 
picked up roughly half the difference each, leaving Can- with a similarly comfortable majority over 
National to the one he had enjoyed in 1954. After his acceptance speech, during which he thanked 
the voters, his opponents and his local party organisation, Carr also thanked the newspaper 
reporters, as usual, but not the subeditors: "I am giving no unqualified thanks to the subeditors. 
Quite often some of them could be described by the name we gave, as boys, to some of our 
marbles. Do you remember? Not alleys, or taws, but ------, yes, yes you remember.,,157 It is 
possible that the cause of Can-'s outburst was anger that one of the full reports of his meetings, 
which had been paid for and an-anged to run in the Tim ani Hemld, had been cut by the 
newspaper's subeditors without his permission or notification. The day after the publication of 
Can-'s election day address, the Timanl Branch of the Canterbury and Westland Journalists' Union 
made a complaint to Walter Nash and the Director of Broadcasting over Can-'s comments. Carr's 
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words were described as "deliberately offensive and inesponsible.,,158 The following day, Carr 
responded to the joumalists' complaint, claiming that he meant to use the word "stonies" which is 
a term he used as a child to describe marbles: "surely the implication is obvious, and sufficiently 
inoffensive." 1 59 An irate letter to the editor the same day argued that Can's speech was "one of the 
most anogant, bombastic and vitriolic ever heard." The letter writer also described Can's 
behaviour as "scunilous", and facetiously added that it seemed strange that Can had never been 
promoted from the backbench. 
With Labour back in govemment, Can was keen to impress the new Labour MPs within caucus in 
the hope of being elected to cabinet. Tizard remembers Carr attempting "to emphasise his vigour" 
by beating his chest in front of the new MPs so hard he almost collapsed. 160 However, Can was 
passed over again, not getting past the first ballot in the caucus vote. 161 
Labour's success at the 1957 election brought about a surge in party membership in Timaru, from 
269 in 1957 to 744 in 1958. However, Arnold Nordmeyer's budget the following year had a 
disastrous effect on the strength of the local party, as it did on branches all over the country, and 
by 1959 membership had dropped to just 195. Bany Gustafson, in his article on the effect of the 
so-called "black budget" on Labour Party branch membership in the Aucldand region, found that 
the most significant drop in branch membership was among semi- and unsldlled workers, and 
noted that "the feeling grew and persisted among many traditional activists, particularly those with 
manual-worker occupations ... that the Labour Party was no longer their party or that they had lost 
control ofit.,,162 Gustafson did not discuss the effect of the dissatisfaction with the 1958 budget on 
membership of affiliated unions within Auckland L.R.C.s. The drop in party membership 111 
Timaru in the wake of the 1958 budget must be seen in the context of the steady decline in 
membership through the 1950s, as illustrated in graph 3.1 in chapter three. In this context, it 
appears not as a singular catastrophe, but rather as yet another (albeit large) nail in the coffin of 
party membership. ImpOliantly, membership of affiliated unions within the Timaru L.R.C. faired 
157 ibid., 2 December 1957. 
158 ibid., 3 December 1957. It is not clear exactly what term Carr used to cause such oftence. The word must 
have sounded similar to "stonies" and have been offensive enough for the Till/am Herald to refuse to print it. 
159 ibid., 4 December 1957. 
160 Robert Tizard to Colin Brown, 16 February 1996. 
161 Sinclair, Nash, p. 304. 
162 Ban'y Gustafson, "Labour's Lost Legions: The Second Labour Government 1957-60 and Grassroots Party 
Membership in the Auckland Region," in Nell' Zealand Journal of History 10, no. 2 1976), pp. 144, 157. 
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better. While the large Hotel and Restaurant Employees' Union (which claimed over six hundred 
members in 1959) disappeared from the list of affiliated unions in Timan.! after 1961, and 
membership of the Workers' Union dropped by three hundred, membership of all other unions was 
unaffected. 163 
Figure 5.2 Clyde Carr, possibly at a visit of the Commonwealth Chief Scout, c. 1960164 
163 N.z.L.P. Annual Conference Reports, 1958-1962. 
164 South Canterbury Museum Photographic Collection 00022938. 
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1960 Election 
A matter of weeks before the 1960 election, Carr addressed an audience at the opening of the new 
police station in Timam. This must have been a highly significant moment for him, as the battle to 
replace the old station had gone on as long as his term in Timan!. Throughout his career, CalT had 
made frequent pleas to parliament for a new station, and arranged for visits by various officials to 
inspect the old facility. As the years wore on, the tone of Carr's regular speeches on the matter 
shifted from being earnest and optimistic, to a kind of resigned cynicism. In 1945, while 
complaining that he had been pushing for a new station for fifteen years, CarT clearly enjoyed 
painting a picture of the farcical conditions at the aging facility, describing how there were "holes 
in the floor and the roof leaked, and every time it rained the police had an active time dodging the 
holes in the floor and the rain coming through the roof.,,165 Once, when inspecting the station, Carr 
fell through the floorboards, nearly breaking his leg. 166 
In his speech at the opening of the new facility, Carr outlined the many representations he had 
made to parliament on the issue. This gave him the opportunity of repeating some of his more 
memorable one-liners, amusing his audience and himself in the process. He quoted himself 
describing the old station as "being hopelessly antiquated and inadequate, resulting in the 
condition for the police force themselves of virtual lifetime imprisonment, destitute of the bare 
comforts of the modem jail", and as being in a condition "such as to disgrace an East End joss 
house." By the time of this speech in 1960, the aging Carr's speech was slightly slurred, and he 
sounded extremely pleased with his own eloquence, giggling frequently. 167 
The 1960 election saw Labour ousted from government as the country swung toward National. 
Carr, now seventy-four, had his majority cut to it lowest point ever: just 2.3 percent of the total 
vote, or 357 people. The National candidate in Timam was once again an experienced local 
politician, R.E. White. A resident of South Canterbury since 1907, White had recently served two 
ternls as mayor of Timanl, during which he had taken a special interest in housing, industrial 
development and social welfare. 168 He shared with previous National candidates an interest in mral 
issues and a conservative, anti-Communist outlook. He opened his campaign to an audience of 
165 N.Z.P.D., Vol. 270, 3 October 1945. 
166 David Thomson and Hendrik Kagei, A Century a/Service,' A History a/the South Canterbury alld North 
Otago Police (Timaru: New Zealand Police, 1987), p. 40. 
167 Clyde Carr, 10 October 1960, TI64, Sound Archives, Christchurch. 
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fifty at Otipua, arguing that young people should be encouraged on to famls. During the campaign, 
he expressed the view that he would like to see the Queen's head back on all New Zealand stamps, 
to demonstrate the country's loyalty to the monarch. 169 
White was an energetic and thorough candidate, and well before beginning his campaign he had 
undertaken a house-to-house canvass of selected areas of the town. 170 White took advantage of the 
local knowledge and visibility that he had built up as mayor during his campaign, for example at 
the Little Playhouse, where he spoke on the need for Timaru to employ a public relations officer to 
help attract industry to the area. According to White, the lack of a such a position had resulted in 
the loss of the opportunity of having a carpet factory locate in Timaru. 171 Furthermore, White 
claimed, Carr's long incumbency had resulted in Timaru's needs being ignored by the Labour 
govemment: 
I believe that to be regarded as a safe Labour seat has not been good for this electorate, in 
so far as govemment expenditure and interest is concemed. It is time for a change to allow 
a National member an opportunity to prove his worth. We need strong and vigorous 
representation to help accelerate our development, which is the only way we can provide 
opportunities for young people. 172 
White claimed that the Labour governnlent had not favoured Timaru as much as Auckland, Nelson 
and other districts in developing regional economy and infrastructure. He argued that he would 
represent Timaru more effectively than Carr, and that a National govemment would be more 
responsive to the issues that affected South Canterbury than a Labour govemment. 173 Only rarely 
did White attack Labour over the increased taxes on income, petrol, alcohol and tobacco 
introduced in the 1958 budget. This was, however, a major theme of National Party leader Keith 
Holyoake's speech at the Scottish Hall. Holyoake described Labour as having lied its way into 
power then increased taxes against its word. 174 
168 Til1laru Herald, 19 November 1960. 
169 ibid., 15 November 1960. 
170 Timanl National Party Minute Books, 17 April 1961. 
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Isitt stood again for Social Credit in 1960, and again ran a mediocre campaign. There was 
another, far more colourful minor candidate at the 1960 election, however. J.R. Rae stood as a 
People's Progressive Independent candidate. His policy advocacy was an idiosyncratic mix of 
radical left-wing and Social Credit politics, pacifism and a state welfarism, under the slogan "Back 
to the Michael Joseph Savage Policy.,,175 Towards the end of the campaign, the amount of 
coverage Rae was receiving in the Timan{ Herald was perceived by the Labour Party as a threat to 
Carr. Rae played on this by accusing the Labour Party secretary of asking him to withdraw from 
the campaign. The Labour Party secretary, H. McManus, replied to Rae's accusations by saying 
that in fact he asked Rae to withdraw a statement he had made, not to withdraw from the 
campaign. 176 
Carr continued to face dwindling audience numbers at his meetings, and had to abandon a 
meeting at Kingsdown through lack of interest. 177 He addressed the issue of low meeting 
attendances in a number of his speeches, and claimed he would be better off broadcasting his 
speeches from radio, to let his audiences stay at home on cold nights. 178 Typically, Carr was able 
to turn what could have been a negative situation into an opportunity to display his way with 
words, expressing his fmstration with "all this trotting around, wasting one's fragrance on the 
desert air.,,179 A Timan{ Herald editorial estimated that at least six meetings had been cancelled 
due to lack of interest during the campaign, and noted that other meetings more closely resembled 
"cosy discussion circles" than the heated debates of the past. 180 
In response to doubts raised by White about his effectiveness as an MP, Carr listed his 
achievements on behalf of Timam: a new wing for Waimataitai School, repairs to South School, a 
new school at Marchwiel, a new Main School, a new school at Grantlea, and another school 
planned for Rimu Street. 181 Other local issues remained umesolved, however, in particular 
differential power pricing which disadvantaged residents of Marchwiel. Carr claimed to have had 
informally discussed the matter with Minister of Electricity Hugh Watt, but to be unsure of his 
175 ibid., 4 November 1960. 
176 ibid., 25 November 1960. 
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plans. At the end of his Marchwiel meeting, Carr joked that he had thought that he might have 
been t0111 limb from limb by the Citizens' Association, but was happy to be leaving in one piece. 182 
Carr saw the development of local industry as an essential means of keeping young people in 
Timaru, and during his campaign detailed his efforts in regard to bringing industry to Timanl, for 
example his work in getting the Tekau knitting factory to Timan!. He claimed that Timaru was 
losing popUlation to expanding industrial areas like the Hutt Valley, and that, while the population 
of suburbs like Marchwiel was increasing, there had been no accompanying growth of industry. 
Carr attempted to shift the responsibility for regional economic development onto local, rather 
than central, government. He suggested that local authorities (such as the Timaru City Council, 
which White had recently led) could build large trading estates and lease the property free to 
businesses for a period, as had been done in Wanganui. 183 
Carr's progressive social views also helped distinguish him from White on the increasingly 
important issue of law and order. Carr believed it was essential to provide positive alternatives for 
problem youth, saying "you won't find people who like rowing, yachting and athletics running 
around with bike chains and razor blades.,,184 To this end, he promised electors that Labour would 
pay for a new sports centre for Timanl, helping combat juvenile delinquency. National, on the 
other hand, promised tougher courts and ridiculed Labour's plans for a centrally heated prison. 18S 
Carr also held liberal views on liquor licensing, saying that restrictions on the licensing of 
restaurants should be eased, as people dining at restaurants do not go just to drink, but for a meal, 
and should be allowed to have a drink "for their stomach's sake".186 Other Labour speakers also 
addressed social policy issues during Carr's campaign. Phillip Holloway, Minister of Industries 
and Commerce, spoke about the New Zealand Opera Company and Ballet, while Walter Nash 
spoke on immigration, equal pay for women, and disarmament. 187 
Only at the end of the campaign did the issue of increased taxation under Labour's 1958 budget 
become an issue. At a lively meeting at Fairview, Carr was faced with a barrage of questions about 
the taxes introduced by Labour since 1957. 188 It seems highly likely most of the questions came 
from National supporters, because the questions asked of Carr all corresponded to specific issues 
182 ibid., 23 November 1960. 
18} ibid., 17 November 1960. 
184 ibid., II November 1960. 
185 ibid., 10 Novembel' 1960. 
186 Press, 23 November 1960. 
138 
which had been recently raised by White in his speeches: tax increases, the need to get young 
workers onto farms, and complaints about the working conditions of bank staff as raised by the 
Banks' Staff Action Movement. The fact that Carr did a relatively poor job of answering these 
questions - simply saying he had faith in Labour's ministers - sllggests that if the local National 
Party had adopted this tactic earlier, it may have been used far more effectively against Carr. The 
next night at Trinity Church Hall, the questioning was even more heated, especially on questions 
of the alcohol and tobacco price rises. While there were only ten people at the meeting, there was a 
great deal of opposition to Carr, predominantly from an audience member called Mr Gamble, who 
sounded like a disgnmt1ed former Labour voter: 
The blokes who voted you in - the men on the freezing works, the limeworks, and the coal 
heaver - have now reached the stage where in many cases their families have grown up and 
gone away from home. Their only pleasure now is in a few beers and a smoke and in their 
cars ... Why did you vote to put up the tax? 189 
Carr was also confronted at Tlinity Hall over the issue of the Timaru magistracy. In 1958, Carr had 
promised to vote against his own party in parliament in protest at a Ministry of Justice decision to 
transfer Timaru's resident stipendiary magistrate to Christchurch without replacement. After 
making a rousing speech in parliament on the issue, when it came to the vote, Carr could not vote 
against Labour because the party's numbers in the house were not strong enough. According to a 
New Zealand Truth article at the time, "Mr Carr then felt bound to support his party, governing by 
one vote, and in the crisis turned his face against the Opposition's attempt to support him. His 
volte face made his face red - and caused the faces in his electorate to redden through a more 
violent emotion.,,190 At the 1960 election, Carr claimed to be working as hard as he could to get a 
magistrate returned to Timaru, and he had indeed brought the issue up in caucus on a number of 
occasions in 1959. 191 The issue provided a good illustration of the potential problems that could 
arise when support for one's party conflicted with support for one's electorate. 
IS7 Till/am Herald, 12 and 18 November 1960. 
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Carr's last campaign was probably also his most difficult. White was an effective and vigorous 
opponent, and the nationwide tide of opinion was swinging against LabOl~r. Carr was unable to 
respond convincingly to National's criticisms of him on a number of crucial issues, especially 
Labour's failure to attract secondary industry to Timaru, and the rise in consumer prices. Carr was 
now an old man, his health was beginning to deteriorate, and he was only able to hang onto the 
seat by the narrowest of margins. The fact that he was able to hold the seat at all given the 
circumstances is testament to the massive base of support he had built up during his thirty-two 
years in the seat. 
Retirement and Death 
Whether his refusal to retire was driven by financial necessity or a single mindedness to hold the 
seat until he was defeated at the polls, Carr continued to represent Timaru in parliament until he 
was well into his seventies. In 1949, in a speech to parliament, Carr expressed his views on 
retirement: "there is no need to retire at sixty years, even though one is then entitled to an age 
benefit. I intend never to retire." Carr believed that as long as one was healthy, one should work, 
and that premature retirement caused mental ills: "self-expression and independence is life; their 
lack is death, a living death.,,192 
By the late 1950s, however, there were persistent rumours regarding Carr's declining health. In 
November 1958, Carr felt obliged to respond to rumours that he was suffering from serious health 
problems by issuing a public statement, saying "I have never felt better in my life than I do at 
present, and I am enjoying my customary exuberant good health.,,193 Four months later, and with 
typical good humour, Carr responded to further mmours, saying: "I am perfectly alright. These 
inquiries are like sticking pins into an effigy - they might kill me off yet." He denied he had 
suffered a stroke, claiming to have had merely a bout of influenza, although, he added, "these 
many inquiries maybring about a stroke yet.,,194 
Despite his denials, CatT'S poor health had affected his ability to do represent his electorate for at 
least a year before his eventual retirement in May 1962. According to some of his younger caucus 
colleagues, by the late 1950s, Carr was displaying "clear evidence of eccentricity and some 
192 N.Z.P.D., Vol. 286,18 August 1949. 
193 Dominion, 11 November 1958. 
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definite signs of senility.,,195 Whether senile or not, Carr's behaviour in parliament at the end of his 
career was undeniably eccentric. There are many reports of Carr's miserliness, a character trait 
which was not unique to his later years, and which was observed in both Timaru and Wellington. 
Robert Tizard remembers Carr breaching the rules of parliament by staying overnight in his 
parliamentary offices to save expenses. Perhaps the most well-known story about Carr is that once 
darned the holes in his socks during a parliamentary debate. During the 1946 election campaign, 
Carr referred to this incident: "I am no snob. They laughed at me when I was darning my socks in 
the House. Well, I had been away from home for a fortnight and my socks needed darning. There 
was no-one in the galleries - I forgot the glamour boys in the Press gallery."I96 According to 
Michael Bassett, by the late 1950s, Carr ate in his parliamentary office whenever possible, 
generating "constant .smells of burnt toast, somewhat to the irritation of colleagues.,,197 Tizard 
backs up this story, saying that Carr would go to Bellamy's only twice a day, filling his pockets 
with sliced bread or scones to be toasted later in his office. Carr's penny pinching extended to his 
weekend trips back to Timaru. According to Tizard, CatT struck a deal with the train guards in 
Christchurch, and when he got off the overnight ferry in Lyttelton, he would join them in their off-
duty room. There, he would toast the bread he had taken from Bellamy'S over the coke brazier 
while waiting for the train south to Timaru. 198 According to another story, Carr used to lock 
himself in his office overnight. He kept an empty five pound prune tin in the office as his "relief 
agency", which he would empty out the window at dawn, much to the chagrin of the staff of the 
parliamentary library. According to Tizard, Carr was considered "more than just eccentric" by 
younger Labour MPs: 
Clyde was quite a raconteur, an orator rather than a debater when I knew him. With a 
couple of somebody else's beers aboard, he would declaim Coleridge's "ancient Mariner" 
in large chunks, especially the parts referring to the "Halbatross" as he pronounced it .... He 
always asked to be greeted as the Rev Clyde Carr, but was not above boasting, when 
lubricated, of his success in sexually solacing parishioners/constituents. 199 
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Carr's friend and associates in Timaru also remember him becoming increasingly eccentric with 
age. Doug Shears remembers that Carr wa,s vice patron of the Timaru Yacht Club for many years, 
and often presented trophies and prizes at the end of the season. At one Yacht Club prize-giving 
"Clyde was quite full of liquor and started to tell a poor type of yarn. In fact he was so over the hill 
that the Commodore had him ejected from the social and he was not asked back again.,,200 Frank 
Heveldt, an A.S.R.S. organiser, often worked during campaigns transporting Carr around the 
electorate for evening addresses. He remembers once picking Carr up from his house and being 
surprised to see Carr come out in his slippers: "I can remember [we] had to take him back and 
make him put his shoes and socks on.,,201 Other former party and union members remember 
eccentric aspects of Carr's behaviour, although most of the recollections collected from 
respondents in 1996 and 2001 necessarily date from the last decade or two of Carr's life, the effect 
of which may be to overstate some of Carr's eccentricities. 
On 2 April 1961, Carr's wife Laurie died of breast cancer aged seventy-four. It was most 
probably after Laurie's death that Carr moved back to Christchurch to live with his daughter and 
son-in-law, as he had been living in Christchurch for around a year when he finally announced his 
retirement from parliament on 31 May 1962. The news of Carr's retirement was met with regret by 
the National Party in Timaru, who had decided that it was in their interests to keep him in 
parliament for as long as possible, knowing of his declining health and frequent absences from the 
house: "A gentle sleeper, [Carr] did little to disturb the deconJ1n of the Assembly as he would 
have, had he been addicted to loud, vulgar snoring .... It is ironic that by getting out he is doing us 
the most damage. It was in our interests to keep him propped up for another 12 months or 
more. ,,202 
Walter Nash made a rather perfunctory statement upon Carr's retirement, saying that Carr had 
"endeared hinlself to all his colleagues", complimenting Carr on his ability as a local 
representative and a public speaker, and noting Carr's major areas of policy interest: education, 
decentralisation of industry, and external affairs. 203 Another tribute to Carr was offered by the 
200 Doug Shears to Stephen Kerr, 31 March 200 I. 
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parliamentary reporter from the Dominion, who described Carr as "one of the most eloquent 
members the House has known, describing his "tremendous command of the English language" 
and his fondness for injecting into his speeches "some tongue-twisters or little-known or used 
word that later sent many of his fellows to the General Assembly Library to consult the Greater 
Oxford." The aJiicle also made mention of Carr's constituency work, claiming that he "always 
acknowledged and immediately took up any questions asked him by constituents irrespective of 
party.,,204 The by-election for the Timanl seat was held in July, and was easily won by a thirty-
three year old Timam-born petrol tanker driver from Temuka called Basil Arthur. Arthur's 
winning margin of 1307 was far in excess of Carr's result in 1960, and Arthur went on to hold the 
seat for twenty-five years until his defeat in 1987. 
Less than four months after his retirement, Carr died of a heart attack on 18 September 1962, 
aged seventy-six. Predictably, Carr's obituaries emphasised his "unremitting ... attention to the 
needs of constituents and to the electorate.,,205 The Timant He}'{[ld described him as a "man of 
considerable intellectual attainments" and an "astute campaigner", and claimed that his 
"unswerving pursuit of his beliefs and his assiduous service undoubtedly had a deep influence on 
the political thinldng of the people and in shaping the future of the district. ,,206 The Labour mayor 
of Timam, Muriel Hilton, quoted Socrates to sum up what she saw as Carr's personal philosophy: 
"I pray the men of the future may live life more nobly than we live it; I pray that all injustice and 
greed and all littleness of soul may perish from the nature of man.,,207 Long-serving Timaru L.R.C. 
chair G.S. Ray described Carr as 
a very exacting member, who gave tremendous attention to detail, he fought strongly for 
the benefit of the individual and the community. No task was too small, and none too large, 
and he never turned down any reasonable request. ... He was a gifted speaker and a learned 
man, but perhaps one of his greatest attributes was that he never lost touch with the 
conmlon man. ,,208 
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CalT's funeral was held in Christchurch on September 21 during light drizzle. Rev R.P. Andrews 
described CalT as having been well-loved for his "cheerful friendliness and his integrity." Among 
the hundred or so mourners were MPs Brain Talboys, Arnold Nordmeyer, Norn1an Kirk, Michael 
Connolly, Herbert Walker, Herbert Pickering, and Basil Arthur. The mayors and town clerks of 
Timaru and Christchurch were also present. An impression of the widespread impact Carr had 
made in Timaru can be gained from the list of organisations in Timaru which sent floral tributes to 
CalT's funeral: the Harbour Board, Labour Party branches, yacht club, Country Drivers' Union, the 
Chinese Association, staff of Lincoln College, and the Woollen Workers' Union. 209 Further tribute 
was paid to CalT seven years after his death with the constmction of the Clyde CalT Memorial Hall 
on North Street by the Trades Hall Society in June 1969.210 
209 ibid., 22 September 1962. 
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6. Conclusion: Clyde Carr, Timaru and the art of 
incumbency 
I'd rather be a rebel, and dubbed a heretic 
Than a whining, wheedling sycophant, with someone's boots to lick. 
A ShOli life and a melTY one I'd chose with noble rage 
Far rather than to linger out my hours upon the stage. 
I'd rather be a sinner with a sinner's joys and woes 
Than a grave and reverend seigneur with a proud, averted nose. 
Better be young and naughty at three-score-years-and-ten, 
Than a deathshead cold and haughty at the feast of merry men. 
- Clyde CalT, "Testament". 1 
The aim of this thesis has been to investigate Carr's incumbency in Timan!. Two quite different 
modes of explanation have been adopted. Chapter three demonstrated that there was a strong 
stmctural basis for Labour voting in Timaru. Throughout Carr's career in Timam, union 
membership in Timam per head of voting population remained high relative to other provincial 
town electorates. Unions remained central to the political labour movement in the electorate, 
numerically and financially dominating the Timam L.R.C. and filling key positions of 
responsibility within it. The strength of unionisation in Timam is key to understanding Carr's 
success, as it explains the source of mass support for the Labour Party and reflects the largely 
urban nature of the electorate. It is also possible that the legacy of patterns of settlement in South 
Canterbury had a role to play in the development of labour consciousness in Timam. Timam was 
one of the slowest growing of the ten provincial towns, and showed a high level of residential 
segregation in its voting patterns. These factors appear to have either increased support for Labour, 
or inhibited the electoral success of the National Party, or both. 
However, while this demographic context was a necessary condition for Can's success, stmctural 
factors are not in themselves sufficient for explaining CalT'S incumbency. There are a number of 
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reasons for this. Firstly, of the ten provincial town seats, Timam did not consistently have the 
highest Labour vote. On average across the period, the Labour vote in Napier and Wanganui was 
higher than it was in Timam. However, the vote in these towns occasionally swung to the right far 
enough to let National win. Only in Timam did Labour consistently win the seat. Or, to put it 
another way, only in Timam did Labour consistently not lose the seat. The "incumbency 
advantage" seems to have worked for Carr not by allowing him to build his majority to a massive 
size, but by consistently preventing enough voters from swinging away from Labour for him to 
hold the seat. Despite several close calls, Carr won and held the seat through eleven election 
campaigns. 
There is another reason that any explanation of Carr's success must account for his conscious 
behaviour as a politician, as well as the stmctural nature of his electorate. There is evidence that 
Carr's appeal to electors stretched beyond the traditional Labour constituency of urban workers. At 
various times in his career, Carr could claim the support of groups like retired fam1ers and the 
chamber of commerce, groups which would normally be expected to support the National Party. 
Thus, the strength of Carr's personal appeal was a cmcial aspect of his political success, and one 
which cannot be explained with reference to the demographic characteristics of Timam. Only 
through a close description of Carr's style as a local representative can his ability to appeal to such 
a wide range of voters be understood. 
The present chapter proceeds by reviewing the political science literature on incumbency in order 
to identify the factors which create the "incumbency advantage" for a candidate seeking reelection. 
The literature survey briefly discusses the relevance of the various factors to Carr's case, and is 
meant to provide a theoretical context for Carr's achievement. Finally, the last section describes 
the six themes which characterised Carr's distinctive political style: constituency work, 
communication, campaign technique, common touch, controversy and chance. The themes give 
coherence to Carr's diverse interests, and help to explain his success in Timam. 
The Incumbency Advantage 
Most investigations into incumbency in the political science literature are based on interviews with 
either contemporary voters or representatives or both. Through a precise statistical analysis of the 
1 Carr, Poems, p. 22. 
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results, investigators attempt to identify how much the incumbent politician's success is the 
product of their position as incumbent, as distinct from other factors such as national voting 
swings, the historical partisanship of the electorate, the demographic characteristics of the 
electorate, and so on. While it is impossible to recreate such interview-based research in a 
historical study such as the present thesis, insights from contemporary political science research 
provide useful starting points for understanding to what extent CalT's behaviour contributed to his 
incumbency. 
Factors that affect the strength of the incumbency advantage for a candidate fall into two groups. 
The first are internal factors, factors over which the politician has conscious control. Such factors 
usually relate to campaign style and constituency work. Secondly, there are external factors, 
factors over which the politician has no control, and of which they may not be conscious. External 
factors include the social and demographic profile of the electorate. Some American studies have 
found that an MP's political style is a weaker factor in explaining their incumbency than the 
stmctural nature of their electorate. However, in Westminster-style democracies, constituency 
work has been found to playa much more significant role in securing a candidate's reelection. 2 
Ironically, party discipline in the New Zealand parliament is the strongest of any Western 
democracy, and therefore the potential for activity by individual New Zealand MPs on behalf of 
their constituents may be expected to be constrained by the demands of the party. Anagnoson 
notes the paradox between the expectation of high levels of constituency work by New Zealand 
MPs and the strength of party discipline in the country: "How members manage both the 
constraints of their small, personalized electorates and those of a strong patiy is by no means 
obvious."} In any case, most studies on incumbency in Westminster democracies have focused on 
internal factors, especially the role of constituency casework, as a factor in incumbents' reelection. 
Constituency casework is a highly visible and readily quantifiable factor over which the member 
has conscious control, and has long been regarded anecdotally as an effective means of increasing 
a member's majority. 
2 John Johannes and John McAdams, "The Congressional Incumbency Effect: Is it Casework, Policy 
Compatibility or Something Else? An Examination of the 1978 Election," American Journal of Political 
Science 25, no. 3 (1981), p. 537; Dianna Yiannakis, "The Grateful Electorate: Casework and Congressional 
Elections," American Journal of Political Science 25, no. 3 (1981), p. 577. 
3 Theodore Anagnoson, "Home Style in New Zealand," Legislative Studies Quarterly 8, no. 2 (1983), p. 158. 
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The most important external factors regarding CalT'S career have been discussed in chapter three. 
The high level of unionisation in Timam was cmcial to Carr's success, and the slow rate of 
population growth and relatively high level of residential segregation were also significant. 
Another factor that was external to CalT's control, but which cert<jinly affected by CalT'S success, 
was the inability of the National Party in Timam to maximise their effectiveness. Their continual 
lack of success meant that fund raising and maintaining enthusiasm for the next campaign became 
increasingly difficult. Attracting high quality candidates from outside the area was also difficult, 
given the electorate's poor record of success for National. Of the eleven candidates Carr faced, 
many were of a poor standard, and failed to relate to the electors as effectively as CalT. 
The key internal factors affecting incumbency identified in the literature are: constituency work; 
aligning policy advocacy to match the preferences of electors; attracting central government 
funding for the electorate; influence over governmental policy, and gaining publicity, usually press 
coverage, for all the above activities. 4 Constituency work, particularly assisting constituents in 
their dealings with government agencies (the "welfare office" role), has become a very important 
part of the MP's responsibilities as the state has taken an increasingly active role in the social and 
economic affairs of its citizens.s Wider access to higher education and the increasing penetration 
of media into society have also worked to increase the likelihood of constituents seeking help from 
their local MP. Another factor which influences the amount of casework done by MPs is the 
marginality of the electorate: the more marginal the electorate, the more casework an MP may feel 
obliged to perform in order to hold the seat. Only in the very safest seats do MPs relax their 
constituency work 6 Also, urban and poor electorates tend to produce more casework for their MPs 
than wealthy and mral electorates.? However, most authors have found that the single most 
important determinant of the amount of casework performed is the personal preference of the MP. 8 
All of these factors, the marginality and urban nature of the electorate, and CalT's personal 
preference for perfonning casework, were present in Timanl. 
4 McAdams, "Congressional Incumbency Effect," p. 513; Yiannakis, "Gratetul Electorate," p. 572. 
5 Anthony Barker and Michael Rush, The Member of Parliament and His Information (London: George Allen 
& Unwin Ltd, 1970), p. 197; Adrienne von Tunzehnann, "Membership of the New Zealand Parliament: A 
Study of Conditions, 1854-1978" (Master of Public Policy, Victoria University of Wellington, 1979), p. 6. 
6 Theodore Anagnoson, "Does Constituency Work have an Electoral Impact? The Case of New Zealand 
MPs," Political Science 39, no. 2 (1987), p. 116. 
7 Anagnoson, "Home Style," p. 171. 
8 ibid., p. 162; Yiannakis, "Grateful Electorate," p. 575. 
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The other factors listed above are less powerful in explaining incumbency, and less relevant to 
Carr's career. Policy matching, for example, is a weak explanation for the incumbency advantage. 
The challenger is equally as able as the incumbent to adjust her or his policy position according to 
what they perceive as the preference of the majority of their electors. In any case, not all 
constituents have the same policy preferences, so policy matching per se is unlikely to be a useful 
technique. The argument that winning central government funding for the electorate acts to 
increase the likelihood of an incumbent's reelection is more convincing. Being able to take credit 
for central government funding to local projects is a major advantage that the incumbent has over a 
challenger. However, this responsibility is a double-edged sword, and the incumbent may also be 
exposed to potential criticism when the electors perceive that they have not done enough on behalf 
of the electors. This was certainly tme of Carr, who, for example, spent over thirty years 
explaining to his electors why a new police station had not been built in Timam. 
Another advantage identified in the literature that the incumbent has over the challenger is a 
governmental influence. At any election, the incumbent MP has had at least one term in which to 
secure advantages for her or his electorate. However, in the case of Carr's career, two factors count 
against governmental influence as an important factor in explaining his incumbency. Firstly, 
Carr's influence within the Labour Party was marginal. He never attained cabinet rank, and was as 
often as not out of favour with his party hierarchy. Secondly, on three occasions Carr's opponent 
was a sitting government MP, and in these cases both the incumbent and the challenger would 
have had equal claim to government influence. 
Public "credit taking" is a cmcial adjunct to all the above strategies. Once again, the incumbent 
has a significant advantage when it comes to attracting media attention for activities. Carr's often 
controversial political style assured he had a regular presence in the Timanl Herald. However, the 
consistent and explicit opposition to Carr by the newspaper cetiainly reduced the extent to which 
he could expect sympathetic press coverage of his activities. High visibility is not the only 
advantage that the incumbent MP has over the opponent when seeking reelection. Most sitting 
MPs have access to certain "prerequisites of office" such as travel, phone and mail perks. 
However, the perks and salary available to MPs in New Zealand in Carr's period were modest to 
say the least. MPs in New Zealand were entitled to a tax-free allowance to meet expenses such as 
travel and accommodation only after 1944. Parliament offered no secretarial, administrative, 
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research or other support to MPs. 9 In fact, far from being advantageous to Carr, the demands of 
office (especially travelling between Wellington and Timan! and living away from home) must 
have been extremely exhausting. 
Constituency work is the factor identified in the literature with the most relevance to Carr's 
incumbency. Thus, it is the first of the six themes of his career and political style which are 
described below. 
Carr's Political Style 
1. Constituency Work 
Carr's work on behalf of his constituents was one of the most visible aspects of his career, and a 
decisive factor in his ongoing success. Throughout his career, he went to great lengths to promote 
the interests of his electorate and electors in parliament. While Can-'s personality and political 
style may have endeared him to voters, it was his advocacy on behalf of his electors that provided 
the substantive basis for the electorate's support for him. Carr was more aware of this than anyone, 
and at every election he emphasised in his publicity his diligent service to both individual electors 
and the electorate as a whole. The fact that Carr went to gre'at lengths to foster his reputation as 
constituency MP certainly suggests he was aware of the importance of such a reputation to his 
electoral success. Perhaps Carr also saw the opportunity to do constituency work as a means of 
attracting the cn!cial extra support he needed to assure the safety of his seat. There were four 
aspects to Carr's role as a constituency MP: his representations on behalf of individuals in their 
dealings with govemment agencies; his efforts to secure central government funding for local 
amenities like the port, airport and police station; his choice of policy advocacy that was meant to 
bring general benefits to secondary towns and/or the South Island; and his ability to maintain close 
relationships with the Labour Party branches and unions within the Timan! L.R.C. 
Carr continuously brought the ideas of his electors to the attention of parliament, whether they 
were criticisms of govemment regulations, ideas for the development of new industries or any 
other comments on the affairs of Timan! and New Zealand. This suggests that Carr was in close 
communication with his electors, that he listened to what they had to say and that he treated his 
role as their representative seriously enough to suggest their ideas to the house. Carr saw himself 
9 Tunzelmann, "New Zealand Parliament: A Study of Conditions", pp. 110-113. 
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as an agent of democracy, creating a means of access for all people within his electorate to reach 
the lawmakers in Wellington. Carr assisted individuals in his electorate in more practical ways 
also. In the post-war period he made so many representations to the Department of Social Security 
on behalf of his electors that a special file series was created by department staff to deal with his 
correspondence. 10 Carr also presented a number of petitions to parliament on behalf of his electors, 
and made representations to parliament on the conditions of groups such as relief workers, small 
farmers, fishemlen, and soldiers. Carr's experience and training as a minister of religion -
specifically his communication skills, his ability to listen to constituents' requests and complaints, 
and his experience in managing a parish or constituency - would have helped him in his role as a 
local MP. 
The other activity that is commonly associated with an MP's constituency role is attracting 
funding for amenities within the electorate. Carr went to a great deal of effort arguing for the 
development of Timaru's port, airport, radio station, police station and so on. He constantly 
struggled to attract new industry to the electorate; lobbied for the continued protection of the wheat 
industry so vital to the South Canterbury economy; demanded progress on the construction of 
housing in Timaru; and promoted the town as a holiday destination in an effort to increase levels 
of domestic tourism. 
In general, though, Carr's efforts in lobbying for local amenities were probably less effective in 
increasing his vote than the individual representations and assistance he gave. There are two are 
reasons for this. Firstly, in contrast to individual representations, the process of lobbying for local 
amenities was slow and unpredictable. Carr spent a great deal of energy lobbying for legislative 
change or funding to local projects, only to see his efforts come to nothing. For example, Carr's 
continual efforts to attract industry to Timaru met with relatively little success, and his struggle to 
have a new police station built took thirty years to come to fruition. This can hardly have helped 
convince voters that Carr's services were invaluable to the electorate. Secondly, even if such 
lobbying was successful, the benefits were sometimes so non-specific or indirect, that they would 
go unnoticed by many electors. The assistance that Carr gave on behalf of individuals, on the other 
hand, would usually have a far more direct and focused effect and a far more explicit electoral 
benefit for him. Thirdly, it not always cut-and-dried as to who would receive the benefits from 
10 SS 71712/19, Pt. 1, National Archives, Wellington. 
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local amenities. Rather than unite the public, issues of local development sometimes divided the 
electorate. A good example of a local issue which divided the community was the issue of the 
alienation of part of Timan! Park for use by the hospital. Lastly, some local policy issues (such as 
the need to attract industry to the electorate or to protect the wheat industry) were too widely 
agreed upon to be politically cogent in an election campaign. They were invariably part of the 
policy platforms of CalT' s opponents as well as his own. 
Much of Can' s policy advocacy was meant to bring benefits not only to Timan!, but to the entire 
South Island, or to all secondary centres. Can probably realised that his efforts were more likely to 
be successful if they encompassed a greater proportion of the country than his own electorate. The 
best example of this was Carr's desire for the decentralisation of industry and population away 
from the main centres. Can emphasised the nationwide benefits of decentralisation, only 
occasionally mentioning the potential for direct benefits to Timan!. 
The last and least visible aspect of Can's constituency role was to maintain close and amicable 
relations with his local party and the union movement. Without the support of the local 
organisation and the unions, Can would not have been able to nm effective campaigns. Although 
his relationship with the party was sometimes stormy, on only three occasions (1928, 1941 and 
1949) was his candidacy challenged. The Labour Party's candidate selection procedure favours the 
incumbent MP more than the National Party's, because the party executive, not the local branches, 
make the selection. Generally, the party hierarchy is more likely to want to hold on to a successful 
member, and not risk a change of candidate, regardless of local party considerations. II Barker and 
Rush cite the example of two MPs who found that the voter credit they gained through "welfare 
officer" work enabled them to hold on to power in their electorate despite a nationwide swing 
against their party. They also argue this credit is helpful for the MP in disputes with the local 
party, which suggests that such credit is "owned" by the member, rather than the party.12 Thus, 
Can's incumbency meant that his renomination for the candidacy in Timan! was more or less a 
formality, even as he entered his seventies. 
Can had a close relationship with the union movement in Timan!. In September 1954, Can's 
twenty-five years of service as MP were celebrated at a presentation social at Strathallan Hall. The 
II Keith Jackson, "Stability and Renewal: Incumbency and Parliamentary Composition," in The Victoriolls 
Incumbent,' A Threat to Democracy?, ed. Andrea Rommele (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1994), p. 269. 
12 Barker and Rush, In/ormation, p. 177. 
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function was crowded with members of the Watersiders' Union, their wives and families. Both the 
vice president and president of the union made speeches praising Carr's constant attention to the 
needs of the electorate. 13 Union support, while essential to Carr and Labour's survival, did have 
one electoral disadvantage: the idea that trade unions had undue and undemocratic control over the 
Labour Party's policy and activities became a constant theme of National's attacks during 
campaigns. 
Whatever his methods, Carr managed to win the support of a diverse range of groups within the 
community. At one point, Carr claimed to have the support of at least part of the farming 
community in his electorate: "I am saying nothing against retired farmers, for I have every reason 
to believe - it could not be otherwise - that a large number of retired farmers in Timam support 
me and I could not get into Parliament without them; there are such a lot of them: d4 Later, during 
the 1954 campaign, Carr thanked the Chamber of Commerce for their support. Support of this kind 
cannot be explained with reference to patiy politics, or to Carr's idiosyncratic political agenda, but 
was rather the result of his activity on behalf of his electors and his personal charisma. 
Constituency work was the most important mechanism by which Carr was able to build upon the 
base of support for Labour within Timam, and establish a personal appeal strong enough to ensure 
that the seat never slipped out of his grasp. Other themes in CatT'S career, mentioned below, most 
impOliantly his communication skills and "common touch" were significant in that they enhanced 
his ability to perform constituency work effectively. And because he could perform constituency 
work so effectively, CatT could count among his supporters members from all sectors of 
community. The nature of some electors' support for Carr went beyond a political level, too. For 
many in Timaru, Carr was remembered as much as a friend and personal advocate as a political 
representative. 
2. Communication Skills 
Perhaps above all, Carr was a communicator. Aside from its central importance to his work as an 
MP, Carr's skill as a speaker and writer were defining features of his pre-parliamentary career. 
Carr remained a lover and writer of poetry his whole life, and worked at various times as a writer, 
a radio presenter, a minister and an editor. Many obituary tributes to him commented on the 
13 N.z. Worker, 29 September 1954. 
14 N.Z.P.D., Vol. 286.12 August 1949. 
r 
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verbosity and obscure vocabulary he employed in his parliamentary speeches. Carr's speaking was 
not necessarily characterised by highbrow language, however. He was equally at home addressing 
a group of relief workers in a remote camp as addressing parliament. He had the rare ability to 
address all kinds of people on their own terms. Furthermore, Carr was often funny in his campaign 
speeches, in stark contrast to his opponents. 
Rather than decrease in importance as campaigning changed and meetings became less important, 
CalT's natural wit and turn of phrase became even more valuable. As attendance at campaign 
meetings dropped away to almost nothing and political meetings became in effect public press 
conferences, CalT's statements, whether dryly amusing or shockingly radical, ensured he stayed in 
the public eye. 
Carr's ability to cOl1ll11Unicate clearly and entertainingly defined his campaign technique and his 
image as a politician who was in touch with the common people. Can"s appeal was based on his 
effective self-portrayal as a "man of the people" in terms of his manner of speech, opinions and 
preferences. He could be by turns funny, irreverent, eloquent, emdite, pious, vulgar, radical and 
inspirational. 
3. Campaign Technique 
CalT'S efforts in 1928 established a pattern for well-executed campaigns. Almost without 
exception, Carr held more meetings on a greater number of campaign days than his opponents. 
Furthermore, CalT had the financial and practical support of both the local Labour Party branches 
and the extensive union networks in the electorate. Early in his career, CalT was a highly energetic 
and innovative campaigner, a gifted and entertaining speaker who was prepared to go to great 
lengths to reach disadvantaged voters who had been ignored by other politicians. In his first 
campaign, Carr spoke at a range oflocations, including the Young Peoples' Social Club, the Old 
Mens' Home, and the relief workers' camp at Cave. Carr also held large evening outdoor meetings 
in the evening in the centre of town as a means of reaching large numbers of urban workers. 
As the nature of campaigning and the context of his candidacy changed, Carr's adapted his 
campaign style. By the 1950s, CalT was an established incumbent and long-serving MP, and the 
importance of campaign meetings had become almost entirely symbolic. With his communication 
skills, experience in broadcast media and distinctive manner, CalT was an ideal candidate for the 
emerging age of mediated politics. CalT ensured he received a high degree of press coverage by 
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making the most of his ability to deliver pithy one-liners and making public appearances in his 
capacity as local MP. During the 1954 campaign, for example, Can' appeared in the Timan! 
Herald at the openings of a couple of local facilities, and began to cast himself as something of an 
elder statesman. Carr's relationship with the local newspapers was fraught at best, the Timan! 
Herald explicitly opposing him in its editorials at all eleven elections. Nevertheless, receiving 
press coverage was an essential aspect of Carr's campaigning, and he managed to achieve this 
through the strength of his charisma and the benefits of public office. 
Cmcial to Carr's success was the campaign assistance offered by the local party and affiliated 
unions in Timaru. Local party officials took responsibility for campaign assistance, such as 
canvassing electors, raising campaign funds, and transporting voters to the polls on election day. In 
his study of the 1960 general election, Robert Chapman found that the effectiveness of local party 
organisation influenced local election results, especially where the seat was marginal. 15 Carr's 
experience in Timaru also suggests that the levels of organisation of the different parties could be 
decisive. The lack of motivation and disorganisation on the part of the National Party was 
probably as important to Carr's continued success as the effectiveness of Labour. 
Carr's campaign style was the product of the other aspects of his career listed here. It was an 
idiosyncratic and dynamic style based upon his "common touch", his abilities as a communicator, 
and his penchant for controversy of one kind or another, with a strong emphasis· on his 
constituency work. Carr's inventiveness and adaptability as a campaigner was crucial to his 
ongoing success. After an especially strong initial three campaigns, Carr was established in the 
seat. He could not relax however, as successive developments in politics (the rise of the D.S.L.P., 
the electoral decline of Labour) demanded that he continue to campaign effectively and alter his 
style to suit the changing nature of political campaigning. 
4. Common Touch 
CaIT'S objection to what he saw as "snobbery" was central to his identity. It informed his policy 
advocacy, his campaigning, his economic philosophy, his constituency work, and his writing and 
speechmaking alike. Carr's "conml0n touch" manifested itself in two ways. Firstly, a deep-seated 
economic and philosophical egalitarianism was central to much of Carr's political activity: his 
support for Labour's social security programmes; his attacks on the privileged classes, large banks, 
r 
I 
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oil companies, stock and station agents and so on; and his concem with social justice and the 
plight of the disadvantaged, for example the mentally ill, relief workers, prison inmates, the 
Samoan independence movement, and juvenile delinquents. 
The second dimension to Carr's common touch was not so much a conscious political stance as a 
personality trait. Carr's manner was such that he appealed naturally to ordinary men and women. 
In his speech, behaviour and preferences, Carr did not in any way try to distinguish himself from 
the people of Timam. Early in his career, Carr made a name for himself mixing easily with his 
audiences, often reciting poetry, entertaining and even singing at campaign meetings. His decision 
to enlist as a private in the amlY was widely seen as a willingness to "muck in" and do his bit for 
the war effort. Even in his sixties, Carr was a regular at Saturday night dances in Timaru. Carr 
advocated a colloquial, populist style of radio where modem music and language would be the 
norm. If anything, Carr's views on social and moral issues like marriage, language, capital 
punishment, and liquor licensing were sometimes too progressive for many of his constituents. By 
contrast, National candidates were often dour and moralistic. Interestingly, Carr would sometimes 
emphasise his own irreverent attitude towards symbols of authority (for example the royal family, 
or the Labour Party leadership), apparently as a means of aligning himself with his everyday 
electors. 
A colourful example of Carr's willingness to mix with his constituents on their own terms came 
in August 1951. As Prime Minister Holland addressed electors at the Theatre Royal, Carr attended 
a New Zealand Workers' Union Monster Shearer's Jamboree held in a shearing shed, where there 
were "sheep shearers actually on the job" and where "ducks and other wildfowl shared the dance 
floor with a record number of couples for Timaru." Carr's official duties took place "during the 
night or early in the moming", when he presented a suitcase, hairbrush and wallet as a gesture of 
appreciation to Bill Dempster, a local N.Z.W.U. organiser. 16 Carr's warmth, humour and humility 
were the heart of his appeal to the electorate. He did not pretend to be any better or more deserving 
than any of his neighbours, and loved nothing more than to ridicule those who considered 
themselves superior. Importantly, he put this philosophical belief in an egalitarian society into 
practical action, for example through his activity on behalf of his constituents seeking help with 
govemment agencies. 
15 Chapman, Jackson, and Mitchell, Politics ill Action, p. 152. 
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5. Controversy 
One way or another, Carr often attached himself to controversy over the course of his career. He 
was attracted to radical political causes, and was unafraid to voice his support for them. Carr's 
close association with Lee, combined with his outspoken support for Social Credit monetary 
reform, kept him out of favour with the Labour Patiy leadership and limited his personal progress 
through the party. Carr's controversial pronouncements on the desirability of closer relations with 
the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War and advocacy for a more liberal attitude towards alcohol 
licensing earned him the disapproval of Fraser, as did the persistent mmours about Carr's 
infidelities. 
Given that there is a perception of Timam as a fairly socially conservative electorate,17 Can" s 
willingness to embroil himself in controversy over both radical political causes and social and 
moral issues is one of the most puzzling aspects of his career. Two points need to be made about 
this aspect of Carr's life. Firstly, the controversial nature of Carr's career was not always 
deliberate. Carr was a passionate politician and a fairly eccentric man, and a certain amount of 
controversy was probably inevitable once he had entered public life. 18 Secondly, it must be 
remembered that for many electors, far from being a tum-off, Carr's personality and character 
quirks were an important part of his appeal. Whether consciously or not, many of Carr's political 
stances were in opposition to dominant conservative institutional values, for example his insistence 
on secular education, his opposition to jingoism during World War Two, his irreverence towards 
the royal family, and his anti-imperialism. 
In both his policy advocacy and his personal behaviour, Carr participated in, or at least tolerated, 
activities that were part of many of his electors' everyday lives, but which were considered "moral 
issues" in the political realm. Such activities included drinking, dancing, smoking, gambling and 
marital infidelity. As much as Carr's attitude to these issues caused offence among certain groups 
in Timam, many other voters would not have taken offence, and may have even applauded Carr's 
frankness. It was credit to Carr's political skill and/or good forhme that he was able to judge the 
climate of popular opinion accurately enough that he never lost the seat. (Although he came close 
16 N.2. Worker, 28 August 1951. 
17 Oliver Gavigan to Robert Paton, 15 March 1992, Trade Union Oral History Project, OH Tnt 0056/l9, 
Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington. 
18 Eccentricity certainly helps account for some of the attention Carr's views attracted. In 1935 during a 
discussion on international security, Carr illustrated a point by saying, "Someone once asked me, 'What 
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on occasion, for example in the wake of the Lee affair, when by 1946 he had lost a significant 
proportion of his support in Timaru.) Carr certainly used his status as an ex-clergyman as a means 
of reinforcing his own respectability when necessary, by insisting on being referred to as 
"Reverend" in parliament, and peppering his speechmaking with biblical quotations and references 
to his church days. On occasion, Carr was called upon to defend his record as a minister, and 
explain his premature departure from both the Methodist and Congregationalist Churches. 19 
Finally, whether the majority of the voting public approved or disapproved of specific aspects of 
his behaviour and beliefs, Carr's outspokenness and radicalism insured that he remained in the 
public eye. For better or for worse, Can' was able to avoid the greatest political crime that a long-
term incumbent can commit: invisibility. 
6. Chance 
The last theme of Carr's political career was not one of his own making, but played a significant 
role in his career nonetheless. This was the role of chance or, more specifically, the role of factors 
outside Carr's conscious contro!' Can' was undoubtedly helped by a nm of fortunate circumstances 
at fortunate times. In 1931, Carr was lucky to face a split anti-Labour vote, without which he 
probably would not have won the seat. The triangular contest at the 1931 election may be seen not 
so much as random chance, but as the manifestation of a constant theme during Carr's career: the 
poor organisation of conservative political interests in Timan!. 
Later instances of Carr's good fortune were more the product of pure chance, but were less 
decisive in determining in the outcome of elections. In 1951, at the nadir of Labour's popularity, 
Carr faced a strong candidate in Richards, the sitting mayor. However, Richards fell ill for most of 
the campaign period, giving Carr a great advantage in an election he may otherwise have struggled 
to win. For the period between 1946 and 1954, when support for Labour nationally was low, and 
his majorities were, at their most slim, Carr's cause was assisted to some degree by electoral 
boundary changes. Several of the small but strongly National-voting rural booths in the Timaru 
electorate were absorbed into the surrounding Waimate electorate. On balance, these changes 
worked in Carr's favour, although only by approximately one hundred votes. 
would you do if Hitler came to New Zealand''', and my reply was, '1 would invite him home for tea. '" 
N.2.P.D., Vol. 245,15 May 1936. 
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After briefly surveying those factors identified in the literature as affecting an incumbent MP's 
chances of reelection, it appears that consistency work was the most relevant to Carr's career in 
Timaru. It was certainly an central aspect of Carr's political style. It was not the only aspect of his 
style, however. Can"s interests and activities were extremely diverse, and his behaviour did not 
always suggest a man who was trying consciously to modify his behaviour to attract the votes of 
the entire electorate. However, when examined in turn, the many dimensions to Carr's life and 
work seem to cohere ideologically. Together they informed his idiosyncratic style. 
It is very difficult to offer a brief but comprehensive explanation of Carr's incumbency in 
Timaru. Nevertheless, a number of factors were crucial to his success. Timaru was a largely urban 
electorate with a number of large unionised workplaces and a history of Liberal voting. CalT's 
personal and political style gave him a strong appeal to the many urban workers there. He was a 
gifted speaker and opposed what he saw as the "snobbery" of the wealthy and upper class. His 
long record of diligent service to the electorate meant that his appeal went beyond the traditional 
Labour constituency to reach enough voters outside these groups to assure his continued success. 
Through a mix of good fortune and a thorough understanding of the preferences of his electors, 
Carr was able to retain the Timaru seat for thirty-four years, despite sometimes having a perilously 
low majority. While Carr's impact on national politics was modest to the point of being negligible, 
his idiosyncrasy and wide range of interests and activities certainly make him one of the more 
interesting characters in New Zealand's political history. 
19 For example ibid., Vol. 283, 13 October 1948. 
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Appendix Two: Population growth in ten provincial towns 
1874-1961 
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Appendix Three: Data and correlation tables for Chapter 
Three 
Table 1: Correlation between intercensual growth and Labour's share of major party vote 
Percentage Labour's share 0 
intercensual growth major party yote 
Spearman's rho Percentage Correlation 1.000 -.514 
intercensual growth Coefficien 
Sig. (Hailed) .000 
N 46 46 
Labour's share 0 Correlation -.514 1.000 
maj or party yote Coefficien 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
N 46 46 
** CorrelatIOn 1S slgmficant at the .01 level (2-tmled). 
Table 2: Correlation between level of affiliated union membership and Labour's share of 
the major party vote 
Affiliated union Labour's share 0 
membership as % 0 major party Yot, 
total yote 
Spearman's rhc Affiliated union Correlation 1.000 .140 
membership as % 0 Coefficien 
total yote 
Sig. (2-tailed) .216 
N 80 80 
Labour's share 0 Correlation .140 1.000 
major party yote Coefficien 
Sig. (2-tailed) .216 
N 80 80 
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Table 3: N.z.L.P. Branch membership as a proportion of the total vote in ten provincial 
town electorates 1931-1960 
Electorate 1931 1935 1938 1943 1946 1949 1951 1954 1957 1960 
5.6% 4.3% 18.4% 19.8% 0.0% 24.0% 24.2% 17.3% 18.9% 14.7% 
Gisborne 1.8% 3.2% 3.7% 2.5% 1.5% 2.4% 3.7% 4.1% 2.9% 2.0% 
Hamilton 0.2% 0.2% 1.0% 0.9% 1.7% 2.5'Yo 2.0% 1.0% 2.3% 2.0% 
Hastings 2.6% 1.0% 4.1% 0.8% 1.8% 0.0% 2.0% 3.8% 2.6% 2.3% 
In vercargi II 0.2% 0.6% 2.2% 3.0% 3.4% 6.9% 4.1% 3.6% 2.3% 1.9% 
Napier 1.7% 2.0% 5.4% 4.6% 2.9% 3.1% 3.8% 3.4% 2.9% 2.1% 
Nelson 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.7% 1.5% 5.3% 5.2% 2.2% 2.4% 0.8% 
New Plymouth 0.8% 0.3% 2.5% 1.0% 1.9% 4.5% 6.3% 4.3% 4.2% 5.5% 
Palmerston North 0.5% 0.2% 0.8% 1.2% 1.7% 2.1% 2.5% 3.5% 4.5% 3.5% 
Timanl 0.1% 0.4% 0.9% 2.4% 2.9% 5.4% 5.1% 3.5% 1.7% 1.9% 
Wanganui 1.0% 0.2% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 4.4% 5.4% 3.7% 2.5% 1.5% 
Table 4: Correlation between level of N.Z.L.P. membership and Labour's share of the 
major party vote 
NZLP branch Labour's share 0 
membership as % 0 major party vote 
total vote 
Speannan's rho NZLP branch Correlation 1.000 -.050 
membership as % 0 Coefticien 
total vote 
Sig. (2-tailed) .658 
N 80 80 
Labour's share oj Correlation -.050 1.000 
major party vote Coet1icien 
Sig. (2-tailed) .658 
N 80 80 
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Table 5: Proportion of total population Catholic, Church of England, Presbyterian, 
Methodist and Other in ten provincial town electorates 1926-1960 
Town Religious 1926 1936 1945 1951 1956 1961 
Affiliation 
Gisborne % Catholic 14.2% 14.7% 14.1% 13.4% 13.9% 14.0% 
%CofE 44.7% 43.7% 40.0% 41.4% 40.5% 40.1% 
% Presbyterian 22.6% 20.8% 22.5% 22.8% 21.4% 20.1% 
% Methodist 5.7% 4.4% 4.9% 4.8% 4.8'% 4.6% 
% Other 12.9% 16.4% 18.5% 17.6% 19.4% 21.2% 
Hamilton % Catholic 13.3% 13.5% 13.5% 13.8% 14.3% 14.5% 
%CofE 41.3% 39.8% 35.5% 35.5% 34.9% 32.9% 
% Presbyterian 21.0% 22.1% 22.1% 22.4% 21.9% 22.9% 
% Methodist 12.1% 9.7% 10.0% 10.3% 9.1% 9.2% 
% Other 12.4% 14.9% 18.9% 18.0% 19.8% 20.5% 
Hastings % Catholic 14.8% 15.0% 15.2% 14.8% 13.7% 14.2% 
% C ofE 42.7% 41.4% 39.5% 40.0% 39.3% 36.8% 
% Presbyterian 21.7% 21.6% 21.6% 22.3% 23.5% 23.9% 
% Methodist 8.1% 8.6% 6.9% 6.6% 5.3% 5.2% 
% Other 12.7% 13.5% 16.8% 16.3% 18.1% 19.8% 
Invercargill % Catholic 13.1% 13.5% 14.9% 14.9% 15.5% 15.9% 
% C ofE 23.9% 23.6% 20.1% 19.0% 17.5% 16.4% 
% Presbyterian 44.5% 44.3% 42.9% 45.3% 44.7% 44.2% 
% Methodist 8.2% 7.7% 7.2% 6.8% 6.5% 6.7% 
% Other 10.3% 10.9% 15.0% 13.9% 15.8% 16.7% 
Napier % Catholic 14.6% 14.2% 14.5% 14.8% 15.7% 16.3% 
%CofE 48.2% 46.0% 41.6% 42.2% 39.9% 38.4% 
% Presbyterian 19.6% 19.1% 19.5% 19.0% 19.3% 19.0% 
% Methodist 6.1% 6.6% 7.5% 7.3% 7.0% 6.9% 
% Other 11.6% 14.2% 17.0% 16.7% 18.2% 19.4% 
Nelson % Catholic 10.1% 10.0% 10.2% 10.8% 10.8% 11.3% 
%CofE 46.5% 46.4% 42.0% 41.9% 41.5% 41.0% 
% Presbyterian 13.6% 14.5% 14.8% 16.8% 16.3% 15.9% 
% Methodist 10.5% 8.9% 9.3% 9.1% 8.5% 8.0% 
% Other 19.3% 20.2% 23.7% 21.3% 23.0% 23.8% 
New Plymouth % Catholic 10.5% 10.7% 12.5% 12.9% 12.8% 14.2% 
%CofE 49.9% 47.1% 42.1% 41.2% 40.6% 39.5% 
% Presbyterian 14.1% 16.4% 17.8% 18.9% 19.9% 19.6% 
% Methodist 14.9% 12.3% 12.3% 11.6% 10.6% 11.1% 
% Other 10.7% 13.5% 15.3% 15.4% 16.1% 15.6% 
Palmerston % Catholic 12.5% 12.7% 12.6% 12.0% 12.9% 13.5% 
North %CofE 42.5% 42.3% 40.0% 39.6% 38.5% 37.3% 
% Presbyterian 17.7% 17.4% 18.2% 20.1% 19.6% 20.2% 
% Methodist 10.9% 9.2% 8.4% 8.1% 7.6% 6.8% 
% Other 16.5% 18.3% 20.8% 20.1% 21.3% 22.2% 
Timaru % Catholic 14.0% 14.9% 15.4% 15.3% 15.7% 16.8% 
%CofE 35.1% 35.1% 31.8% 31.6% 31.0% 30.0% 
% Presbyterian 31.0% 30.6% 30.3% 30.8% 31.3% 31.7% 
% Methodist 9.9% 9.6% 9.5% 10.5% 8.3% 7.5% 
% Other 10.0% 9.8% 13.0% 11.7% 13.7% 14.1% 
Wanganui % Catholic 13.2% 14.7% 14.7% 15.3% 15.8% 16.7% 
%CofE 44.4% 42.7% 40.0% 39.5% 38.0% 36.1% 
% Presbyterian 21.0% 19.7% 20.2% 20.2% 20.1% 20.7% 
% Methodist 8.8% 8.0% 7.4% 7.4% 6.9% 6.6% 
% Other 12.6% 14.9% 17.7% 17.6% 19.3% 20.0% 
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Table 6: Correlation between proportion of population Catholic and Labour's share of 
major party vote 
% Catholic Labour's share 0 
major party vote 
Spearman's rhe % Catholic Correlation 1.000 .234 
Coet11cien 
Sig. (2-tailed) .117 
N 46 46 
Labour's share 0 Correlation .234 1.000 
major party vote Coefficien 
Sig. (2-tailed) .117 
N 46 46 
Table 7: Correlation between proportion of population Church of England and Labour's 
share of major party vote 
% Church 0 Labour's share 0 
England major party vote 
Spearman's rhe % Church 0 Correlation 1.000 .190 
England Coefficien 
Sig. (2-tailed) .206 
N 46 46 
Labour's share 01 Correlation .190 1.000 
major party vote Coet11cien 
Sig. (2-tailed) .206 
N 46 46 
Table 8: Correlation between proportion of population Presbyterian and Labour's share of 
major party vote 
% Presbyterian Labour's share 0 
major party vote 
Speannan's rho % Presbyterian Correlation 1.000 -.088 
Coefficien 
Sig. (2-tailed .560 
N 46 46 
Labour's share 0 Con'elation -.088 I.ooe 
major party vote Coefficien 
Sig. (2-taiJed) .560 
N 46 46 
Table 9: Correlation between proportion of population Methodist and Labour's share of 
major party vote 
% Methodis Labour's share 0 
major party vote 
Spearman's rhe % Methodis Conelation 1.000 -.297 
Coefficien 
S ig, (2-tailed) .045 
N 46 46 
Labour's share 0 Con'elation -.297 1.000 
major party vote Coefficien 
Sig. (2-tailed) .045 
N 46 46 
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Table 10: Dwelling tenure in ten provincial town electorates 1926-1961 
Electorate Tenure 1926 1936 1945 1951 1956 1961 
Gisborne Renting 43.6% 52.1% 44.1% 33.7% 27.1% 25.8% 
Mortgage 42.4% 33.8% 30.3% 30.6% 36.2% 39.1% 
Freehold 10.6% 10.5% 22.7% 31.8% 33.2% 31.4% 
Other 3.4% 3.6% 2.9% 3.9% 3.5% 3.7% 
Hamilton Renting 41.4% 57.4% 48.9% 39.9% 29.1% 27.5% 
Mortgage 46.8% 29.8% 28.6% 31.3% 40.5% 44.1% 
Freehold 9.5% 9.5% 20.2% 26.0% 27.5% 25.9% 
Other 2.3% 3.4% 2.3% 2.8% 3.0% 2.5% 
Hastings Renting 35.2% 48.5% 43.1% 33.7% 23.2% 22.9% 
Mortgage 43.6% 33.8% 32.8% 35.8% 42.4% 43.7% 
Freehold 17.6% 13.7% 22.0% 28.2% 31.2% 29.9% 
Other 3.6% 4.0% 2.2% 2.4% 3.2% 3.5% 
Invercargill Renting 23.5% 33.0% 22.9% 18.1% 14.8% 16.1% 
Mortgage 50.8% 43.5% 49.2% 48.5% 50.2% 50.4% '. 
Freehold 22.8% 18.9% 25.4% 30.7% 32.4% 30.9% 
Other 2.9% 4.5% 2.5% 2.7% 2.6% 2.6% 
Napier Renting 42.9% 52.6% 47.6% 40.6% 29.5% 26.5% 
Mortgage 37.6% 28.7% 28.1% 30.3% 40.3% 44.0% 
Freehold 15.9% 14.0% 22.2% 26.3% 27.3% 27.2% 
Other 3.6% 4.7% 2.1% 2.8% 3.0% 2.3% 
Nelson Renting 25.9% 33.7% 32.8% 27.5% 21.9% 19.4% 
Mortgage 42.2% 38.1% 34.7% 37.3% 43.6% 45.7% 
Freehold 27.5% 23.6% 29.6% 32.4% 31.9% 32.5% 
Other 4.4% 4.7% 2.9% 2.7% 2.6% 2.5% 
New Plymouth Renting 31.2% 45.3% 39.8% 32.8% 24.9% 23.4% 
Mortgage 42.6% 31.0% 28.0% 29.9% 36.7% 41.0% 
Freehold 23.1% 19.4% 29.5% 34.3% 35.1% 32.8% 
Other 3.1% 4.3% 2.7% 3.1% 3.4% 2.8% 
Palmerston North Renting 36.7% 48.7% 44.6% 39.8% 32.6% 31.5% 
Mortgage 44.1% 33.7% 31.7% 31.2% 38.3% 40.0% 
Freehold 16.1% 13.7% 21.7% 26.3% 26.1% 25.9% 
Other 3.1% 3.9% 2.1% 2.7% 3.0% 2.6% 
Timaru Renting 30.8% 41.3% 34.5% 30.8% 25.0% 22.6% 
Mortgage 41.7% 34.1% 35.2% 34.3% 38.0% 40.3% 
Freehold 24.1% 20.4% 27.4% 31.7% 34.0% 34.0% 
Other 3.5% 4.2% 2.9% 3.2% 3.0% 3.1% 
Wanganui Renting 36.7% 52.5% 42.8% 33.2% 24.7% 23.7% 
Mortgage 44.6% 28.3% 27.7% 30.6% 36.7% 40.2% 
Freehold 15.9% 14.9% 26.9% 33.3% 35.2% 32.9% 
Other 2.8% 4.3% 2.5% 2.8% 3.4% 3.3% 
Table 11: Correlation between proportion of dwellings rented and Labour's share of major 
party vote 
% Household Labour's share 0 
rented major party vot< 
Speannan's rho % Households Correlation 1.000 .325 
rented Coefficien 
Sig. (2-tailed) .027 
N 46 46 
Labour's share 0 Correlation .325 1.000 
maj or party vote Coefficien 
Sig. (2-tailed) .027 
N 46 46 
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Table 12: Correlation between proportion of dwellings mortgaged and Labour's share of 
major party vote 
% Households Labour's share 0 
mortgaged major party vote 
Spearman's rhe % Households Correlation 1.000 -.252 
mortgaged Coefticien 
Sig. (2-tailed) .091 
N 46 46 
Labour's share 0 Correlation -.252 I.ooe 
major party vote Coefticien 
Sig. (2-tailed) .091 
N 46 46 
Table 13: Correlation between proportion of dwellings freehold unencumbered and 
Labour's share of major party vote 
% Households Labour's share 0 
freehold major party vote 
Spearman's rho % Households Correlation I.ooe -.268 
freehold Coefficien 
Sig. (2-tailed) .071 
N 46 46 
Labour's share 0 Correlation -.268 1.000 
major party vote Coefficien 
Sig. (2-tailed) .071 
N 46 46 
Table 14: Correlation between combined proportion of dwellings mortgaged and freehold 
unencumbered and Labour's share of major party vote 
Combined o/c Labour's share 0 
mortgaged anc major party vote 
freehold 
Spealll1an'S rho Combined o/c Correlation 1.000 -.336 
mortgaged and Coefficien 
freehold 
Sig. (2-tailed) .023 
N 46 46 
Labour's share 0 Correlation -.336 1.000 
major party vote Coefficien 
Sig. (2-tailed) .023 
N 46 46 
* 
. . Correlation IS significant at the .05 level (2-talled) . 
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Appendix Four: Support for major parties in Timaru 1922-
1960 
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